Polina Verbytska, Robert Maier (Eds.)

Images of Europe in Transition.
Textbook Representations in Post-Soviet Space
# Contents

Introduction  
(Robert Maier) ................................................................................................................... 4

The role of history in the construction of new identities and the responsibility of historical didactics  
(Polina Verbytska) ........................................................................................................... 13

Europe and the Countries of the Eastern Partnership: Thoughts on the Imaginative Space “Europe”  
(Frank Golczewski) ......................................................................................................... 17

Europe in History Education: Risks and Potentials  
(Bodo von Borries) .......................................................................................................... 28

What Role does Europe Play in Textbook Narratives?  
(Sergii V. Koniukhov) ...................................................................................................... 52

The Image of Europe in Belarusian Textbooks  
(Denis G. Larionov) ......................................................................................................... 68

Images of Europe in Moldavian Textbooks  
(Andrei Antonov) ............................................................................................................. 85

What Images of Europe Arise out of Georgian Textbook Narratives?  
(Nodar Shoshiashvili) ...................................................................................................... 96

The “Europeans of the Orient”: The Relationship between Armenia and Europe in Armenian History and Geography Textbooks  
(Mikayel Zolyan) ........................................................................................................... 104

Self-Orientalisation as a Practice of Europeanisation: Images of Europe in Azerbaijani History Textbooks  
(Sergei Rumyantsev) ..................................................................................................... 113

The Image of Europe in Russian Textbooks  
(Alexander Shevyrev) .................................................................................................... 123

Images of Europe in History Textbooks and their Correlation with Public Policy in the Baltic States and Countries of the Eastern Partnership  
(George Zakharov) ........................................................................................................ 132

The Nation and Europe: Semantics and Subject Models  
(Magdalena Telus) ......................................................................................................... 140

Images of Europe in Transition: In Search of a Common Denominator  
(Agnieszka Pawłowska) ................................................................................................. 158

Contributors ................................................................................................................... 171
**Introduction**

(Robert Maier)

The contributions collected in this volume sprung from the conference “Images of Europe in Transition”, which took place in Kiev from 25 to 26 November 2016. The conference was organised by the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research and the Ukrainian Association of Teachers of History, Civic Education and Social Studies, Nova Doba. It addressed images of Europe with geographical focus, concentrating on Eastern Europe: specifically Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also Russia. In addition, temporal parameters were specified: the investigations were to treat transformations in the period since 1991, when a number of these states first gained sovereignty. The sources employed for these empirical enquiries were school textbooks.

In the past quarter century Europe has been the object of exceptionally heated societal debate. In the 1990s it was the notion of the ‘European house’, arising initially in Eastern Europe but soon spreading to Western Europe, that guided considerations and provided the possibility of orientation around a common image. The metaphor of the ‘common European house’ has since then all but disappeared from the discussion. Yet Europe appears in our headlines more than ever, presented of course in a different light depending on location. In Western Europe there is much disillusionment with, and movements to withdraw from, the European project. Even the detached and measured positive stance towards Europe, termed “permissive consensus”¹, has been punctured by Brexit, despite Theresa May professing the following in her statement on leaving the EU: “We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe”². At times, such as in connection with German reunification, as well as very recently, fears of a Europe dominated by Germany are aired.³ In East-Central Europe the euphoria that accompanied accession into Europe in the 1990s has been usurped by a certain disenchantment paired with increasingly routine participation in EU executive management. In the countries of the Eastern Partnership, the idea of Europe is to some extent still associated with a spirit of optimism, and with hopes for a means of escape

---

from messy geopolitical constellations, unfavourable economic-political conditions and burdensome historical experience. The events of Euromaidan in the years 2013 and 2014, triggered by the refusal of the Ukrainian government under Viktor Yanukovych to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, demonstrated the mobilizing power of pro-European visions. In Russia, Putin’s government is succumbing to old anti-Western antagonisms and propagates differentiation from Europe under an ideology of Eurasianism. In recent times Turkey, long an aspiring candidate for EU-entry, has turned openly and aggressively against Europe, due not least to developments in domestic politics.

In light of its great societal relevance it is unsurprising that Europe also represents a highly topical field of research. Europe was long understood as a normative and essentialist concept. Generations of scholars attempted to determine what the essence, the core, of Europe consisted in, where its borders were to be defined and who might or might not be said to belong to it. For a long time the triad of Greek thought, Roman law and Christian faith was regarded as this constitutive core. Building on this Greco-Roman heritage, which manifested itself in art and literature, philosophical doctrines, rational sciences and systems of government, the Europe of the Middle Ages was united through Christianity in the corresponding narrative. With Charlemagne, styled as ‘Pater Europae’, this construction underwent a kind of personalisation, and was endowed a certain identity. The age of discovery, humanism, renaissance, reformation and enlightenment was regarded as providing further connecting elements. In the nineteenth century, industrialisation extended the European shared ground and economically secured the continent’s position as the dominant global power factor. Finally the introduction of checks and balances for those in power and the ideals of sovereignty of the people and human and citizens’ rights were represented as achievements of European history, and upheld as a norm which today acts as a standard for membership. This master narrative masked profound divergences and disintegrative developments. The world wars of the twentieth century in particular prove unwieldy in a story of Europe’s continuous development into a civilizational unity, which finds its logical con-

---

clusion in a flourishing European Union that unites the continent. European ‘catastrophes’ are inserted into the narrative through the ascription of an accelerating and catalytic function in the process of unification.

Academic scholarship has warned against such teleological constructions since early on, recommending instead that European diversity and brokenness be taken as the point of departure of considerations of European history. 5 Today researchers are in broad agreement that Europe should be understood as a variable, historically mutable set of ascriptions. Europe is not static; rather it is constructed and constituted in social interactions and perceptions. Europe is the product of discourse, and this product must be regarded as a fleeting snapshot. It is fundamentally open, and can be internally inconsistent. Wolfgang Schmale puts it as follows: “Europe exists where people speak and write of Europe […] where people imagine and visualise Europe, where people construct meaning and significance in connection with the name and concept of Europe”. 6 Cultural research has additionally established that self-images, including the images Europeans have of themselves as Europeans, are shaped through engagement and exchange with the culturally other: that that which is one’s own for the most part also represents a product of this engagement.

Images of Europe can be shaped by historically traded normative conceptions of a European family of peoples, a community of values or fates or a cultural sphere distinct from other spaces. They can reflect present political circumstances or be tied to institutions. They can be restricted to the European Union, or span a seemingly objective geographical expanse. Equally however they can act as model or ideal, in the form of design or political concepts. Approaches to Europe are prefigured by the collective memory of national and social communities. Often they are grounded in national historical traumas and are shot through with emotion. In the countries of Eastern and East-Central Europe, collective memories are not seldom associated with the feeling of having been betrayed, forgotten or excluded by Europe. This is accompanied by an image of Europe that is shaped by suspicion, and that charges the EU or the leading countries in it with pursuing egotistical internal politics. As is shown by recent developments in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, certain images of Europe in Eastern Europe

can lead these populations to see themselves as ‘better Europeans’”, in that they, as opposed to the elites in the west of the continent, have remained true to the ‘original values of the West’. It is suspected that these values are in decline in Western Europe, that the populations there are losing their relation to Christianity and succumbing increasingly to non-European influences in their ethnic composition due to migration. There are audible calls from Poland from those who wish to lead Europe back to the ‘right path’, or even to ‘rescue’ it. Orthodox European thinkers point to the great contribution that the East could bring to Europe. Europe, they say, could gain a new dimension of spirituality through such orthodoxy. According to their findings, Byzantium is regrettably no longer present in the collective memory of Latin Europe.

Are such notions constructive or to they represent a relapse into patterns of thinking that had long been overcome in Western Europe? The British historian and textbook author E. H. Dance, participant in a conference held by the Council of Europe in the 1950s on the topic ‘The European Idea in history teaching’, felt secure in the following assumption:

“During the last few centuries every generation of European school children has realised its European heritage automatically, because the influences of its environment were almost wholly of European origin. During the present century the case has altered. European culture is becoming saturated with influences from other continents, and there is an obvious danger of being swamped by the flood of external forces.”

Such a perspective would today be vehemently rejected by the academic community. Its intimate relation to colonial and imperial thinking is evident and the total failure to recognise the potential of intercultural encounter as a resource for development appears anachronistic. We are thought to have overcome its underlying conception of European homogeneity, and the choice of words and imagery would be derided as fearful provincialism. However a great deal of evidence suggests that in the feelings of many Europeans, the conception formulated by Dance lives on, particularly the fears of potential threat from outside, as reflected in the election results of parties who play upon such fears. This is true not least of the east of the continent, which is striking insofar as Eastern Europe does not boast the colonial-imperial past from which Dance’s thinking stems.

A study of Poland attests very convincingly to the notion that it is concepts of national identity which to a large degree determine images of Europe, and thus shape the

discourse around Europe. These concepts are rooted in old republican traditions, in nineteenth century Romantic concepts of the nation, as well as in pragmatic modernisation strategies. The author of the study, Irene Hahn, established that diverse and ambivalent images of Europe arose out of these traditions. The images are correlated differently, and the tradition in question by no means pre-determines whether one will be unambiguously ‘for’ or ‘against’ European integration. Thus the Romantic direction exhibits anti-European dogma on the one hand, yet prides itself, as early as in the Polish uprisings of 1831 and 1848, on having represented the struggle for its own national freedom as one for the liberation of all European peoples. On the pragmatic side, a passionate plea for Polish entry into the EU was possible without relinquishing the exclusionary dichotomy of ‘we Poles’ and ‘the others’ (the EU). A further result of the study was the recognition that attitudes towards Russia and feelings of allegiance to Europe do not necessarily predetermine preferences in relation to European integration. In the right-wing anti-Communist or anti-Moscow political spectrum one runs into massive scepticism regarding the European Union, while post-Communists, despite their nostalgic alignment with Russia, can prove to be EU-enthusiasts.

The Polish discourse mentioned here centres on the country’s entry into the EU, showing how the ‘European debate’ is often shorthand for the ‘EU debate’. This is the case in all countries with historical roots in the West, and which remained under Russian control in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Naturally there were also voices in Eastern Europe who rejected the proclaimed ‘return to Europe’ as a false principle. This slogan was countered with the assertion that they had always been in Europe, and understood themselves to be carriers of European culture. In this regard Caucasian peoples such as Georgians and Armenians have more of a struggle, although they too seek to establish their allegiance to Europe in insisting on their spiritual-religious connection with European culture. The European debate in Eastern European countries was and is strongly shaped by economic arguments. The Eastern countries hope for EU direct investment, dynamic trade relations and the provision of modern technologies. Insofar as the EU is associated with stability, productivity, effective economic activity, civilizational progress, modernity, prosperity and power, it is granted a certain attractiveness, which finds linguistic expression in the use of ‘Europe’ as its syno-

---

9 Ibid., 60.
nym. Of interest in this volume are general conceptions of Europe and not only specific images relating to the European Union. The central questions are around how a country can be said to be located in Europe; how it links its national identity with conceptions of Europe; which experiences of Europe are reflected in such conceptions; what it demands of Europe at present; and what visions of the future are connected with Europe.

Much was set in motion by the revolutionary events of the years 1989 to 1991. The political map was altered colossally. Russia was brought more in line with Western standards of democracy in the 1990s, and under Putin has distanced itself from them again. The eastward expansion of the EU has sparked discussion of Europe’s geographical dimensions anew. Divergence between Western Europe and the newly acceded countries arose for the first time in 2003 in connection with the Iraq War, designated somewhat provocatively in the US as an opposition between ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe’. In Eastern European countries, the EU sometimes competes with the US for the position of benchmark; the latter’s mythology of freedom and military power appears particularly attractive to countries perceiving existential threat. The shockwaves of the Russian aggression first towards Georgia and in 2014 towards Ukraine are felt far more intensely in Eastern Europe than in the west of the continent. Ideological myths of ‘Slavic brotherhood’ have either disappeared or been replaced by more pragmatic deliberation. Their presence is best demonstrated by Belarusian President Lukashenko’s dream of a ‘common house of brother nations’. With regard to the question aired within the EU of how far European solidarity should go in the case of a Greece struck by debt crisis, the firm preference of Eastern member states was for a restrictive stance. In the refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016, a gulf between East-Central European conceptions and those of Brussels came to light once again, although the hard-line isolationism of countries like Hungary and Poland by all means found approval and proponents in Western European countries. Across Eastern Europe these developments are as carefully observed as the EU’s worsening relations with Turkey. All such events find expression in images of Europe.

School textbooks are an ideal source for the identification of such changes. The contents of textbooks are relatively resilient. Textbooks filter out the pendular move-

---

10 Similarly the term ‘America’ has come to act as a synonym for the USA. This parallel does not extend to the usage of the term within the American continent; not all inhabitants of the continent ‘America’ reserve the term’s use for the USA.
ments and overreactions that often govern the press or politics of the day, in favour of including lasting determining events. At the same time they are a mirror of societal transformation; they transmit the knowledge considered by the state to be relevant, and represent the ideas and values discussed in society. In this way textbooks also hold visions of the future. Participants in the conference ‘Images of Europe in Transition’ were asked to consider changes in narratives around Europe, as well as the contextualisation of Europe, in their textbook analysis. Is Europe a normative benchmark? How is it framed? How does it relate to national self-image? What imaginations and spatial conceptions are conveyed with it? What mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion are set in motion through the use of Europe? How strong is people’s self-awareness as Europeans? What differentiation is made between Europe and the EU? Is the EU itself perceived as an autonomous deciding agent, or are the hegemonic countries within it chiefly considered the agents?

It was quite clear to the organisers of the conference, and even more so to the editors of this volume, that these questions may only be partially touched on or answered in the analyses presented here. For one, a comprehensive discussion of these matters would call for the inclusion of a wider range of sources than simply textbooks. In the case of East-Central Europe, important existing studies may be drawn on. Irene Hahn’s analysis, which has already been mentioned, is primarily one of debates on Europe in the Polish Sejm. Eugen Kotte’s comparative monograph deals with “dominating national conceptions of Europe in Central European countries” 11, on the level of the foundations of historiographical research and of statements by politicians. Studies of images of Europe in Western European countries are various and have long been produced. One recent study concentrates on Germany and France, tracing historical images of Europe found in textbooks there over the period from 1900 to the present day. 12 Using the transnational approach of histoire croisée, the authors demonstrate that nationally framed conceptions of Europe, along with self-conceptions of nations as European, are never self-generating, but rather are always established between the poles of competition and convergence with comparable processes in other nations. Another new publication adopts an unusual approach to images of Europe: namely fo-

11 Eugen Kotte, “In Räume geschriebene Zeiten”. Nationale Europabilder im Geschichtsunterricht der Sekundarstufe II, Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner Verlag, 2007. He examines Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
cusing on their evolution at the European periphery. Even it does not cover the countries of the Eastern Partnership and Russia, however. In this sense this volume answers an urgent need for research.

In the past textbooks were routinely harshly criticised for being allegedly unable to successfully convey the European idea in history education. Attempts at creating a common European textbook have effectively failed. Not an insignificant number of history education experts believe this to be for the best. Eugen Kotte offers the following justification for this position:

“European consciousness can hardly be sensibly promoted by means of a prescriptive curriculum, through the specification of a European identity or through myths of European unity constructed in historical propaganda. However it can grow, if the possibilities for participation of the people in Europe increase, and if the information deficit of the younger generation is overcome, including, in particular, through school instruction.”

The transmission of a European consciousness is thus not easy, but nor is it impossible.

Bibliography

---


The role of history in the construction of new identities and the responsibility of historical didactics
(Polina Verbytska)

There will always take place a search for solutions to problems thrown up by new social realities. These new realities include globalisation, the intensification and increasing interdependence of various components and processes of social development, and the dynamic development of information, media and cultural technologies. Such developments contribute to the creation of new perceptions of socio-cultural values and meanings. In this context history education gains a special significance, aimed as it is at creating favourable conditions for the personal development of an individual, as they develop an active civic position and a sense of responsibility in social life.

An increase in academic interest in the potential of historical didactics has resulted from modern socio-political transformations in post-Soviet countries. Problems of civic responsibility and cultural identity arise especially acutely in countries which remain in a space characterised by contradictory social and socio-cultural tendencies and challenges. The internal national dialogue is complicated considerably by the existence of communities and subcultures which are led in different directions by the instructions available to them, and there arises a problem around conscious choice. Responses to these challenges can be found in the modern methodological approaches of European historical didactics, as well as in the conceptual provisions formulated by scholars and educators in the social and academic discourse of post-Soviet countries in the recent years.

The materials presented in this publication were produced by participants in the international conference “Images of Europe in Transition”, which took place in Kiev, Ukraine, on 25 and 26 November 2016. The conference aimed to determine of the role of the history textbook in the formation of historical awareness, to analyse history textbooks in the light of images of Europe, as well to suggest through historical didactics an optimal model for history education which takes into account the national, European and global dimensions of history.

Following the achievement of independence by former Soviet countries in Eastern Europe, problems arose around the role of history and historical didactics in the creation of the nation. The inculcation of historical awareness in the youth was considered in the context of wider political and national dimensions of historical interpretation, and of historical policy, in the post-Soviet space. Citizens’ historical awareness is
formed in part by history textbooks; thus their analysis in the light of images of Europe offers the possibility for a reinterpretation of the legacy of national post-Soviet historiographies and wider memory policy. History textbooks are not the only sources of use here, but their role in the post-Soviet space is important. Different generations of textbooks which appeared since the independence of post-Soviet countries reflect the transformation of national historiographies and memory policy.

The relation of school education to academic historiography is reflected in the interdependence of methodologies and contents of educational materials in both spheres. Scholars in post-Soviet countries have actively joined in a reconsideration of history in the context of their countries’ search for a European identity. They aimed at incorporating into national histories European and world perspectives, and at overcoming the stereotypes of imperial and national narratives. This is part of the necessary search for adequate tools for presenting national history as a constituent part of world history. The role of the country as an intermediary between civilizations is topical in such national historiographies.

A reinterpretation of national historiographies in the years since independence is now taking place in discussions in historiography and didactics. The key problem of school history teaching is the division of material into national and world history which has been preserved since Soviet times in the majority of post-Soviet countries. One positive as compared to Soviet textbooks is that modern textbooks cover the history of neighbouring countries under the heading of world history. But the concepts which acted as foundation for teaching world history at the beginning of independence have not changed since then. The image of Europe in world history textbooks is associated with the countries of Western Europe, and the presentation of other cultures is insufficient. Europe is an example and model; world history textbooks unanimously acknowledge the constructive influence of European events on national history.

Historians from various European countries have pointed out that the construction that is Europe does not have precise limits, and that there are both positive and negative aspects to it. Absolutism regarding the nation and nation-state, and notions of societal homogeneity, limit the view from different perspectives on a historical process that includes diverse subcultures and identities. The division of society along the lines of “us” and “them” in a textbook leads to the canonisation, stereotyping and mythologisation of school history, and renders the contents of a textbook static. In such a text-
book little attention is lent to everyday history and issues of culture. The development of a new model for educational material requires a reconsideration of the nationally focused scheme of history and its limitations regarding the political experience of Western European countries; the deconstruction of established notions such as Eurocentrism, ethnocentrism, the state and development; along with a synchronization of world and national history.

Historical awareness should be developed not only through examples of historical political events, wars and matters on a national scale, but also by means of examples from everyday cultural, and multicultural, history. They should appear in the framework of a dynamic, diverse narrative, not a static one. Multiculturalism, with a focus on cross-cultural relations and interactions, regional history and the development of history in the light of everyday practices of individual experience should be represented in history textbooks. The inclusion of such aspects will help young learners overcome conflicts in their everyday lives. In this way it is important not to overlook contradictory and sensitive pages of history, but rather to consider the past from a multi-perspectival and multi-dimensional point of view.

Social and educational needs stimulate new approaches to the teaching of history and other social disciplines. History teaching aims at the development of a critical attitude on the basis of work with various historical sources, each containing diverse interpretations of the past. Accordingly, the elimination of overlap in the contents of national and world history curricula will allow for an unloading of the curriculum and leave more time for the development of historical competence and critical thinking among students. In connection with this there arises a need for optimized forms and methods in history lessons. The problems of the coordination of terminology in textbooks, as well as those of an integrated history course, remain topical in the historical didactics of post-Soviet countries.

History education can provide the youth with opportunities to research the ways in which the past contributes to the formation of various identities, common cultures and values, and assist in shaping tolerant attitudes towards diversity. As such young people should not only be provided with knowledge about historic events, but also be ready for a constructive dialogue with representatives of various cultures and bearers of different historical memory, in order that they might develop a respect for their views and preferences. The development of tolerance and constructive dialogue skills should be
the object of history education in a modern diverse society. At the same time, the detailed research of historical events, allowing for the discovery of positive interactions between cultures, along with critical analysis and open discussion of sensitive and controversial issues, contribute to the overcoming of social prejudices and stereotypes.

By promoting research on various perspectives, the interactive learning of history can aid the emotional development of learners, as well as their understanding of cultural particularities and their sense of belonging to a community. The abilities and skills gained in working through sensitive historical issues are the same ones which make possible a young person’s successful engagement in contemporary society. Thus modern history education strives to formulate responses to social challenges: suggesting means for understanding the complex interrelations of the historical past, visions of the future, and the learner’s own role in social progress. We consider the socio-cultural assets of historical didactics to be among the available efficient tools for preventing conflict and securing peace, reconciliation and understanding in society. Most important is an understanding of the values common to all humankind, the defence of human rights and the promotion of respect for cultural diversity.
Europe and the Countries of the Eastern Partnership: Thoughts on the Imaginative Space “Europe”

(Frank Golczewski)

Some 20 years ago, in the mid-1990s, a summer school was held at a beautiful location near Warsaw. The participants were students of different subjects from a number of European countries, from Finland and Russia to Portugal. It was still the time of a certain euphoria in Western Europe and in Germany in particular, stemming from the fall of the Berlin Wall, the signing of new European treaties, and the beginning of a seemingly everlasting peace, akin to Fukuyama’s “End of History”. Those who believed in this could have been considered naïve even without the benefit of hindsight; the wars in Chechnya, Pridnestrovie, Armenia and Azerbaijan and in the now independent republics of former Yugoslavia should have given the impression that the future was not as bright as some theoreticians hoped.

My point is a different one, however. The summer school had as its topic ‘the future of Europe’. One of the tasks assigned consisted in the students writing short statements on how ‘Europe’ was understood from the perspective of their home countries, and what their hopes were for a united Europe. There was one consistent result: except for the Finns, the Estonians and the Portuguese nearly all statements began with ‘my country lies in the centre/heart of Europe’. However there was a clearly distinguishable difference between the statements of those who came from countries west and those east of the former Iron Curtain. Those from the West associated Europe with the spread of democracy, student exchanges, free travel and a rise in ecological-mindedness. Those from the East wrote about career opportunities, Western investment and a rise in salaries. While nobody was against Europe, there was a clear difference between what we might call ‘idealistic’ and ‘self-interested’ expectations.

This is just a snapshot, and perhaps a distorted one, but I have been made to think of it more and more in recent years, as it is now virtually impossible to disagree with the diagnosis that the European Union or, in short, Europe is in crisis. Many issues could be brought up in this context, including a variety of economic problems, culminating in the Greek crisis, among others. One might discuss accusations, some unfounded, some not, that the EU is dominated by particular countries, notably France and Germany. The issue of political asylum and the extreme pressure put on border countries by the Dublin regulation might arise. So too might the chaotic reaction to the refugee and migrant crises, whereby some countries closed their borders, others de-
clared themselves closed to specific religious denominations, and some moved from one extreme to the other in a game of musical chairs (called ‘Reise nach Jerusalem’ in German and “muzykal’nye stul’ja” or “gorjačye stul’ja” in Russian).

This crisis has resulted in growing discontent with the European Union, most drastically shown in Brexit and the rise of anti-European nationalist parties both in the EU’s founding countries and in newer member states. Additionally it has led to discussions in Ukraine and other countries (such as Turkey or Georgia) about whether they belong to ‘Europe’, or to ‘Eurasia’. To decide on this matter we might first seek to define ‘Europe’. In fact, this is impossible. There is no agreed-upon definition for Europe if we do not have in mind the daughter of the Phoenician king Agenor, abducted by Zeus according to Greek mythology. In order to answer the question of Europe’s meaning we must add a ‘to whom’: what does Europe mean to whom? The answers will be as diverse as those of the summer school students mentioned above.

We might begin with a statement that is unpopular in parts of present-day Ukraine: Russia is in Europe too. A common slogan of the 1990s was the so-called ‘return to Europe’ of countries that were formerly directly or more indirectly subordinated to the Russian-dominated Soviet Union. The implication was that these countries had at a certain point ‘left’ Europe, which in turn implies that the Communist state was un-European. In the following years the meaning of this slogan changed again: the divide between Europe and the Soviet Union was re-interpreted as a divide between Europe and Russia. The ‘Europe’, ‘Russia’ and ‘Soviet Union’ we encounter in such divisions do not refer to real spaces, but are constructs created in a discourse that is gladly employed by politicians and certain intellectuals in service of specific aims. It is not a new discourse. It was first developed in the First World War, and can be adapted for political expediency, very similarly to the anti-Semitic discourse also moulded to different political purposes throughout the twentieth century.

In this discourse Europe refers to some sort of ‘progressivity’, or to a ‘civilizing’ mission. Both conservative and National Socialist Germans interpreted Europe as a bulwark against Slavs and other supposedly less developed peoples. Poles understood it in religious terms, seeing themselves as an ‘Antemurale Christianitatis’. We find similar statements by Ukrainian nationalists directed against the Steppe peoples, the
Europe and the Countries of the Eastern Partnership: Thoughts on the Imaginative Space “Europe”

Tatars and subsequently modern Russians. Europe was considered the primary moderniser until the nineteenth century, but this image waned as cultural, technical and political ‘progress’ (whatever that may mean) shifted away from Europe.

The compatibility of ‘Europe’ and ‘Russia’ and thus also Ukraine has long been a subject of discussion among historians and politicians. Popular theories on the difference between Rome and Byzantium, figuring prominently in the theories of Samuel Huntington and some Russian dignitaries as opposed to those from the Greek Orthodox church, omit that Byzantium and Greece were and are no less European than the Latin culture that borrowed heavily from the Greek one, the latter of which was for a long time considered to be superior to that of the Roman newcomers. Except for a few centuries in the Middle Ages, the divide between Russian and European history is a myth. Long before Peter, Ivan III competed with Habsburg over the use of the double-headed eagle. Peter’s opening of the ‘window to Europe’ and Russia’s role in the Holy Alliance of 1815 demonstrated that Russia officially considered itself a part of Europe and its political machinations. Ukraine became a territory of the crown of Poland in 1569, and it was by way of Kiev and the Mohyla Academy that Peter’s Russia imported its ecclesiastical and more secular reforms. These reforms were no “Europeanisation”, however; they were “Westernising” activities (where the “West” referred to is Western Europe), as all the parties in question were European.

Even the Slavophiles of the nineteenth century, strong opponents of Peter’s Westernising activities, along with the so-called Eurasians of the twentieth century, are dependent on Europe for their identity. The Slavophiles are one instance of Romantic European intellectuals all over the continent attempting to find their respective ideological roots in pre-modern peasant societies, idealising constructed or imagined perfect societies as much as the Slavophiles did with their image of the “pure” Russian peasant. Ironically, in insisting on their uniqueness they demonstrate the commonalities of European cultures. The Eurasians, among them linguist Nikolaj Trubeckoj (1890–1938) and geographer Petr Savickij (1895–1968) from Černihiv, sought after the First World War a spiritual (and political) restoration in the combination of Eastern European and Asian influences, strongly criticising (Western) European decadence.

This occurred at the time when Hermann Hesse wrote *Siddartha*, and Rabindranath Thakur received his Nobel Prize (1913), being greatly admired in Britain and Germany. Again, in seeking a solution, an iskhod, in the East, these thinkers demonstrated the common background of Western and Eastern European schools of thought.

Their cultural criticism, their aversion towards European and American urban decadence was evidence of their belonging to exactly the same culture. This is a culture marked with growing radical nationalism, in which perceptions of one’s own complete cultural uniqueness and superiority over one’s neighbour perverted the perception of cultural difference, which in the beginning was imagined as neutral. In Russia it was Nikolaj Danilevskij, in Ukraine Mykola Hruševškyj, who transformed perceptions of cultural difference (which exist even between Cologne and Düsseldorf) into a political agenda. Danilevskij’s book *Rossija i Evropa*, predicting an Armageddon-like battle between the old Romano-Germanic Europe and the young Russia in which Russia triumphs, became a bestseller. This occurred among efforts to define the Russian Empire more or less as a nation-state, as it fought against competing national concepts which in turn endangered the shape of its territory. At the same time other empires (such as the German one) similarly attempted to adapt to the modern standard of the nation; Russia did not differ at all from the European model. Hruševškyj represented a competing concept of the nation, reworking a unified Russian history into two different narratives and claiming national autonomy or sovereignty for the new “unusual” (*ne-obyčna*) one, even becoming president for a day of his own constructed nation.

As the twentieth century went on, two ideologies became strong competitors for the minds of people. Left-wing and right-wing radicalism arose out of the same school of thought and are in fact very similar in structure, being profoundly anti-liberal. Both exhibited a modern form of opposition to individualism, replacing it with collectivism. Both opposed the basic teachings of Christianity that order the faithful to love their enemies, even if they cannot hope to gain from this. And both aspire to organise not only the country in which they originate, but virtually the entire world. Both ideologies were European ones, and represented more of the socio-political structures of Western Europe than those in the East. Both claimed to follow secularised ‘scientific’ rules, and both spread into Eastern Europe, where conditions differed from West Europe.
It was in Central Europe that radical nationalist undemocratic regimes won the most support among their populations. They operated in the name of a radical etatism in fascist Italy and in the name of a biological ‘race science’ in Nazi Germany. During the inter-war period, undemocratic authoritarian regimes of one kind or another came to power in most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This history must be borne in mind as we witness today how countries like Latvia proclaim their direct descent from pre-war states, voicing no objections to the Ulmanis regime. Poland wishes to return to clerical one-party-authoritarianism, and Ukraine allows terrorist organisations like the UVO and the OUN to be honoured under the law: ‘Про правовий статус та вшанування пам’яті борців за незалежність України у XX столітті’; the ‘decline of honour’ is ‘against the law’ (protypravnym).

There is now a similar law in place in Russia, and preparations are being made in Poland for a law that penalises not untrue statements, but simply those which “harm the image of Poland”.

Стаття 6. Відповідальність за порушення законодавства про статус борців за незалежність України у ХХ столітті
1. Громадяни України, іноземці, а також особи без громадянства, які публічно виявляють зневажливе ставлення до осіб, зазначених у статті 1 цього Закону, перешкоджають реалізації прав борців за незалежність України у ХХ столітті, несуть відповідальність відповідно до законодавства.
2. Публічне заперечення факту правомірності боротьби за незалежність України у ХХ столітті визнається наругою над пам’ятю борців за незалежність України у ХХ столітті, приниженням гідності Українського народу і є протиправним.

http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/314-19

Metody dyplomatyczne, które miały przeciwdziałać falszowaniu naszej historii oraz służyć ochronie dobrego imienia Polski i Polaków okazały się nieskuteczne. Nadal pojawiają się wypowiedzi, zwłaszcza w zagranicznych środkach masowego przekazu, sugerujące udział Polski i Polaków w zbrodniach II wojny światowej. Dlatego minister sprawiedliwości przygotował nowelizację ustawy o IPN, odpowiadającą na oczekiwania wielu obywateli, którzy domagają się skutecznej i szybkiej reakcji na
pomawianie Polski o organizację obozów koncentracyjnych i współudział w Holocauście.

Nowe regulacje penaltują znieważające sformułowania, szkodzące wizerunkowi Polski, czyli pozwalają na pociągnięcie autorów takich wypowiedzi do odpowiedzialności karnej.


To return to communism and integral nationalism, commonly combined with racism: suffice it to state that its founders Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels came from Western Germany (Trier and Barmen, now part of Wuppertal). Communism is unthinkable without German Idealism; it is a ‘European’ product brought to Russia by Westerners. The Bolsheviks were clearly Europeans. Meanwhile the Nazis, crudely perverting Darwinism, proclaimed a “New European Order” with “Aryan” Germany at the top, while those in lower positions subject to deportation or murder. Such a “new order in Europe” (novýj lad v Jevropi) was included in article three of the Bandera-Stečko OUN proclamation of a “Ukrainian state” in Lviv on 30 June 1941. These two “European” transplants are the basis of what Timothy Snyder has called the “Bloodlands”. He is one of many scholars in recent decades who look at violence as an anthropological constant. He does not, however, look beyond geographical definitions to explain why this area became a battlefield. It was for him simply a question of time: But “Bloodlands” existed in previous centuries in other parts of the world, including Central Europe until the world wars, or the Mediterranean and Middle East in antiquity.

In the light of these considerations, what can we say about the meaning of ‘Europe’? We might wonder if ‘Europe’ should be preserved, or if we should instead search for a different term or unifying concept, if one is needed at all. I do not see a concept of Europe that is based on common ‘values’, as is often proclaimed by politicians. The following example, if one reads it charitably, demonstrates a changing interpretation of ‘European unity’; otherwise it can be seen as a case of historical amnesia.

When Charlemagne set out on his Christianising mission against the Saxons in the late eighth century, those who did not accept the new faith (and his rule) were killed in what was called a ‘sword mission’ (Schwertmission), culminating in the so-called Verden Massacre in 782.

I will not discuss the authenticity of this particular disputed Saxon killing (that resisters were regularly executed is not disputed at all). However I would be grateful for an explanation of the difference between the ‘Schwertmission’ and the activities of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ we all abhor. This might appear a kind of historical blasphemy. However I simply wish to point out the fact that the crueler aspects of Charlemagne’s reign are all but forgotten: in France Charlemagne is honoured for having founded schools, while in Germany the unification of Europe is his main legacy. This can be seen in the International Charlemagne Prize at Aachen. “The International Charlemagne Prize of Aachen is the oldest and best-known prize awarded for work done in the service of European unification”: this is the text on its official website. The violent subtext is virtually unknown by or unimportant to any person connected with the prize, including last year’s laureate Martin Schulz, or this year’s Pope Francis.

The ongoing process of EU extension began in the 1990s and continued in 2004. In the following years three categories were established. There were countries included in EU, countries who were offered participation in the EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’, and there was Russia. It might seem that Russia had the lowest standing on this list, but that was not the case. The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Russia, implemented since December 1997, provided a political, economic and cultural framework for relations between Russia and the EU. It was primarily concerned with pro-

---

moting trade, investment and harmonious economic relations. In the Putin era Russia aspired to be an ‘equal partner’ of the EU (as opposed to the ‘junior partnership’ that Russian politicians see in the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership program, since 2008 a specifically Eastern dimension within the Neighbourhood Policy). This is no Russian peculiarity; Western states like Britain or France, not to mention Germany, have continued difficulties with smaller ones that want to be treated on the same level, but are considered to be less important in their eyes. Once again: this is Europe.

Smaller countries too felt uneasy in the union; Poland’s PiS party objected strongly to their country’s standing and desired more influence. The continuing quarrels between Hungary and Brussels are a related topic. The Ukrainian question can be seen in this context: was the EU Association Treaty a logical and a wise step? Looking at the present problems with the TTIP Agreement between the EU and the US, we might come to the conclusion that not all integrative achievements are really for the best. The parties to the Association Agreement were committed to cooperation and convergence on economic policy, legislation and regulation across a broad range of areas, including equal rights for workers, steps towards visa-free movement of people, the exchange of information and staff in the field of justice, the modernisation of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and access to the European Investment Bank. But in article ten, the Agreement commits both parties to promote a gradual implementation of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and European Defence Agency policies. It was perfectly clear that this entailed an expansion of NATO, which continues to this day with Montenegro as the last candidate.

Those who warned against this were not heard, although both Mr Barroso and Mr Putin saw a conflict with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Community. They gave the Ukrainian leadership a choice: a catch-22 which was bound to alienate one side or the other side. This explains in part Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement and the subsequent events of Euromaidan. Russia took this opportunity to annex Crimea and set in motion the Donbass conflict. This conflict is ongoing, but otherwise bears all characteristics of the dormant conflicts Russia is eager to preserve in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia has returned to a nineteenth century policy, a European policy.
The difficulties of Euromaidan were founded on a choice between Russia or Eurasia and Europe. The crux of the issue was that these two possibilities were seen as contradictions. They were unnecessarily presented as opposing political power collectives, as different ideological entities, when this is not what they were. A country can of course belong to several different economic communities if the agreements are adjusted accordingly. However the players in this case had other priorities. Mr Kaczyński came to the Euromaidan to support Ukraine’s orientation towards ‘Europe’: he who had long fought against Poland’s joining the EU on the EU’s terms. His overwhelming concern was with promoting an anti-Russian policy.

Under the “European” banner, political groups which were clearly democratic united with authoritarian ones like ‘Svoboda’, in the tradition of the OUN or the ‘Prawyj Sektor’. This was possible, of course, because both were ‘European’. The French Revolution, Italian Fascism, German National Socialism and Communism were or are European. When Boris Johnson, in an interview with the Telegraph, compared the EU to Napoleon and Hitler in that they shared the aim of unifying Europe under one authority, he was not completely off the mark.18

‘Europe’ is a multifaceted cliché. In the Euromaidan, it did not maintain its central position for long. These events in 2013 were triggered by a dispute on the relationship between Ukraine and ‘Europe’. The slogan ‘For a European Ukraine’ (Za jevrepejs’ku Ukrainu) on the central bandstand on the Maidan was, however, soon plastered over with icons, images of Taras Shevchenko and Vyšyvanky (embroidered cloths). What then was meant by a ‘European Ukraine’? Was it simply meant as an anti-Russian slogan? Did it refer to a state of mind or to institutions; was it rhetoric, or did it possess a deeper meaning? In the Euromaidan the demand for ‘a European Ukraine’ was soon eclipsed by equally important demands for an end to corruption and kleptocracy, and for the demission of the president and his terrible government. The use of national iconography was regressive, speaking to a desire to return to a seemingly reliable earlier stage.

This anti-European regression is European too. With the various European crises anti-European sentiment is growing all over, becoming a European characteristic as

much as criticism of European spiritual life had been in the first decades of the twentieth century. In Ukraine there is growing disillusionment, very similar to that after the Orange Revolution, when hope soon gave way to lethargy. In the Second World War, Russian regression took the form of a turn to the church, Tsarist generals and Slavic unity; now Russians turn to Soviet Union ideals and some Ukrainians to nationalism.

There are very good examples of a better ideal of “European-ness”. In the Transparency International Corruption Index for 2015, Denmark placed number one in the list; Germany is at number ten. Ukraine is in position 130 (of 175), up from 142 in 2014; Russia is in place 119, up from 136. They are the countries geographically situated in Europe which place lowest on the list, appearing among countries like Bangladesh, Guinea, Kenya, Laos, Uganda, the Comoros, Nigeria and Lebanon. The European countries closest to them on the list are Belarus (107), Moldova and Kosovo (103).¹⁹

Corruption is still rife in a number of European countries, but not to the extent of Ukraine and Russia. Treaties and associations do not help in the fight against corruption; instead one must simply not offer or accept bribes and expose those who do. This would bring Eastern Europe in line with other European countries. However with Poroshenko’s closure of the citizens’ bureau and the demission of Saakashvili in Odessa, the fight against corruption has suffered a further setback.

This volume treats different ‘images’ of Europe in school textbooks, presented to younger generations in a more or less convincing way. For half a century at least the image of ‘Europe’ was very positive in Germany. We are now witnessing growing disapproval in nearly all European countries, as evidenced by the widespread success of authoritarian parties who advocate a return to nationalist policies and disregard the benefits the European Union brought to many (though not all) of its citizens. We are now clearly moving away from the concept of the ‘common house of Europe’ that provided inspiration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At present European nations are moving away from each other, and with Trump’s victory they will likely also move away from the US, economically and politically. Where exactly this move will land us is still unclear. One must not be overly pessimistic to note that anti-Europeanism is growing more and more popular. But this negative image of Europe is one rooted in

---

European traditions. ‘Anti-Europeans’ are not truly anti-European; but they choose the worst anti-humanitarian traditions that Europe has to offer, the in-fighting and militant hatred that once caused our small continent to think it would be exterminated forever in war.

**Bibliography**


Wöller, Burkhard. “*Europa* als historisches Argument. Nationsbildungsstrategien polnischer und ukrainischer Historiker im habsburgischen Galizien”, Bochum: Verlag Dr. Dieter Winkler, 201
Europe in History Education: Risks and Potentials
(Bodo von Borries)

Posing the question: What can be learned about, from and for Europe?
The term ‘Europe’ is not used in this chapter to denote the ‘European Union’; nor is the ‘Eurozone’, ‘Schengen zone’ or ‘Council of Europe’ meant. The meaning of ‘Europe’ in history education, the term’s historical associations, is rather consciously left open, and remains to be discussed. The presentation of empirical findings, in the form of the ideas of learners across different states about ‘Europe’ and ‘European history’, is also explicitly foregone. To that end I collected and analysed data on 6,500 German adolescents in 1992, and more than 30,000 European adolescents in 1995.20 These data are now over 20 years old and perhaps no longer relevant or conclusive. Yet it can be stated that starkly divergent concepts and evaluations of Europe pertained and surely still do pertain in the different European countries, and not only in the context of their schools.

It would be utterly impossible for me to carry out a comparative investigation of the status of ‘Europe’ (whatever that might be) in the policies and textbooks in the subject of history across numerous countries. I do not possess the requisite language skills or manpower for such qualitative-empirical content analysis. Instead my concern is with normative statements on the one hand, and theoretical considerations on the other; I lay out objectives and a proposed structure for a history curriculum. Some of the ideas I present here are several years old. However they strike me as still valid, precisely because the developments in Europe in recent years in fact surpassed my already sceptical prognoses: in the crises brought about by annexation, separatism, civil war, an influx of refugees, right-wing populism, anti-Europeanism, exit from the EU, debt traps and economic slowdown. There can be no alternative to peaceful European cooperation. Prudent history education can support and help to safeguard this very

goal: no more, no less. Its potential for re-orientation will be returned to at the end of this chapter.

**Europe: terms, concepts and expectations**

One can of course attempt to define “Europe” in purely geographical terms, as a clearly delineated continent west of Asia and north of Africa, stretching from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the Caucasus and Ural Mountains and the Ural River. But what then of Cyprus, the Transcaucasian countries, Greenland, the Azores, Madeira, the Canary and Cape Verde islands? These are mostly considered European, but in geographical terms they must surely be called Asian, African or American. This suggests that Europe should instead be regarded as one of ten or twelve “cultural continents” of subcontinental size, like South-Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa or South America. However a question immediately arises as to whether the US and the other former British settler colonies, that is Canada, Australia and New Zealand, on the one hand, and Russia and the neighbouring North and South Caucasus on the other, in fact structurally belong to Europe. But what account is to be given of Europe’s cultural and historical unity in any case? This is not as simple as it might seem.

European optimists who believe in progress consider Europe the great ‘bringer of light’ to humanity of past centuries; this has been achieved through Enlightenment, science, arts, industry and democracy. Can these developments, which position Europe as an unquestioned and longed-for end, be denied? However pessimists and sceptics instead call this cultural continent the temporary ‘ruler and destroyer’ of the world; they point to murderous conquest, racist contempt, colonial exploitation, and ecological destruction. This was followed in the twentieth century by two more enormous waves of totalitarian ideology, in the form of communism and fascism: bringing dictatorship, devastating wars and genocide (Holodomor and Holocaust); originating in Eu-

---

21 Europe’s current state of crisis cannot be the direct object of consideration here; this is not a treatment of political didactics. But it is of course, whether we know or want it or not, invariably present as a foil, as a relevant set of problems and interests. Even if not everyone wishes to admit it, this is always the case in history, considered as an academic discipline, in terms of historical culture, or in the context of history education. An obvious motto presents itself: ‘Crisis is danger and opportunity’. A tell-tale sign of this duality is the fact that at present, some states and great streams of people urgently seek entry into Europe; while simultaneously some others wish to exit.

22 Indeed counting Europe its own continent, distinct from Asia, with a land border of several thousand kilometres, remains highly arbitrary, and is a blatant exception to ordinary practice. In any other case a term such as ‘North-Western Asia’ would be used instead.

23 ‘Industrialisation’ also includes capitalism and the market economy; ‘democracy’ includes human rights and civil society.
Europe, but laying waste to large portions of the world. Are those who admonish and warn of Europe as a horrific nightmare wrong? The accusation that these sorts of considerations amount to *judgments* as opposed to *definitions* of Europe does not hold much sway; there can after all be no completely neutral language or emotionless thinking.

Europe can also come to be a key concept and fundamental value of a new supranational ‘European chauvinism’, whether that is conceived in critical or hopeful terms. It replaces nationalism but soon takes on a renewed arrogance, potentially displaying continued racism towards most non-Europeans. Standing opposed to this is equal cooperation of big and small, richer and poorer states, appearing in this form for the first time historically. The goal of this cooperation consists in an attainable fostering of peace (through multilateral security), freedom\(^{24}\) (through self-determination and participation), prosperity (though not to the point of extravagance) and sustainability (with minimal sacrifice).

Some currently consider Europe to be the failure of two misguided generations of idealistic and delusional European politicians, who would unwittingly stand and act in the service of ‘neoliberal turbo-capitalism’ and globalisation, rather than represent and promote the interests of their citizens. Is this account compelling when it comes to freedom of trade, travel, education and settlement that prevail in large portions of the continent? Or can one conversely call these systems the result of a ‘first draft’, which was necessary for survival? Should cooperation then be *responsibly* continued or developed even in the case of long-term blockades, or immediately overhauled and replaced with cleverer means in the face of potential failure in destructive crises?

In history education, these many concepts of Europe cannot appear as determined, decided and organised in advance, to be forced upon students. Rather they must be presented as *open*, to be negotiated and decided on an individual basis. Learners should acquire competence for responsible political action, based on historical experience and reflection.\(^{25}\) The ‘Beutelsbach Consensus’ (with its four points on “prohibi-
tion against mental overwhelming”, “controversial imperative”, “assistance in own articulation” and “promotion of competence”) applies to numerous questions, and certainly to the topic of Europe; it is the only acceptable model for the teaching of history in democratic societies.26

The accusation of ‘Eurocentrism’ and Europe’s relation to other ‘cultural continents’

One-sided observations from a European perspective are to be categorically avoided; rather a comprehensive multi-perspectivity is needed. Similarly we must avoid any arrogant presumption of superiority over other parts of the world and their inhabitants; human rights form a system that is unbounded and open to all. However the great and inescapable relevance of Europe for all other parts of the world in the modern era must by all means be considered; it consists in colonial rule and industrial capitalism, but also in ‘scientification’ (the spread of rationality and Enlightenment ideals, the natural sciences and secularisation) and democratisation (in human rights, participation, civil society, individualism).

This is not to say that the ‘other’ (non-European) cultural continents are not contributors to world history or cultural heritage; this would prove to be pure nonsense, easily refuted, in any examination of the religious, aesthetic and philosophical realm, and in economics, technology and environmentalism as well. Just such a refutation must be a task for history education, for the purpose of avoiding illusion, arrogance and racism. But the historical development of political, economic and technical power, and the asymmetry this development has generated, has made Europe into the fate of all, and perhaps also an opportunity for everyone. This development is such that for those of us who think in the European tradition, the particular achievements of Europe are outstandingly clear and far easier to recognise than the perhaps just as significant contributions of others.27


Thus “Europeanisation” and the often neglected processes of “de-Europeanisation” (of the eighteenth and early nineteenth as well as the twentieth centuries) must certainly be thematised, without interpreting or judging these processes ‘Eurocentrically’, or misunderstanding any engagement with them as itself ‘Eurocentric’. It should without fail be maintained that Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation must each be examined ‘multi-perspectivally’, using materials from different sides: a task which is not at all easy in the case of cultures without written language where sources are lacking. The extent to which both processes have been and are to be presented as positive or negative in historiography, and the interests which this might serve, must be explicitly demonstrated and discussed (‘controversies’). In the interests of ‘plurality’, presently-felt consequences of historical developments and current behaviour may similarly not become a matter of dogma or prescription.

The question of whether all of Europe took equal part in this spread across the world is not a simple one. Reference to the long-standing dominance of the five Atlantic powers (Portugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands and England) is accurate; however it falls short, because in it other colonial activity is simply forgotten: the colonies of the Italian maritime powers of Venice, Genoa and Pisa in the Levant, (short-lived) Italian acquisitions in Africa (Libya, Eritrea, Italian Somalia, Ethiopia) and above all the Russian colonisation of Siberia (as far as the Bering Strait, the Kamchatka peninsula and Vladivostok), the North and South Caucasus, as well as Central Asia (to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan). The area covered here is almost that of a geographical continent, yet the affected territory, other than the Caucasus, can hardly be called ‘Europe’.

The ‘East-West asymmetry’ in Europe and the role of ‘Central Europe’

Europe is far from homogenous; at best, one can advocate or hope to demonstrate a ‘unity in diversity’. Any attempt to introduce uniformity into the historical consciousness, such as in the introduction of a completely identical history education for all states, nations and minorities, would not only trigger considerable resistance from states, press and parents, and eliminate meaningful cooperation; it would also necessarily involve crude misrepresentation. Thus we must, whether we like it or not, en-

gage in a clarification and explanation of “the limits and divisions of European history”.29

In antiquity (itself a thoroughly Eurocentric term), there was a strong contrast between the advanced civilization of Southern Europe and the preliterate Northern Europe, north of the Alps and Carpathian Mountains. This broad distinction between north and south still holds today, in terms, for example, of climate. From the early Middle Ages (another Eurocentric concept) however it became far more a matter of a polarity between the West (Rome) and the East (Byzantium). This polarity evolves later, for instance to one between London and St. Petersburg, or Paris and Moscow; but it by no means disappears.30

The reasons for this polarity are highly contested. Often cited are the perpetual conquest and plunder by nomadic peoples (Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns, Avars, Khazars, Pechenegs, Polovtsi, Mongols and so on), Tatar invasion and tributes, the ‘Ottoman yoke’ and Tsarist autocracy; along with the East-West Schism in the Church, a lack of reformation in the Orthodoxy or of ‘Enlightenment’ generally, delayed industry and stifled democracy. Establishing such reasons would require intensive and differentiated discussion. However this much has previously been determined: the social-psychological impact of polarity, in the form of prejudice and resentment, unconscious guardedness or even condemnation from both sides, is to this day rather strong.

In reality it is by no means a matter of two blocs; rather there is a rich transition zone made up of the territories of the former multi-ethnic conglomerates of ‘East-Central Europe’ (to use the Germanic terminology) or ‘Central Europe’ (mostly said in the region itself). This denotes the Lands of the Hungarian Crown (with Croatia, Slovakia and Transylvania), the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (with Moravia, Silesia, Lusatia), the confederation of Poland and Lithuania (with large parts of Belarus and Ukraine), Sweden (including for a long time Finland, the Baltic regions, parts of

---

30 At present there is, as there was in the past, an objective divergence in the economic situations of East and West: that is, a relative impoverishment of many people across the East (some say that the ‘Third World’ begins at the Oder-Neisse line, the Bohemian Forest, the Leitha and the Karawanks). This generates on the one hand a certain migratory pressure (far more than that however the fear of mass migration of people to the West and jobs to the East), and on the other hand a move towards mafia-style structures. It can lead to the perpetuation of an inferiority complex, remaining half-unconscious, yet inviting overcompensation.
Northern Germany and later Norway) and the State of the Teutonic Order (including East and West Prussia, Courland, Livonia and Estonia).\(^{31}\) In certain cases the border between Eastern and Central Europe today runs right through a single country: it runs through Serbia along the Danube, in Romania along the Carpathian Mountains and in Ukraine east of the Bug River between Lviv and Kiev.\(^{32}\)

Karl Emil Franzos, an important nineteenth century German-language Jewish author, called the East of this transition zone (Eastern Galicia and Bukovina), and the land to its East, ‘Half Asia’, expressing simultaneously pity, denigration and the need for reform and progress in education, justice and so on.\(^{33}\) When Snyder speaks today of the ‘Bloodlands’ of the twentieth century (the regions of Hitler and Stalin’s genocides), it hardly sounds any different.\(^{34}\) Have the countries in question, which have experienced world wars, civil war, Holodomor, Shoah, Gulags and Chernobyl, really deserved this treatment?

Conversely Eastern countries have myths of their own historical superiority over the West: for example the notion of Pan-Slavism, which appears as a religious ideal of world salvation, and the idea of Russia’s sacrifice for the perpetually ungrateful Western Europe in the Tatar invasions.\(^{35}\) This model of self-aggrandisement is clearly very attractive. Serbia has chosen a similar interpretation of its historical achievements to the great detriment of ethnic peace and relations with its neighbours; it portrays itself as acting as a shield for Western Europe in the fight against the Ottomans, a sacrifice that went unrewarded.

Europe’s “East-West asymmetry” always appears as a problem of accurate history, and as a problem of retrospective historical consciousness, though these problems do not always correspond. Even if history always represents a particular perspectival

\(^{31}\) Perhaps any such mechanical gradation is empirically false or unsecure. One such inadequate picture is as follows: the French look down on the Germans, the Germans on the Polish, the Polish on the Ukrainians and the Ukrainians on the Russians; and the shunned party in each case develops a defensive resentment. Yet here even gross simplification can serve to make serious problems quite clear.

\(^{32}\) What of Germany? Is it Western or Central European, or both, depending on the particular region and epoch in question?


\(^{35}\) Many people in the East feel themselves to be both inferior and superior to Western nations. Even today they act as if torn between two positions or tendencies; just as Russian intellectuals of the nineteenth century have been either imitative “Westerners” (such as Herzen and Turgenev) or proudly Western-sceptic “Slavophiles” (such as Goncharov and Dostoyevsky). These are indicators of a split orientation in relation to “foreign” and “native” traditions.
“construction” or “narrative”, the question of validity, be it empirical, narrative or normative, and so the question of plausibility and truth, is not thereby dissolved. Therefore the terminology of ‘historical accuracy’ is to be retained, and we might seek to definitively answer historical questions, such as the one of whether the Enlightenment in Russia under Catherine the Great, with Radishchev, Novikov and Fonvizin, was just as profound, influential and far reaching as that in the France of the Encyclopaedia, with Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau.

But just as important, if not more so, is historical consciousness: the subsequent and ongoing processing and working-through (or – its opposite – even manipulation) of stories about past events and transformations in historical culture and politics. This is engaged in not just by the state (through parliament, government bodies, universities and schools) and other institutions (mass media, museums, memorial sites); but also by minorities and subcultures, as well as, ultimately, families and individuals, in their private lives and down to their psychological makeup. History is a cognitive science but it itself has the character of a mental process, following the rules of psychology and depth psychology: rules that are in need of elucidation, and worth learning.

Imprints of historical mentalities can prove very durable and powerful (and remain completely unconscious), all the more so when they are shot through with one’s own evaluative feelings and intentions. People are not of course mere ‘prisoners’ of their history; they can make progress or change their minds, or retrospectively ‘adopt’ another tradition to that of their biological ancestors, as the Germans did with classical Greece in the idealistic neohumanism of the period around 1800. However this is not a simple process; for example the adoption of rationality and Westernisation under Peter the Great and Catherine the Great never quite worked, neither among elites nor among the masses.


37 One might ask whether the Polish, Czech and Hungarian ‘return to Europe’ in 1989–90 was in fact an attempt at retrospective ‘adoption’. When carried out openly and well justified, this is absolutely permissible and preferable to the subreation of ‘invented traditions’.

urn:nbn:de:0220-2017-0213

Eckert. Dossiers 16 (2017)
The presence of Islam and Judaism in Europe, or the “clash of civilizations”

The quite common equation of ‘Europe’ with ‘Christianity’ is an example of pure ideology.38 How can one approach Islam, Judaism, or the more recent agnosticism historically? This question has been of concern since long before Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations39 and Islamic State terrorism. There was a clear presence of Muslim states, populations and cultures in Sicily, Southern Italy and the Iberian Peninsula in medieval times, just as in modern times and still in large parts of Southern (Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, East Thrace, Istanbul) and Eastern Europe (Crimea, Cyprus, Kazan, Azerbaijan). Conversely, Christianity was dominant for a long time in Asia Minor, and remained spread in wide parts of the Middle East (its region of origin), such as in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, up to the present day.

In Europe today there are millions of recent (the last three to four generations) Muslim immigrants, including economic migrants and refugees. They are viewed with suspicion and contempt by large parts of the old native populations who fear being overwhelmed by ‘foreigners’. This is a central theme not just of public debates, but especially for underground movements. It incites a fierce reactive nationalism among authoritarian, identitarian and xenophobic right-wing populist movements. Even if one considers this reaction equally morally and intellectually erroneous, the historical contexts out of which it arose must be questioned and appropriately clarified. One cannot understand history without examining the extremely common, and not always peaceful, migration of ideas, people and even borders.

Europe is not to be understood as “Western Christendom”, as Novalis did in 1799 in “Christendom or Europe”.40 In recent years much has been said of the “Judaean-Christian Tradition”. However I consider this trend to be unspeakably fraudulent and hypocritical: an example of the perpetrators of a mass murder (as recent as 1939–45) retrospectively robbing the cultural treasures of those murdered. Nevertheless it is right that today we should no longer be able to or wish to disregard Judaism. Jewish contributions to Europe are too significant for this. This includes not just their early

38 This of course applies too to simple identification of Europe with the ‘Free World’, the ‘Occident’ and the ‘West’.
contributions, but also those of, for example, Marx, Freud, Einstein and Kafka in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

But what aspects of Muslim and Jewish history qualify as ‘distinctly’ or ‘natively’ European, and are not just lifted up for the sake of differentiation and an understanding of the ‘other’? We might look to the relatively tolerant, multi-religious and intercultural way of life in medieval Moorish Spain; to Lessing’s “three rings” in _Nathan the Wise_ (1779), a tale of Enlightenment tolerance; but surely also to the accounts of the “three imposters” (Moses, Jesus and Muhammad) which remained anonymous and highly secret until the atheistic radical enlightenment.\(^{41}\) Should the terroristic ‘Holy Wars’ of groups seeking salvation, conquest or plunder (counter-crusades, Ottoman attacks, Barbary pirates) be privileged? In Judaism, is the mystical Hasidism of the East, the enlightened Haskalah of the West (represented by Moses Mendelssohn) or even Baruch Spinoza’s Jewish humanism, censured, i.e. forbidden and outlawed, by the Rabbis, to be remembered and designated ‘typically European’?\(^{42}\) Perhaps all such aspects should be actively considered, discussed and disputed.\(^{43}\)

---

\(^{41}\) This is a case of true underground literature, and is thus difficult to date; the books _Traité des trois imposteurs: Moïse, Jésus-Christ, Mahomet, De tribus impostoribus_ and Jean Meslier’s _Mémoires_ appear as full texts only around 1700, however they can be traced back to Muslim and Jewish precursors from the High Middle Ages.

\(^{42}\) Martin Buber (1878–1965) documented and exalted Hasidism time and time again, such as in the _Erzählungen der Chassidism_ (1949, with an earlier version appearing in 1928); Karl Emil Franzos, particularly in _Der Pojaz_ (finished in 1893, first published in 1905), mercilessly depicted and lambasted its dogmatic authoritarianism and brutally anti-enlightenment character.

\(^{43}\) The debate around the potentially disproportionate number of Jews among leading Communists (Marx, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Joffe, Sverdlov, Rosa Luxemburg, Jogiches, Leviné, Ruth Fischer and so on) need not be reopened, if only because the proportion of Jews among the moderate or revisionist/reformist Social Democrats (such as Julius Martov, Victor Adler, Eduard Bernstein and Heinrich Braun) proves to be comparable.
Topics for a European history curriculum

Some years ago I proposed topics for a basic curriculum.

Ten topics for a compulsory curriculum

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>State and nation, state-nation and nation-state [early processes of nation-building]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Balance of power and hegemony in the European state system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Europe and the ‘others’ [colonialism, covering discussion of imperialism and decolonisation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Another (non-European) cultural continent [the world before and outside of Europeanisation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Migrations and minorities between ghettoization and assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The East-West/West-East ‘asymmetry’ in Europe [Western Europe, Central Europe and Eastern Europe]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Modernisation, globalisation, industrialisation and “Americanisation” [the eighteenth to the twenty first centuries]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The merging of communities, societies and political systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Human rights: cultural relativity versus rational universality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Social movements and collective processes of identity-formation [race, class, gender, age and so on]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that most of these topics cannot be covered systematically or exhaustively in a history learning unit (even less so with younger learners). Rather they may be taken up by means of examples, which are often thoroughly nation-specific. These ten topics or structures must first be briefly explained.

The path from Empire to a looser feudal state founded on mutual association of people, to a territorial state institution, right up to the notions of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ (topic 1) has proceeded rather differently in different countries. It has led to different ideas of the ‘nation’, such as Herder’s ‘linguistic nation’, or Renan’s nation founded on the ‘will’ of the people. One could for instance compare Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland; or France, the Netherlands and Belgium; or Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine. This variety of possible examples makes the relative arbitrariness of any given development just as clear as its deep entrenchment in people’s consciousness. It must be made clear in history education that not only have there been different paths to the formation of a state, and further alternatives are conceivable, but also subsequent restructuring mostly comes at a high moral, mental and economic price; and thus fair solutions including ample minority rights are preferable.


It must be made clear in history education that not only have there been different paths to the formation of a state, and further alternatives are conceivable, but also subsequent restructuring mostly comes at a high moral, mental and economic price; and thus fair solutions including ample minority rights are preferable.

urn:nbn:de:0220-2017-0213
the will, but rather ‘imagined communities’ with ‘invented traditions’, should become very clear through a deep investigation of the given case studies.

At least since the end of the Roman Empire, Europe has not been under the long-term control of a single imperialistic state, like those in China, the Near East or North America. It cannot be centrally determined which examples might best demonstrate the mechanisms of governing hegemonic ambitions and more balanced systems of power (topic 2): Emperor Frederick II, Emperor Charles V, King Louis XIV, Napoleon or the Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich Adolf Hitler may all function as such. However the structure outlined here, closely tied up with notions of the state-nation and nation-state and their various actualisations, is decisive. The relevance of such considerations for the present crisis in the EU is easily illustrated.

It is apparent that one cannot avoid the notions of Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation, conceived as going beyond just colonial conquests (topic 3). I have presented my own (widely-used) comprehensive textbook model for the early epoch from 1492 to 1830, which includes the first round of decolonisation. It allows for a relatively free choice of emphasis, i.e. of historical examples. Even where it is a matter of self-criticism of former colonial powers, this choice will turn out differently in Spain, England, Austria or Bulgaria.


47 In the study of nation-building, the psychological and cultural costs of the destruction of smaller more mixed groups of people are to be addressed in addition to the wars, displacement and genocide brought about. These are groups that wish to escape straightforward national categorisation, such as the Upper SileSIANS (also called ‘Wasserpolacks’ [‘diluted Poles’]), who want to be German and Polish, or neither German nor Polish. Many millions belonged to such groups in Europe around 1900. Were the benefits of democratisation really so great as to justify their loss? Or is the crucial role of nationalism in the development of democratic participation and joint decision for all in the state a myth of the conservative or even right-wing populist historians? Have dictatorships not used and abused chauvinism even more than democracies?

48 Also worthy of attention is the significance and ongoing privileging of the powers at the edge of Europe (Great Britain and Russia) and the particular exposure of the central powers (such as Germany, Poland and Lithuania, Austria-Hungary and Bohemia).


urn:nbn:de:0220-2017-0213
However it would be quite wrong to only let ‘non-Europe’ appear in the context of colonial dependence (topic 4). Europe does not after all form the entirety of humanity, though history education often fuels this dangerous illusion, even if it does so unknowingly. But since one cannot study all cultural continents in depth, an example must be selected, be it India, the Islamic Near and Middle East, Japan and Korea, the Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa or, to use my preferred example, China.50

Less intuitive, and all the more important, is the fact that migration, even mass migration, is no exception in history (topic 5). Rather it represents in its very different forms a self-evident norm, though it is not self-regulating, and does not proceed conflict or problem free. For in migration very serious interests and prejudices come into play from all sides, along with cultural, religious, linguistic, economic and so-called ‘racial’ differences, which may carry grave consequences, even to the point of genocide. Questions of possible segregation of migrants into upper and lower classes arise.51 It would thus be irresponsible to treat the history of migrations with either naïve idealism or cynical xenophobia in history education.

The question of the ‘asymmetry’ within Europe (topic 6), which is naturally closely tied up with that of migration, has already been extensively discussed; additional arguments on this point can be omitted here. This is a question that must certainly be posed if we do not wish to be plunged helplessly into new ethnic conflicts and national prejudice.52 What is the use of historical reflection here? Above all it can be practically and experimentally applied to other people’s perspectives (some use the term “empathy training” for this). In history education one’s own group, defined in national, ethnic or dynastic terms, should appear as conqueror and as the party attacked, as emi-


52 It is certainly very striking that Great Britain accepted many Polish refugees in the period from 1939–45 and contributed to the resurrection of the Polish state, but in 2016 still voted to withdraw from the process of European integration because of the right to settlement of a couple of hundred thousand Polish migrant workers.
grant and immigrant, and so on. In this way different perspectives are systematically thought through, and guided by the ‘golden rule’: ‘what you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others’.

More recent development is characterised in the late eighteenth century in Western Europe, and later everywhere, by an unprecedented and on-going acceleration of the development in all societal spheres, not adequately classified as simply ‘progress’ or ‘decline’ (topic 7). These developments should be examined even-handedly under the headings of ethics (covering ideas of equality, inequality and exploitation), economics (including a reduction in workload, sustainability and the risks of technology) and culture (looking at alienation, cultural homogenisation and increased leisure time). They can each be interpreted ambivalently. To attempt to present the world-historical process of industrialisation as a whole in a single short unit would certainly be excessive, and would place unreasonable demands on learners. Selective emphasis is required. The emphasis of these lessons will turn out fairly differently in smaller and larger countries, more and less developed countries, relatively poor or rich countries, and countries which yield or take on massive migration.\(^53\) That is no mistake; rather it is quite normal.

This economic process of acceleration and mobilisation cannot be viewed in isolation from the formation of ever-larger collectives of people, or the differentiation of social forms like ‘family’”, ‘community’, ‘society’, ‘state body’ and ‘mankind’ (topic 8).\(^{54}\) It relates also to a kind of dissolution of space and time, beginning with the introduction of rail travel and artificial lighting, which would have been downright unimaginable in the slower-moving and longer lasting pre-modern age.\(^{55}\) It should be noted that this is not primarily a matter of political history; rather it is one of the history of mentalities.

The study of history cannot dispense with a normative foundation; this is where the topic of the (un-terminated, unbounded and intercultural) process of human rights’ de-

\(^{53}\) I personally consider the connection between industrialisation and ecological crisis, that is, the “unsustainability” of industrial activity, to be of particular importance: see lesson models in Bodo von Borries, Kolonialgeschichte und Weltwirtschaftssystem, 330–333, 379–387; Ders., Durchbrüche von Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft, 342–390, 391–412.

\(^{54}\) Since then people have come to live more in “networks” than in “societies”. With only around eight degrees of separation we are personally connected with practically everyone else on earth, though knowing them is another matter.

development comes in (topic 9). It is tremendously important to work on this topic even with relatively young learners, through concrete case studies and deep analysis. Using practical examples it readily comes to light that human rights cannot be considered independently of the idea of democracy, or social movements and civic activities; otherwise it would be a rather empty concept.

The core objective of this model consists in a new identity structure (topic 10), called “intercultural humanism” by Rüsen and Laass, and “human progress” by Schulz-Hageleit. If this is considered correctly, then the disappearance of human rights discourse and the advancement of narrow nationalistic and openly xenophobic attitudes that has accompanied European crises for some years appears as deeply disturbing. The formation of and shifts in “identities” (a demonstrably unpopular term) are of course fruitfully addressed only in relation to areas with which children and teenagers are relatively familiar. This includes, for example, gender roles, which have changed greatly in recent generations, and the cultural (ethnic, linguistic and religious) self-conception of majorities and minorities in cases of migration.

Are the historical topics named here, around Europe and beyond, not far too wide-ranging and overly ambitious? Their discussion is greatly facilitated by the fact that they are closely interwoven. Colonialism is related to industrialisation; nation-building is related to the balance of power. The enforcement of human rights has a great deal to do with the treatment of minorities, and the East-West asymmetry with questions of delayed ‘modernisation’. Seen in this light it is certainly possible to air the topics men-


59 Additionally workers’ movements and unions, peace movements, women’s movements and gay associations offer themselves as cases for investigation. Engagement here can be successful, leading to the development of self-efficacy. This is exceedingly important, as history can otherwise lead to apathy, cynicism or resignation.
tioned in the school subject ‘history’, if it is suitably equipped and well-laid out. This is however only the case if the structures available are not defined in advance in relation to an illusionary uninterrupted chronology, an authoritative master (his)story of the suffering and success of one’s own reputedly everlasting nation (enforced upon minorities also).

Children and teenagers become overburdened in history education when they are simultaneously alienated and bored, because the objects of discussion do not obviously or concretely relate to their lives, interests, questions, hopes and fears. It is not to be disputed that some topics are more or less accessible, and that some approaches are more or less correct. Thus the focus on the mechanical timeline of chronology should be replaced by a more valuable focus on the *progression of learning*.

**A systematic structure for a history curriculum (with two chronological runs)**

With this in mind I recommended some time ago a two-stage curriculum for secondary level education (the fifth to the tenth grades). It only appears to be chronologically ordered; in fact it is organised by categories. Its intention is to introduce into the children’s thoughts the most important historical *structures*, and once they have been introduced, to connect them in a more complex and diverse manner. The blueprint for this curriculum is presented here, and is not restricted to the topic of Europe.
### Suggestions for a revised core curriculum with a higher chance of competence gains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage one: fundamental experiences and methods. On the historicality of human life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>6th Grade</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7th Grade</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8th Grade</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9th Grade</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10th Grade</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This proposal, which has not been considered in any German states, cannot simply be mechanically carried over to other countries. However it lends itself to relatively

---

easy adjustment around a fundamental structure that is maintained in all versions. Many of the individual teaching units appear decidedly conventional, such as ancient Egypt, the Crusades, the French Revolution and the First World War. Indeed this is necessary in order not to demand too much of teachers with the introduction of the new curriculum. It is structured primarily around categories; chronology, though an indispensable means of classification, cannot be used as a meaningful structure.

Relatively many of the questions and teaching units relating to Europe in the previous table are also included in this list. The discussion of hegemony and balance of power is raised here by means of the examples of the Congress of Vienna and Napoleon. The non-European ‘other’ appears with the example of China. Colonialism is thematised in relation to early systems of world trade, including of course colonial trade, slaves, mining and plantation. Industrialisation appears firstly in the dichotomy of agrarian and industrial society, and again in discussions of post-industrial society. The unit on ‘men and women’ might accommodate questions of human rights even better than that on the French Revolution. The unit covering the nation-state and the state-nation is practically identical to its counterpart from the quoted European model, which originated several years later. Questions of migration and multiculturalism are set out using the topic ‘our region has changed’ and the Roman Empire.

Over half of the European topics developed for the model mentioned are loosely accommodated in this older one. Processes of socialisation and identity-formation, along with the activities of social movements, were admittedly not sufficiently clearly conceived in the earlier model’s approach; this is true for the East-West asymmetry also, which was already mentioned in 2001. By all means space must be cleared for these considerations. Indeed the history of mentalities as a whole must be given more weight than was conceded in 2001. It is certainly a decidedly difficult topic, and must be attached to more accessible notions of gender roles or age groups (children, youngsters, adults, aged people). If this is adhered to, the two proposals can certainly be combined and integrated.

**History education for and about Europe today**

Europe is becoming increasingly and intensely unpopular among its populations: an unpopularity that is accompanied by a general ignorance of its benefits. The crucial reasons cited are an alleged democratic deficit and an insinuated inexcusable loss of nations’ sovereignty. In this climate, right-wing populist, authoritarian, xenophobic
and chauvinistic movements make inroads. Some of these groups have already come to power with an electoral majority, and have begun to perceptibly undermine the democracies they control; this is the case in Hungary, Poland and Turkey. Will the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and France face the same threat shortly? Officially such regimes strive to ‘take back control’ of their country’s own affairs; in fact they establish authoritarian systems and eliminate opposition.

At the same time the opponents and denigrators of a European federation are openly triumphant. Leaders such as Putin, Erdoğan and Xi Jinping must no longer take Europe seriously; as it is, they have not feared its military for some time. Even former allies such as the USA seem to have come to perceive themselves as competitors rather than allies; this is certainly the case under Donald Trump. The economic damages for European countries could soon grow to a comparable size to that of its cultural and security problems. Politics is to some degree a matter of power and strength. As the saying goes: united we stand; divided we fall.

At present we are experiencing the misguided self-destruction and dismantlement of Europe, at the level of the EU, the Euro, the Schengen Zone and even the Council of Europe. We see this in Brexit, and in the disunity and neglect of human rights in the face of the refugee crisis. Ultimately this must be regarded as an unspeakable foolishness and a dangerous regression, rather than some kind of ‘muddling through’ or prudent ‘transformation’. One dimension of this is barely recognised: namely the possibility of regional and ethnic conflict within Europe, which may culminate in separation or civil war. In the territories of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia de facto feigned ethnic mini-states have come into being under Russian guidance and protection, though not necessarily under its full control. Our discussion of nation-states and state-nations might easily end in one of failed states.

Is there really any difference between this and the West’s relation to Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro or Macedonia (the latter of which cannot even use this name on account of its Greek neighbours), let alone Bosnia and Herzegovina? Are these states, by the grace of the West, something other than mini-states? Can the Western Balkans persist going forward without danger of self-detonation if it is without hopes of accession into Europe, without EU police supervision and facing the complete withdrawal of Trump’s America? The traditional, ostensibly ‘normal’ nation-states of Western Europe prove to be just as fragile. Referenda are taking place or being demanded on the complete independence of Scotland, Catalonia, the Faroe Islands, the Basque Country
and Corsica. Would this really be preferable to the admittedly often opaque negotiations in Brussels, sometimes suspected as they are of corruption or irrationality? We must compare historical experiences, and do so in history education as well.

What, then, can history education on Europe achieve? Where do risks and potentials lie? The following table takes account of the fact that in history, extreme solutions are seldom successful, and ambivalences must be left stand. ‘Truths’ are often complex and demand multiple stages of reflection. Potential practices and insights are arranged in the middle column, with corresponding errors on either side. This model can only come in the form of examples in need of expansion or proposals for discussion. It is not a matter of setting down rules; rather it is one of defining categories, criteria and aspects, which may be carried over between national contexts.

### Europe in history education: risks and potentials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Potentials</th>
<th>Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe as <em>simply</em> a bringer of Enlightenment, industry and democracy, human rights and prosperity</td>
<td>Europe as a danger and opportunity, for itself and other cultural continents</td>
<td>Europe as <em>simply</em> a bringer of subjection, plunder and genocide, colonialism and totalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glorification or demonization of European colonialism</td>
<td>Multi-perspectival and pluralistic evaluation of European colonialism</td>
<td>Concealing or forgetting European colonialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous absolutism regarding the nation-state and state-nation, against Europe</td>
<td>Relativisation of the nation-state and state-nation. Cooperation within Europe and in the wider world</td>
<td>Illusionary abolishment of the nation-state and state-nation in favour of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumption of symmetry between Eastern and Western Europe</td>
<td>Careful examination of real and imagined asymmetries between Eastern and Western Europe</td>
<td>Naïve neglect of either Eastern or Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration as <em>simply</em> a ‘misfortune’ or an ‘evil’ to be avoided</td>
<td>Migration as a highly variable normality, self-evidence and a problem to be solved</td>
<td>Migration as an unremitting positive, an asset to be strived for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniformity: a single common history for all countries of Europe</td>
<td>Negotiation of compatible but distinct European histories</td>
<td>Isolationism: ethnocentric partial histories for European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positivistic historiography with the illusion of objectivity</td>
<td>Investigations of narratives and constructions for their empirical, narrative and normative validity</td>
<td>Ideological historiography in service of the stability of rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-aggrandisement and denigration of the ‘other’</td>
<td>Investigation of ‘otherness’ and ‘ownness’: comparison, juxtaposition, reconciliation</td>
<td>Self-contempt and veneration of the ‘other’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The historical experiences and traditions that relate to Europe are fundamentally different and highly ambivalent. They are in part catastrophic or criminal, rather than ideal or good. One cannot seek to find Europe. Rather we construct Europe with others, through thorough reflection and as peacefully as possible; even if we no longer wish to name the product of this construction ‘the common European house’ as Gorbachev did in 1990. Perhaps however we might arrive at a ‘European district’ in this global village, through good neighbourship, but also a certain hardiness directed outwards and inwards. Thus we should get some villas, some family houses and flats, but hopefully no slums.

Bibliography


Bodo von Borries

Europe in History Education: Risks and Potentials


———. *Der Pojaz* [1905], Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 2005.


What Role does Europe Play in Ukrainian Textbook Narratives?
(Sergii V. Koniukhov)

The study of reflections of Europe in Ukrainian history textbooks is highly relevant, due to geopolitical changes on the map of Europe, Ukraine’s ‘European Choice’ and the scientific dialogue between Ukraine and Europe. Textbooks reflect the new role of Europe as a culturally and politically determining factor in the development of Ukraine’s independence. The study of the processes of Europe’s formation, its features and current strategies is extremely important for Ukraine.

Ukraine today, like many other post-Communist countries, is seeking to become a member of the European community. In practice this will entail many changes aimed at harmonising Ukrainian regulations and standards with those prevailing in the West. Such changes are occurring right now. It is clear that this necessitates the development of the nation’s system of education, given the importance of schooling in the formation of a population’s views and beliefs. In my opinion it has become particularly important for school textbooks to present Europe in such a way that the younger generation is encouraged to develop their own nation in line with European aspirations, especially with regard to the proper resolution of conflicts. This involves the preservation of dignity and tolerant attitudes towards the other party in the conflict.

Teaching history is a matter of national significance. Each state strives to educate citizens such that they will remain loyal to it. It is very important to the Ukrainian government that history textbooks convey a concept of the nation which will generate Ukrainian patriots. At the same time, world historical matters and matters of integration cannot be ignored; no nation may develop in isolation, and thus no nation’s history may be viewed as separate from the history of humankind in general.

The issue of the image of Europe in history textbooks is related to the problem of the quality of school textbooks. The history curriculum aims at developing students’ knowledge about the past. At issue today is the question of which school history courses should be given priority. Should the focus be on national history, world history, or history more generally conceived? What criteria should be decisive for the formation of the image of Europe? Historians, sociologists, political scientists, cultural experts and educators today debate the status of history teaching in Ukraine. Their vi-

---

sions are presented in modern academic literature. In the proceedings of the international round table “Historical education in a multicultural society: challenges and prospects for Ukraine”, focusing on the problems and prospects of school textbooks in education around cultural, ethnic and gender tolerance, attention is drawn to the history curriculum and its compliance with modern requirements. The universality of the experience of teaching history in schools is pointed out.⁶²

A number of analyses of Ukrainian history textbooks have appeared in the modern academic landscape. V. Ivashchenko and V. Kulikov conducted a content analysis of images in several textbooks on Ukrainian history and demonstrated that the history taught in schools is still mainly political, but that there is a noticeable tendency towards the diversification of approaches to history.⁶³ In accounts of Europe’s position in Ukrainian textbooks, academics still do not rule out the importance of the history of Ukraine. O. Radzywill analysed innovative modern approaches to textbook writing on the history of Ukraine, and approvingly noted the desire of the authors of the Ukrainian textbooks to ‘nationalise’ Ukrainian historical science.⁶⁴ The problem of the nation and opportunities for the study of national history in modern Ukrainian textbooks is presented in the works of S. Terno.⁶⁵ The academics H. Kasyanov and O. Shcheglov looked at national histories in modern history textbooks.⁶⁶ Many modern historians draw attention to the fact that the school textbook should work to promote reconciliation both among Ukrainians and with neighbouring peoples.⁶⁷ Academics indicate that special attention should be paid to the teaching of historical material

---

around controversial issues. The German historian Falk Pingel notes: “the Second World War, the Holocaust and the ideological and political division of the post-war period is a European phenomenon. Therefore, the updated national history should be placed in the European context”.68

My task will be to determine how much of the space in modern history textbooks is reserved for national history, how much for world history and how much is European in particular. Today history is taught in Ukrainian schools as part of two separate subjects: the history of Ukraine and world history. Each has a distinct curriculum. My concern is with the presentation of general European history in Ukrainian textbooks. Are regional history and historical ethnography considered alongside general historical phenomena?

The aim of my study is to show how the events of European history are represented in Ukrainian school textbooks and what components there are to these textbooks’ image of Europe. As part of this I will identify the theoretical approaches and interpretations of different historical periods that appear in the history textbooks, and analyse how they illuminate historical processes and interethnic relations. I will also determine the amount of space devoted to the history of Europe in these textbooks. This study of the role of Europe in Ukrainian textbooks involved analyses of 42 textbooks on Ukrainian and world history.

The textbooks selected for analysis were published from the end of the twentieth century up to the present day, meaning they all were published in the independent Ukraine. I established that in the history curriculum emphasis on European values and the relationship with the European family is consistently observed. This chapter presents fragments of this research. For example, the modern textbook for the fifth grade, by Mysan, deals with tools left on the lands of modern Ukraine similar to those found at sites in Germany, Poland and Slovakia.69 This example indicates that in these textbooks the territory of Ukraine is presented as having been part of Europe from the very beginning of human history.

The authors of Ukrainian textbooks assign a significant place to the influence of religion on the formation of interethnic and interstate relations. In the world history textbook for the seventh grade, authored by T. Ladychenko, V. Sviderska and Y.

68 Ibid., 223.
69 V. O. Mysan Vstup do istoriyi Ukrayiny: pidruchnyk dlya 5 kl. zahal’noosvit. navch. zakh; Viktor My-
Svidersky, the introduction of Christianity to the territory of modern Ukraine and the
territory’s relationship with Europe are primarily seen through the lens of European
values.\(^7\) The author of the textbook “History of the Middle Ages” I. Lihtey also
touches on this issue. For example, he notes that

“an important role in the formation of statehood was played by the spread of Chris-
tianity among the Germans. In the fourth century the Bishop Ulfilas converted the
Goths to Christianity. To do this he had to translate the Bible into the Gothic language
and to create a written language based on the Greek alphabet for his new flock.”\(^7\)

For the author of this textbook the religious beliefs of the Middle Ages not only
form the basis of Europe as a civilization model, but also provide an incentive for the
unity of Ukrainians with the European family, due to the prevalence of common be-
liefs.

In the textbook for the seventh grade, authored by O. Bon’ and O. Ivanyuk, there
appear in the Middle Ages the first steps towards a free European society: parlia-
mentary democracy, courts before which citizens are equal and free, laws that restrict the
will of rulers and universities as centres of science and education.\(^7\)

The textbook analysed for eighth grade Ukrainian history, covering the sixteenth to
eighteenth centuries, also deals with religious life in Ukraine. It features description of
the influence of European tendencies on the country’s religion, including the Refor-
mation and the development of Jesuit and Protestant institutions. In the story of Socin-
ianism, the author of the textbook states that “Socinianism proclaimed the principles
of freedom of opinion and tolerance and respect for the beliefs of others”.\(^7\) Thus, the
image of Europe in the textbook comes in the form of ideas and values that for many
centuries were characteristic of Ukrainian society.

However the textbooks include the fact that relations of individual European states
with Ukraine were not always neighbourly. In a textbook from 1993, the European
states of the Middle Ages exhibit aggressive plans against Ukraine. They mention the
‘resistance to attacks by the German Teutonic knights and Hungarian and Polish feu-

---

\(^7\) T. V. Ladychenko, V. V. Sviders'ka and Sviders'kyy Yu. Yu. *Istoriya Ukrainy. 7 klas*, Ternopil':


\(^7\) O. I.Bon' and O. L. Ivanyuk *Vsesvitnya istoriya: pidruchnyk dlya 7 klasu zahal'noosvitnikh nav-
chal'nykh zakladiv*,., Kyiv: Litera LTD, 2015, 272, 269.

\(^7\) Shvyd'ko H.K. *Istoriya Ukrayiny. 16-18 stolittyta. Pidruchnyk dlya 8 klasu seredn'oyi shkoly. – K.:
Heneza, 1997, 50.
dal lords on the lands of Ukraine”\textsuperscript{74} and “the capture of Ukrainian lands by Poland, Lithuania and other neighbouring states”.\textsuperscript{75} However, in a textbook on world history from 2015 by O. I. Pometun and Y. B. Maliienko, the story of Europe is primarily told through accounts of the formation of medieval states, with special attention to the manifestations of their power and the interaction of different cultures. The relationship of Ukrainian and European cultures is widely described; to this end each section contains a column entitled “Ukraine is Europe”. Illustrations demonstrate the similarity of Ukrainian and European urban architecture, art and legal and philosophical thought.\textsuperscript{76}

The textbook for the eighth grade written by V. Vlasov refers to the impact on Ukrainian culture of European masters of the Renaissance: “Ukrainian architecture has undergone noticeable Western influences […] such as] in the building projects of well-known architects such as Paolo Dominici Romanus, Vojtech Kapinos, Ambrogio Prykhyniyi, Petro Barbon and others”.\textsuperscript{77} The same author gives an account in another textbook of the development of cities, the peculiarities of Magdeburg law and the impact of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation on the course of historical events in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{78}

Given Ukraine’s place in Europe in the seventeenth century, the authors of the textbooks on Ukrainian history analyse the position of the Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox countries in relation to events in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{79} In the textbook by V. Vlasov (1999) the author of the Ukrainian “Constitution” of 1710, the Hetman in exile Pylyp Orlyk, is presented to the reader as a “European politician with a broad diplomatic reach”.\textsuperscript{80}

The textbook by S. Osmolovskyi refers to European values at the end of the eighteenth century and in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{81} There is material about the development of the market economy and changes in the societal structure. The author notes: “the individual’s outlook was changing […] the state had lost its divine aura and atti-

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 97.
\textsuperscript{77} Vlasov V.S. \textit{Istoriya Ukrayiny: pidruchnyk dlya 8 klasu zahal'noosvitnikh navchal'nykh zakladiv. – K.: Abrys,1999, 100.}
\textsuperscript{78} Vlasov V. S. \textit{Istoriya Ukrayiny. 8 klas / za red.. Yu A. Mytsyka: navch. posibnyk. – K.: A. S. K., 2000. – 256 s.: il., karty.}
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 226–228.
tudes towards it were changing. Now the purpose of government was seen to consist in protecting the natural rights and freedoms of the individual”. 82

Events of the nineteenth century in the territory of modern Ukraine is presented in connection with European history or the history of individual European countries. In the ninth grade textbook by V. Sarbey (1996) it is stated that “the beginning of the politicisation of the Ukrainian national movement […] took place as it sought to unite with the Polish national liberation movement in the struggle against Russian Tsarism, as they had a common enemy”. 83 In the seventh section entitled “Ukraine in the European democratic revolution” much space is devoted to the events that preceded the revolution of 1848, known as the Spring of Nations. 84 However very little attention is paid to European events during this time; the section features just one sentence on these: “the European revolution of 1848 that swept France, Germany, Austria, Italy, namely, the countries with monarchies, is figuratively called the ‘Springtime of the Peoples’”. 85 At the same time there is an entire subsection on the “echo of the European revolutions in Ukraine under the rule of the Russian Empire”, which traces the repercussions of these revolutions in the Russian Empire. It can be seen that in the Ukrainian history textbooks of the early 1990s, significant attention was paid to the role of Russia and Russian historical heritage.

In the textbooks of the late 1990s and early 2000s, considerably more space is devoted to European values and their reflection throughout history. In the story of the revolution of 1917–21 in Ukraine the author of the tenth grade textbook F. Turchenko presents this historical fragment:

“In late September of 1917 in Petrograd, the Democratic Conference was convened to elect the Council of the Republic (pre-Parliament). The Central Council clearly defined the platform of its delegation. This platform contained a number of items that it had not contained before […] In addition to these, the order included the Central Council’s traditional demands: recognition of the right of unrestricted self-determination for all nations; the convening of a nationally and regionally sovereign

82 Ibid., 6.
84 Ibid., 69.
85 Ibid., 70.
Constituent Assembly by each nation; and the transfer of all power in Ukraine to the Central Council and its General Secretariat."\(^{86}\)

The inclusion of these Ukrainians demands in the textbook demonstrates the desire to present Ukrainians as aspiring to European principles of national self-determination, according to which nations should be considered different but equal. It is my opinion that this textbook demonstrates the attempt to teach history in such a way that Ukraine’s ‘Europeanness’ is made clear to students, while at the same time their country’s distinct identity and “otherness” is preserved. A lot of information is provided about the consequences of Ukraine’s remaining in the Soviet Union. It would however be possible to instead include a comparative table of the achievements and losses of the Ukrainian people during the years of Ukraine’s membership of the USSR. In this way the students could reach their own conclusions about the level of censorship and rights and freedoms of the population in the Soviet Union, as well as about achievements in industry, services and social development.

In modern Ukrainian textbooks the history of Ukraine is presented as closely related to that of European societies and the wider world. In the eleventh grade textbook edited by S. Kulchytskyi and Y. Lebedieva, it is stated that the country made efforts to implement economic reforms to build a civil society, and that Europe was the main point of reference for this.\(^{87}\) The authors present the history of Ukraine in the context of European history and encourage students to view historical processes objectively. To this end the textbook includes the headings: “the use of language in the source”, “personality in history” and “work with historical documents”. The textbook encourages students to formulate objective and impartial judgments on the interpretation of historical phenomena. Each section is followed by topics and questions for group or class discussion under the heading “express your own judgments”. These involve perceiving Ukrainian history in the context of an integrated world history. For example, in discussing the foreign policy of Ukraine, students must consider the relationship of Ukraine with other states. In the discussion around Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament, the authors suggest that students consider international historical processes (the corresponding task of impersonating a historical figure is also proposed).\(^{88}\)


\(^{88}\) Ibid., 245.
The theoretical material observes the desire to develop among students the notion of ‘open history’, which focuses on the interdependence of neighbouring cultures, cooperation in science, economic development and so on. For example, in the section entitled “Cultural and spiritual life of society” it is noted of Ukraine’s aspiration towards the unity and competitiveness of European academic and higher education systems: “having joined the Bologna process in 2005, Ukraine has undertaken to amend the national education system”. 89 In this section there is an emphasis on the coordination of Ukrainian academic research with institutions in the USA, Russia and other countries.90 With regards to relations with other countries, the authors of the textbook widely elucidate the Ukraine’s activities in the UN and COE, and devote attention to the agreements between Ukraine and the EU.91 They note Ukraine’s aim to join the European higher education system, pointing to its dealings with the British Council, UNESCO and other international organisations.

The authors of the above mentioned textbook attach a special importance to the elucidation of ‘dark’ pages of history. Using witness documents, they attempt to teach students to develop a more objective vision of historical processes. Indicative in this respect are the topics ‘Ukraine in the Second World War’ and ‘Ukraine in the first post-war years’92. The authors of the textbook offer questions and tasks designed to teach the students to independently analyse events, to compare the historical realities in Ukraine and other countries and to make their own conclusions. These tasks include the following examples: “compare and analyse the lives of Ostarbeiter from Ukraine and other states in the towns and villages of Germany”;93 “compare the position of France and Britain with Germany and the Soviet Union before the Second World War and after 22 June 1941. Explain the reasons for the changes”;94 “describe the features of the diplomatic activities of the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1940s to the first half of the 1950s”. 95 However, despite attempts to elucidate historical events objectively and allow for the thoughtful reception of the information presented, the clear bias of the authors is still evident. The topic entitled “Ukraine during the Second World War: the Great Patriotic War” and in particular sections three to four “the first

89 Ibid., 269–270.
90 Ibid., 271.
91 Ibid., 244.
92 Ibid., 80
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., 88.
stage of the Great Patriotic War confirm the position of the textbook authors. The clear impression is that they consider the Second World War a patriotic war, even as the theoretical material presented in the paragraph denies this.

I consider the use of the expression “the Great Patriotic War” to be the remnants of an older historiographical tradition. If one puts aside this shortcoming, it can be argued that the textbook by S. Kulchytsky and Y. Lebedieva *History of Ukraine* contributes to the development the ability among students to formulate impartial judgements in their interpretation of historical phenomena, and helps them to consider the history of Ukraine through the prism of European history. Thus I conclude that this textbook, despite its shortcomings, is of high quality.

I move now to an analysis of a more recent textbook: *World History* by T. Ladychenko. It covers the events of the second half of the twentieth century up to the early twenty first century. The textbook brings together text by the author, historical documents, testimony from witnesses and participants of historical events, excerpts from the works of well-known historians, maps, diagrams, questions, tasks and topics for discussion and debate. The material contributes to the sense among students of Ukraine’s belonging to European civilization. It creates an understanding of the interconnectedness of the world and the need to solve global problems through joint efforts. The author does not avoid complex historical issues and tries to highlight those historical moments whose meaning remains controversial: the activities of resistance movements, the status of the occupying regime in enslaved countries. In the account of resistance movements during the Second World War, the author of this textbook introduces the Ukrainian struggle into the pan-European discourse, focusing on the diverse means employed by different European countries in the struggle for the freedom and independence of their countries.

However, in presenting theories of events of global importance, the historian appears to forget to emphasise the participation of Ukraine in historical processes. For example, section five on page 44 refers to the results, consequences and lessons of the Second World War. Here Ukraine is neglected; the author takes into account only the Soviet Union. And on pages 36 to 38, Ladychenko demonstrates that he considers the

96 Ibid., 80.
97 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 29.
following to be a “liberation” of the countries in question: “the final stage of the liberation of Europe in 1944, with the entry of Soviet troops into Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia”. In general, however, the textbook meets the current requirements and facilitates the assimilation of information about the role of Ukraine in integration processes; this is covered, for example, on pages 78 through 81. When considering topics relating to the history of various states, Ukraine’s relations with these states is specified. These are the names of the individual paragraphs: “Ukrainian-British relations”, “Relations of France and Ukraine” “Ukrainian-German relations”. Despite some shortcomings then, the textbook by T. Ladychenko still contributes to the establishment of an “open history” that promotes tolerance. The author implies that despite certain conflicts, the world’s countries are in a state of interconnectedness and should strive for dialogue.

Thus in modern Ukrainian textbooks, the nation is located within a common European framework, although the study of history includes many elements of national history. This means that we are witnessing the Europeanisation of national history, and seeing at the same time how the nation finds a new place in this European framework. The proportion of space devoted to Ukrainian, European and world history varies in the different textbooks for the fifth to the eleventh grades. These results are displayed in tables 1 and 2.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade Level</th>
<th>About the History of Ukraine</th>
<th>About the European History</th>
<th>About the World History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 – Introduction to History</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – The History of Ancient and Early Times, Ancient History of Ukraine</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 – World History – History of the Middle Ages</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 – World History (16th – 18th centuries)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 – World History (Late 18th century – 19th century)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – World History (1900-1939)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – World History (Period from the Second Half of 20th – Early 21st centuries)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade Level</th>
<th>About the History of Ukraine</th>
<th>About the European History</th>
<th>About the World History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 – Introduction to History</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – The History of Ancient and Early Times, Ancient History of Ukraine</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 – History of Ukraine – Medieval History of Ukraine</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 – History of Ukraine (16th – 18th centuries)</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 – History of Ukraine (Late 18th century – 19th century)</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – History of Ukraine (1900-1939)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – World History (Period from the Second Half of 20th – Early 21st centuries)</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on a detailed analysis of specific history textbooks, it can be stated that today the national perspective is in some cases more readily visible than the European one (for example, in the textbooks for the ninth to the eleventh grades). The curriculum for the ninth to eleventh grades is often oriented around the national narrative. In later editions, as can be seen in the textbooks for the fifth to the eighth grades, Europe is presented more positively and the wider Ukrainian tendency towards integration with Europe is observed. The history of Europe as it appears in Ukrainian textbooks has various aspects. This is displayed in more detail in tables 3 and 4 (the statistics presented in these tables are based on the analysis of textbooks from 2005 to 2014).

**Table 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grade 5 – Introduction to History</th>
<th>Grade 6 – the history of ancient world. The ancient history of Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military actions</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious values</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical location</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture development</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational and scientific processes</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social changes</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grade 9 – History of Ukraine (late 18th century – 19th century)</th>
<th>Grade 11 – World History (period from the second half of 20th –early 21st centuries)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious values</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical location</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture development</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational and scientific processes</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military actions</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organiza-</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social changes</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The observations presented here demonstrate that the image of Europe in Ukrainian history textbooks depends to a certain extent on political processes in Ukraine. Today, as Ukraine strengthens its position as an independent state and is actively in-
volved in European integration processes, the following factors are prioritised in the textbooks’ images of Europe: the representation of European values; the promotion of tolerance in the interpretation of past events; the development of relations with certain states; the movement to an integrated national and world history and an understanding of the fact that Ukraine’s history, like that of any other state, was formed through interaction with other states; and finally the use of new methods which enable students to develop objective judgments regarding the explanation of historical processes.

In addition to the study of European history, there are in Ukraine individual course programmes which can be adopted by education institutions: “relations between Ukraine and the European Union” and “modern European integration processes” (edited by A. M. Kruhlashov and I. S. Nedokus. 100, 101) It is worth noting that despite the fact that Ukraine was seen as distinctly valuable and geographically separate from Europe in the national textbooks of the 1990s and early 2000s, today, particularly since 2014, the historical events and cultural heritage of Ukraine are included in the European space in textbooks.

The visual content of the textbook is changing as well. While in textbooks before 2005 images acted as mere illustrations of the text material, the figures, tables and sources presented alongside the text in more recent textbooks contribute to a deeper analysis of historical events and reflect the relationship of national history with that of not only individual European states, but also of Europe as a whole.

However even today the authors of Ukrainian textbooks do not always succeed in relating the impact of political, economic and cultural events and achievements in European and world history with the situation in Ukraine. This analysis of modern Ukrainian history textbooks, centred around their reflection of Europe, highlights the following ways in which these textbooks create images of Europe: the theoretical material reveals a certain image of Europe; the inclusion of historical documents develops interpretative skills among students which contribute to the development of certain images of Europe; and didactic material encourages students to assess European values and interpret the image of Europe they accompany.

100 Vzayemyny Ukrayiny ta Yevropeys'koho Soyuzu ukladachi Kruhlashov A.M., Nedokus I.S. Prohrama kursu za vyborom dlya ZNZ 10 Chernivets'kyy OIPPO Lyst IITZO vid 05.03.2014 № 14.1/12-H- 385.

101 Suchasni protsesy yevropeys'koyi intehratsiyi ukladachi Kruhlashov A.M., Hev’yuk U.Yu. Navchal'na prohrama spetskursu dlya ZNZ 10 Chernivets'kyy OIPPO Lyst IITZO vid 05.03.2014 № 14.1/12-H.
The elucidation of the main historical events along the organisational principles of Ukraine’s European Choice determines the features of the textbooks’ image of Europe. Thus the textbooks from 1991 to 1995 follow the thematic line of “Ukraine is Europe”; the textbooks from 1996 to 1999 establish the line that “Europe is a common house”; and the textbooks from 2000 to 2016 years observe the strategic line “Europe and the EU is the goal of Ukraine”. Individual historical subsections are tied to Ukrainian-European relations as “European topics” are added to educational material. In some sections the image of Europe has become a priority. Here European integration processes are widely elucidated, covering all spheres of its manifestation: the economic, political, social, legal, cultural, and so on.

Modern Ukrainian history textbooks perform not only an informative and educational function, but also encourage discussion and consideration of controversial historical events. They extend the image of Europe and develop a desire to integrate into the European and international space. Ukrainian history textbooks deal with the following problematic issues: processes and means of integration; the importance and benefits of European integration for Ukraine; and the lessons of the experience of Central and Eastern European countries who have already joined the EU. It is important to note that the reflection of European history and European values in Ukrainian history textbooks allows Ukrainians to enter into the European space and, accordingly, change their state’s cultural policies around historical memory, in order that they might move towards a more open society.

Bibliography


Iwashchenko V. Yu., Kulikov V. O. Kontent-analiz zobrazhen’ u pidruchnykakh z istoriyi Ukrayiny dlya starshykh klasiv/ V.Yu. Ivashchenko, V.O. Kulikov//


Suchasni dyskusiyi pro Druhu svitovu viynu : zb. nauk. st. ta vystupiv ukr. i zarub. istorykov / [uporyadkuv. ta red. materialiv : Yaroslav Hrytsak, Petro Kendz'or, Svyatoslav Turkanyk].– L'viv : ZUKTs, 2012.


Suchasni protsesy yevropeys'koi integratsiyi ukladachi Kruhlashov A.M., Hev'yuk U.Yu. Navchal'na prohrama spetskursu dlya ZNZ 10 Chernivets'kyy OIPPO Lyst IITZO vid 05.03.2014 № 14.1/12-H.
In the Republic of Belarus, like in other countries, the school history course is closely related to the university history course and academic historical sciences; together they form a common academic and educational space. Taking into account the specifics of their professional activities and age, the majority of citizens of Belarus will certainly confine their systematic engagement with history to the school course. Thus the choice of material to be offered to school students is of special significance. It is the knowledge gleaned in school education that proves to be the basis on which the worldview of the majority of our fellow citizens is shaped. We should of course consider a number of sources that contribute to this worldview: education in science and literature, cinema and mass media. However these work on people’s pre-shaped historical picture of the world, and therefore turn out to be of secondary influence. Analysis of educational literature is thus always topical and essential, both in terms of its theoretical interest and cognitive insights, as well as practically speaking: the literature should be corrected when analysis reveals it is lacking. A statement made by President of Belarus A. G. Lukashenko on 12 February 2016 speaks to the significance of this problem; he reminded of the necessity of improving school textbooks, connecting this issue not only to society’s wider needs, but also to the future of university research.102

Educational literature in history in the Republic of Belarus corresponds to the history curricula and syllabuses approved by the Ministry of Education. School students study two historical disciplines: the history of Belarus and world history. The school history course is divided into periods according to the generally accepted periodisation of history. These periods are studied chronologically throughout different school years, beginning with the history of primitive societies at a young age and finishing with recent, contemporary history in the final year of school. Students in the final (non-compulsory) two years of school, grades ten and eleven, revise the entire previous history course, but at a higher theoretical or conceptual level.

It is worth mentioning that the present division of history has been shaped gradually over the course of the recent state’s existence. For example, in the Soviet period and

---

in the first years after obtaining sovereignty, Belarusian school students studied three history courses: history of the USSR, history of Belarus and world history. Some textbooks were inherited from Soviet times (published both in Moscow and in Minsk), while others were developed by Belarusian historians, taking into account new political and ideological realities. Since then the idea of what history should look like in Belarus has been revised several times, including reconsiderations of such issues as what the essential history of Belarus is and the periodisation of history as a whole (for example, chronological frameworks of the Middle Ages and Modern Period), as well as of specific historical events (for instance, the date of the end of the French Revolution). The best didactic and methodological models of learning and teaching history have been sought. In particular there was a refusal to use only Marxist analysis and the social formation approach to history education, and a preference for the methods of the Annales school and civilization approach, among others. Additionally there are new groups of textbook authors.

In the framework of this project I have analysed practically all textbooks and manuals covering the history of Belarus and world history published in Republic of Belarus. On the basis of this analysis, I selected textbooks for inclusion here in which the most characteristic and spectacular ideas concerning Europe are represented. In order to preserve the logic of the source material, my analysis works through the textbooks’ accounts from ancient to contemporary times, examining the history of Belarus and world history separately. In most cases the same groups of authors have worked together for over 20 years (V. M. Fomin, G. V. Shtykhav, V. S. Koshelev, G. A. Kosmach and others). Some authors have published several textbooks (M. O. Bich, P. O. Loiko, I. V. Orzhekhovskiy and others). I also include textbooks which were not re-published following their initial publication (A. F. Miasnikov, V. A. Milovanov).

As is clear from the titles of these textbooks, there is no school subject or specialised educational literature devoted exclusively to the history of Europe in Belarus. Europe is considered either in the context of world history or that of the history of Belarus. Moreover, it is necessary to remark that the image of Europe is far from unified in Belarusian history textbooks. It is diverse and to a great extent depends on the author’s own position, on the age of the students for whom the material is intended and on whether the image arises in the context of Belarusian or world history.

One more important factor to note is that there is a wide belief in Belarusian society that the geographical centre of Europe is situated in the territory of the Republic of
Belarus. This is certainly not the only country to claim such a status; Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Slovakian and other researchers make their cases just as convincingly.\textsuperscript{103} Belarusian school textbooks feature this common claim.\textsuperscript{104} In this case it is not its scientific validity that is important, but rather its social significance. It is a claim that can be regularly heard in the republican mass media and in the speeches of political, public and cultural personalities.

Thus the geographical idea of Europe is familiar and common in the Belarusian intellectual sphere, as well as more widely. For Belarusians, the Europeanness of their country is axiomatic. But, I repeat, this is a geographical understanding of Europe. The ideas of Europe, some familiar and some more unusual, appearing in the educational literature in history have different interpretations and senses: political, ideological, moral, practical, and so on.

Much of the information concerning Europe is given in the form of assertions, fulfilling an obvious purpose. For example, in literature devoted to the ancient period of history, well-known facts are presented which allow school students to understand basic, fundamental truths, and which form their understanding of the fact that Belarus is Europe: “geographically Belarus is situated on the Eastern-European plain”.\textsuperscript{105} The same idea, expressed differently, is present in the textbook by E. Zagorulskiy, as well as in the Manual for Students Entering Universities by A. Kokhonovskiy.\textsuperscript{106} However in the latter the region of Belarus is mentioned not in the context of Eastern, but of Northern Europe: “in the Stone Age the glaciers moved towards Northern Europe, including to our land”.\textsuperscript{107} School students are informed that:

“The Slavs are the biggest group of people in Europe. Slavonic languages form a separate group of Indo-European languages. All the languages spoken in the European nations, as well as by the peoples of Iran and India, are related to and originate from


\textsuperscript{107} Kakhanovskiy et al. (eds), History of Belarus: manual for students entering universities, Minsk: Ekaperspektvy, 1998, 5.
one common proto-language. This testifies to the fact that the majority of European nations have common roots.”

The original homeland of the Slavs is also situated in Europe, in the upper reaches of the Oder, Vistula, Dniester and Pripyat rivers, and stretching to the Dnieper and Desna rivers in the east. Reasons are offered as to why people appeared later in this part of Europe, as to why the local area started participating in historical processes later: “The ancient people settled in the warm south of Europe, and they penetrated the territory of Belarus later, because of its geographical location, and due to its land being covered with glacier”.

We can observe that the authors refer to Europe more often and in more interesting and disputable ways in the textbooks covering Belarusian history of the Middle Ages. In this way Belarusian authors emphasise the correspondence of developments in Belarusian history to those of the wider world and Europe. In particular they remark that “all the nations now in Europe had a feudal system at one stage in their development; that is, they passed through their Middle Ages”. A similar idea is developed in other textbooks. It is pointed out that the establishment of the first Principality of Polotsk coincided with the rise of many Slavic European states and the first states in Scandinavia. This was followed with a period of feudal disunity, simultaneously to those in European countries (Italy, France and Germany).

Alongside these pan-European tendencies, differences in the destinies of various parts of Europe are noted and explained. Considerable attention is paid not only to climatic peculiarities, but also to religious factors. It is stated that the adoption of Christianity in Europe occurred in two stages: first, in the seventh to eighth centuries, the Franks and Britons adopted Christianity, and later, in the ninth to tenth centuries, it was adopted by the Slavs and Scandinavians. “In the thirteenth century the threat

112 Kakhanovskiy et al. (eds.), History of Belarus: manual for students entering universities, 36.
113 Ibid., 44–45.
114 Ibid., 61.
posed by German knights was cunningly disguised by their missionary activities”.\textsuperscript{115} It is noted that afterwards, the Duke of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Algirdas

“created a mighty Orthodox bulwark in Eastern Europe with tremendous potential for further development. But it was not part of the plans of the Catholic West to allow this development to take place. Not without interference in the internal political struggles […] of the Roman Curia and Polish Kingdom – who implemented its policies in Eastern Europe – did the re-orientation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania around Western Catholicism take place”.\textsuperscript{116}

However at the same time the Muscovite state, which claimed to be the continuation of Kiev and Byzantium and the head of all Orthodox Christians of Eastern Europe, conducted “open aggression against its western neighbour”.\textsuperscript{117}

“By the end of the twelfth century two large, distinctly delineated religious zones had been formed in Europe: Eastern Orthodox Byzantium and the Western Roman Catholic zone. Each of them had its own ideology and culture. The border between them went along the Western Bug River. Belarus was at the frontier, the place of collision and interaction of these civilizations. It has a unique historical position in Europe.”\textsuperscript{118}

This notion is expressed most distinctly and consistently in the Belarusian history textbook for the eleventh grade edited by E. K. Novik in 2009:

“The geopolitical situation of the Belarusian lands is characterised by their location at the border of two subsystems of European Christian civilization and culture: Western and Eastern Christianity. In ancient times and the Middle Ages religious denomination was the decisive factor for a land. Originally Belarusians belonged to the Eastern Slavonic Orthodox subsystem of European Christian civilization. However following the Union of Krewo (1385) the influence of Catholicism increased. All the subsequent history of the Belarusian lands was characterised by the society’s division into members of the Orthodox Church and Catholics. The ethnic self-perception of Belarusians is based on the crossroads of three ethnic and cultural traditions: Eastern Slavonic, Baltic and Polish, in which the Eastern Slavonic tradition is prevalent.”\textsuperscript{119}

Finally, the not always friendly relations between Europe and Belarus is accounted for by certain historical and ideological factors. For example after the consolidation of Soviet power in Russia, whereby the BSSR became part of the USSR, Belarus and its

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 78–79
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 94.
western regions which became part of Poland was turned into a *cordon sanitaire*, a buffer between the USSR and capitalist countries who aimed at preventing the dissemination of communist ideas.\(^{120}\)

However there are also other reasons for the differences in historical, economic and political development. In particular, textbook authors are of the opinion that “as a result of becoming part of the Russian empire, the system of feudal serfdom continued for 70 years, which led to considerable backwardness compared to Western countries”.\(^{121}\)

The special role of Europe in the destiny of the region in question is also reflected in the history of the later period of the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. The bourgeois revolutions in the countries of Western Europe also mobilised the Polish bourgeoisie. It led the feudal monarchies of Prussia, Austria and Russia to first partition the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1772) in order to stop the spread of the “revolutionary infection” in the centre of Europe. Afterwards the Polish national liberation movement was developed in close connection with pan-European and French revolutionary movements.\(^{122}\) The representatives of the Polish Uprising of 1863 also placed considerable hopes upon European countries.\(^{123}\) The hopes of some Belarusian public figures for Western European help were revived after the First World War and Russian Revolution of 1917, when the Belarusian People’s Republic was established. However this time Europe again failed to provide diplomatic or military assistance.\(^{124}\)

All the textbooks stress the limited and controlled character of the BSSR’s contact with European countries in the post-war period. Only after the collapse of the USSR and the achievement of independence could Belarus begin to implement the European project itself. However this process turned out not to be so simple, as the textbooks note in the relevant chapters. It is stated that since the early 1990s, taking into account its economic potential and geographical situation, the Republic of Belarus

---

“strived, first of all, for gradual integration into the European and world economy. In 1993, the main foreign trade partners of Belarus were European countries, making up about 70 per cent of foreign trade.”\textsuperscript{125}

However the following factors impeded the development of foreign economic ties: the uncompetitiveness of Belarusian products, the anti-dumping quotas placed on Belarusian produce and the efforts of foreign businesses to export raw materials and foodstuffs from Belarus. As a result of this there emerged in Belarus a desire to make more effective use of the traditional economic ties with the Russian Federation and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Furthermore it is stated that Belarus received ten times more assistance from Russia for the relief of the Chernobyl disaster than it received from all of Western Europe, the USA and international organisations.\textsuperscript{126} One encounters even more forceful statements in the textbooks:

“Western policymakers imposed market reforms on the former Soviet republics using the method of “shock therapy”, hoping by these means to destroy their economies, to very cheaply buy up their lands, enterprises and other assets, to turn the CIS countries into profitable markets for their own products and to source cheap raw materials and labour forces.”\textsuperscript{127}

It is also noted that in contemporary Belarus the chief difference between the political parties consists in their approaches to the socio-economic development of Belarus and its relations with Russia. Opposition parties make a stand against the union with Russia, championing the course of ‘Belarus to Europe!’ and the implementation of reforms following the Western model. Other parties advocate good relations with Western countries, but without copying their models.\textsuperscript{128} Despite these more negative images, Belarus is not depicted as turning away from Europe. On the contrary, Europe remains a sort of example and model. Thus school students are reminded that in the electoral program of the Belarusian presidential candidate A. G. Lukashenko in 2001, an essential stage in the strategic aims of socio-economic development for 2001 to 2005 was an increase in prosperity and an approach towards the standard of living of the economically developed European countries.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{125} Kakhanovskiy et al. (eds), \textit{History of Belarus: manual for students entering universities}, 471.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 472.
\textsuperscript{128} Petrykav, \textit{History of Belarus}, 159.
In addition to this, the textbooks emphasise that Belarus is interested not only in economic cooperation with Europe. The main priority of Belarus’s European policy is the development of a new security system. As early as 1992 Belarus became the first CIS state to sign the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and became an OSCE member. However it is stated with regret that

“in the activities of the OSCE the humanitarian functions of monitoring elections, developing democratic institutions and protecting human rights began to prevail over economic, ecological, military and political functions. Nonetheless, election standards that are equal for all states and approved by all of the organisation’s members have not been worked out; visa limitations for Eastern European countries have been preserved; OSCE members did not provide non-nuclear states with absolute guarantees of security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”130

It is also stated that Belarus itself does a great deal towards providing security in Europe, as the first country not only to proclaim a neutral and non-nuclear status, but also to fully and voluntarily withdraw nuclear weapons from its territory. At the same time Belarus strives for the unification of its educational sphere with Europe, conforming to the Bologna process.131

The textbooks also state that after the 1996 referendum in Belarus, EU leaders decided to put on hold much of its interactions with the Republic of Belarus. However, the textbooks state, because of its geopolitical situation in the centre of Europe, it is impossible to solve the European problems of illegal immigration, human trafficking, drug traffic and border security without Belarus. Belarusian-European relations have unlimited potential and are founded on the acknowledgment of mutual interests in the common European space, first and foremost in the economic sphere. With this in mind, in 2009 Belarus together with Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the Eastern Partnership: “however this project still has a more symbolic than practical character”.132

All the textbook authors without exception acknowledge the considerable and often determining role of European events on the development of Belarus in different historical periods. Among the key factors are European cultural and political developments in general, but especially the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, bourgeois revolutions, Industrial Revolution and the development of socio-philosophical

130 Ibid., 164–165.
131 Ibid., 182.
132 Ibid., 171.
Belarusian authors also admit the constructive role of Europe in the development of Belarusian culture; it is only through European acknowledgement many famous representatives of modernism, including Marc Chagall and Alexander Isachev, became known in the USSR and the post-Soviet space.\textsuperscript{134}

Furthermore it is noted that some realities of life in the Belarusian lands could serve an example for Europe. Thus it is stated that in the sixteenth century, there was much greater religious tolerance in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania than in Europe; various nations and religious denominations peacefully co-existed, arousing the interest of Europeans, who said of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: “here lives God”.\textsuperscript{135} Later, in the epoch of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, events in Belarus “did not assume those abhorrent features which characterised Western Europe (the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre, the fires of the Inquisition)”.\textsuperscript{136} At the same time the Union of Brest of 1596 is described as having been initiated by the Catholic Church in Rome; considerable territories of Europe were now beyond the control of the Popes, and Catholics were either converted to Protestantism or conquered by Muslim Turkey. In order to compensate for these losses, the Union was agreed in the lands of Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{137}

It is quite popular in Belarusian educational literature, as well as in Belarusian society in general, to emphasise the special status of Belarus as compared with the rest of Europe. It is stressed in the textbooks that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was one of the largest European states in the Middle Ages,\textsuperscript{138} or even the largest.\textsuperscript{139} Not infrequently sentiments are expressed which are intended to arouse in school students pride in their country as it appears in the European context: “the history of the Belarusian nation vividly confirms that Belarusian culture, historical heritage and language was at those times equal to that of other European nations”.\textsuperscript{140} Some authors state with pathos

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{133} Kachanav, Martsul’, Novik et al, \textit{History of Belarus: the late eighteenth century to 1999}, 8–11, 33.
  \item\textsuperscript{134} Sidartsov, Famin and Panov, \textit{History of Belarus 1917–1996}, 142–143.
  \item\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 96, 52–54.
  \item\textsuperscript{137} V. A. Belazarovich, I. P. Kren and N. M. Ganuschanka, \textit{History of Belarus: second half of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth centuries: manual for the eighth grade of secondary schools with Belarusian and Russian languages of instruction}, Minsk: Publishing Centre of BSU, 2010, 56.
  \item\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Illustrated Chronology of the History of Belarus: from ancient times to the early twentieth century}, Minsk: BelEn, 1995, 5.
  \item\textsuperscript{140} G. V. Shtykhav, \textit{History of Belarus in the Middle Ages: manual for the fifth grade of secondary school with Belarusian and Russian languages of instruction}, Minsk: Narodnaya Asveta, 2002, 189.
\end{itemize}
that “Belarus enriched Europe with the first constitution and the world with its classical medieval law”.\textsuperscript{141} A few years later this statement appears somewhat differently: “Belarus enriched Europe with its classical medieval law”.\textsuperscript{142} Belarusian textbooks state that it was in their lands (as a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) that the first Ministry of Education in Europe was created in 1773.\textsuperscript{143} On 3 May 1791 the first constitution in Europe (and the second in the world, after the USA) was adopted by the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{144} Elsewhere it is specified that it was the first state in Europe to establish a secular sphere of education\textsuperscript{145} and the first bourgeois constitution in Europe.\textsuperscript{146} One can find even more emotional statements: “our motherland has the most honoured place among the countries of Europe and the world. Firstly, because its history spans many hundreds and even thousands of years, and secondly as it has had such a hard destiny: contradictory, complex and long-suffering”.\textsuperscript{147}

The views of Belarusian historians with regard to national history in the European context is expressed the most concisely in the following statement: “Belarus is a part of Europe and therefore the Belarusian people move along their historical path simultaneously with Europeans”.\textsuperscript{148}

In the world history textbooks Europe is considered from another perspective. It is treated not in comparison with Belarus, not as part of or opposed to “us”, but as an object of study equal (at least, in theory) to other objects.

It is important to mention that sometimes the omission of Europe is most telling in these textbooks. For instance in the textbook by G. Dovgialo, M. Korzun and K. Reviako, in the description of most ancient civilizations (Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and China) there is reference to the continent in which these civilizations appeared. But in the chapter on Ancient Greece there is no mention of its belonging to Europe.\textsuperscript{149} In fact this testifies to a deeply rooted Eurocentrism on the one hand, and to an identification with Europe on the other.

\multicolumn{1}{l}{\textsuperscript{141} P. A. Loika, \textit{History of Belarus: manual for the seventh grade of secondary school}, Minsk: Narodnaya Asveta, 1993, 3.}
\textsuperscript{142} Loika, \textit{History of Belarus from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries}, 1998, 3.
\textsuperscript{143} Kakhanovskiy et al. (eds.), \textit{History of Belarus: manual for students entering universities}, 166.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 167–168.
\textsuperscript{145} Belazarovich, Kren and Ganuschanka, \textit{History of Belarus}, 152.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 142.
\textsuperscript{147} A. F. Miasnikov, \textit{History of Belarus: from ancient times to the present day: questions and answers}, Minsk: TetraSystems, 2004, 3.
\textsuperscript{148} Novik (ed.), \textit{History of Belarus}, 5.
A special view of Europe is presented in the textbooks edited or written by G. A. Kosmach. He does not write about European civilization, but rather about Western civilization, to which Europe, the USA and Canada belong.\textsuperscript{150} He indicates that “after the Second World War the size of Europe diminished, not in a geographical, but in a political and information-cultural sense”, resulting in the desire of Europeans for integration.\textsuperscript{151} He also states that after the war military and ideological confrontation in Europe coincided with the struggle between the Slavic and Germanic peoples. Broadly speaking it also coincided with the border between Orthodox and Catholic cultures.\textsuperscript{152} Moreover, his textbooks contain optimistic expectations of European integration; and he also claims that by the late twentieth century “Western civilization has been and still remains the engine of the world’s social development”.\textsuperscript{153}

One of the most popular and highly sought-after textbook authors is V. S. Koshelev. He has been author and editor of modern and recent history textbooks for school students in the seventh to eleventh grades for over 20 years. Thus the image of Europe provided by this author dominates in Belarusian schools. In a generalised form this image, present in all of his textbooks, can be described in the following way. European civilization is one of the main world civilizations. It is based on religious values. Christianity is the most important component of European civilization. The division of Christianity into the Catholic and Orthodox Churches had an impact on the course of the entire European civilization. Russian Orthodoxy was different to Western and Central Europe. At the same time, the divergence in the destinies of various parts of Europe began much earlier, with the division of the Roman Empire into west and east. European relations with other civilizations were also complicated, including crusades against the Muslim world, and in modern times the colonial expansion that became an inseparable part of European civilization. Europe annexed territories, robbed and exterminated the indigenous populations in America, Asia and Africa, becoming the ruler of the world. The acceleration of Europe’s development was a tragedy for the peoples of Asia, Africa and America. Europe received the initial capital for


the development of manufacturing from the colonies, thereby damaging their opportunities for growth. The European slave trade was also fatal for the development of Africa. At the same time, Europe brought to other nations the achievements of its thought, science, technology and parliamentary democracy. However, the First World War demonstrated that the successes of Europe were accompanied by the fatal tendency towards internal destruction. After the First World War the influence of Europe decreased, and the Second World War only made matters worse.

The author stresses one important moment: having established its domination over the world, whereby for the first time one civilization conquered the whole world, Europe set up close interrelations between countries and civilizations. As a result, history truly assumed its global character, and the world “ceased to merely be the sum of countries and civilizations isolated from one other”.154

He also notes the reasons for differences inside Europe:

“The European continent includes several territorial regions with their own natural and climatic peculiarities, characterised by differences in the origin and historical destinies of separate populations, in their economic systems, cultures, beliefs and so on. In contrast to barbarians of the Western Europe, who kept contact with Rome and adopted the traditions and achievements of antiquity, thus quickly establishing the feudal Western European civilization, the Slavs did not maintain a close relationship with the Greek and Roman world. As a result, the vast territory of the Slavs became a kind of bridge between feudal Europe and the half-wild Asia. Slavonic nations were destined to receive equal streams of civilizational influence from Western Europe and from Asian tribes.”155

Thus it is evident that in general, the image of Europe in Belarusian textbooks is positive, but not homogeneous. Europe is understood as a geographical, political, cultural, ideological and strictly historical concept. Each concept should be treated on its own terms. Belarus is conscious of its being part of Europe. At the same time, it also realises the contradictions inherent in its position: it is situated in the geographical centre of Europe, but it is on the periphery of European political and economic life. Frequently “Europe” is understood by default to denote the countries of Western Europe. In this respect, the Belarusian consciousness persists in the paradigm of the Old and New Europe that was popular at the turn of the twenty first century, as the EU was

155 V. S. Koshelev et al., World History: from ancient times to the late eighteenth century: textbook for the tenth grade of secondary school with Russian language of instruction, Minsk: Narodnaya Asveta, 2000, 159–160.
extended with the accession of former members of the socialist bloc. Perhaps because of this Belarusians strive to compare themselves to Europe, to find and demonstrate the examples of its unique character for Europe.

Examples of textbooks’ comparisons with the rest of Europe, along with their evaluative judgements of Europe, are important because they allow Belarusians to systematise their knowledge not only of Europe, but also of themselves, to see themselves through a European lens. In addition to this, they allow other Europeans to see themselves through another’s eyes, and also to see Belarus, and its expectations, claims, grievances or grounds for pride. Frequently some very important questions are omitted from our field of vision: who do Europeans themselves consider to be Europeans, and what in their opinion is Europe? These questions are significant, because interlocutors can often possess different frames of reference. The following is an example of this: all of the contributors to this volume position themselves as Europeans, at least in the geographical sense. At the same time, on the website of the German branch of the well-known delivery and logistics company DHL, the geographical division of the world is different to the division familiar for us. Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia belong to what is called “Zone 2: Europe beyond the EU”; and Azerbaijan and Armenia belong to “Zone 3: the world”, which includes the countries beyond Europe.156

That is why, it seems to me, there is a need for a complex levelling of perceptions of Europe and its social, economic and political realities. School education is certainly one of the most significant sites for this project. However if knowledge is not put into practice, it remains just white noise.

It is remarkable that there is neither a school subject nor a textbook based on the history of Europe in the Republic of Belarus. It is likely that the introduction of such a subject and the development of a corresponding textbook, which took account of all the dividing lines as well as unifying elements, could promote further rapprochement of peoples and countries. However in order to even the playing field, similar subjects and textbooks should be developed in all European countries. Furthermore these should be unified, in order to aid the development of a common vision of history and

156DHL Deutschland, “Preise und Produkte für Ihren weltweiten Versand”, https://www.dhl.de/de/privatkunden/preise/preise-international.html, last access 20 April 2017. May 11, 2017, the numbers of Zones changed, but the essence remained the same: Zone 3: Europe beyond the EU – includes Belarus, Zone 4: Russia, Zone 6: the world – includes Armenia and Azerbaijan.
reality. But here a new problem arises: who (which country, nation, organisation or political power) will define and monitor this common, equal and fair approach?

Bibliography

Textbooks


**Other literature**


Images of Europe in Moldavian Textbooks
(Andrei Antonov)

Introduction
‘Europe’ is a term with a real intensity and complexity of meaning. Geographically it represents a subcontinent which can include the eastern part of Russia, up to the Ural Mountains and Caucasus. Economically it represents countries like Germany, Switzerland, France, Belgium and Great Britain: the west of Europe. Ideological concepts of Europe have varied greatly. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s notion of the federalisation of Europe, involving the unification of European nations, represents an inter-war period concept of Europe. In the post-war period, following the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the catalysts for unification were created. Nowadays the idea of Europe is thought to carry with it the values that make it an example for other states. One thing is certain: the geographical, economic, political, social and cultural meaning of Europe is shifting constantly. These shifts are reflected in European society and in academia too. The Republic of Moldova is no exception.

History textbooks are a tool that shapes new generations. This chapter aims to analyse the perception of Europe in Moldavian textbooks at different times in the contemporary epoch. Presented for analysis are ideas of Europe or ‘Europeanness’. The sources used are history textbooks published after the year 2009; this choice is explained below. Descriptive, analytical and deductive methods are employed. The overall goal is to synthesise and understand the evolution of images of Europe in Moldavian textbooks.

History textbooks in the Republic of Moldova
During the twentieth century, when the Republic of Moldova was a part of the USSR, all social life was strongly influenced by the Communist regime by means of propaganda. The purpose of the regime’s totalitarian ideology consisted in the creation of a new Soviet people. Moldova underwent much change as a result of Soviet occupation, as the regime directly rewrote history from the perspective of communism.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, national identity became a crucial issue. In the years immediately following 1988, Moldavian society accelerated through a spiritual transformation, the result of which was the construction of at least two identi-
ties.\textsuperscript{157} National identity represents a dispute among large parts of society, and is considered a challenge to the political class. This state of affairs can be explained as the remnants of Soviet thinking, or as due to the lack of experience of democratic governance in this territory.

In the Republic of Moldova there is a series of history textbooks called Istoria Românilor [History of Romanians], covering the history of the Romanian space (including the territory of the Republic of Moldova), and wider history. Textbooks with titles like Istoria Românilor și Universală, [Romanian and Universal History] or Istoria integrată, [Integrated History] represent attempts to frame national history within an international framework. The titles of history textbooks have a specific character in the Republic of Moldova. Moldavian textbooks are written by historians who consider national history to be Romanian history. This is grounded on a historically common language, tradition and territory. Four different textbooks written after the year 2009 were selected for analysis here. After the elections in 2009, pro-European parties grew in power to the detriment of the Communist Party. The Communist regime of 2001–2009 attempted to replace the title Istoria Românilor [History of Romanians] with Istoria Moldovei [History of Moldova]. These attempts were abandoned due to the opposition they faced. The textbooks analysed here are intended for use in the graduating class, in the study of contemporary history. The term ‘Europe’ plays an essential role in the creative and cognitive process of these students. In these new textbooks, past movements and concepts are presented in more critical and objective terms than previously. Were the authors subject to less political pressure?

To write a history textbook is to represent the perceptions of the past that persist for a community, a society, a state. In this chapter, I will identify the place of the European space in national history and determine the image of Europe in textbooks covering recent history: 1914 to the present day.

The period of nationalism: Romania and Europe in the inter-war period 1918–1939

The starting point of contemporary history in Moldavian textbooks, as in other countries, is the year 1918, the end of the First World War. This period is characterised by the collapse of continental empires and the emergence of new states on the map of Eu-

Europe. In national history the year 1918 represents not only the end of the war, but also the reunification of all Romanian territory. As a result there appeared a new state in Eastern Europe: Romania. The international context at the end of the First World War created an opportunity for the realisation of a national ideal, the Great Union. This was the creation of a new territorial, social, economic and demographic framework.\(^{158}\) The new state and its territorial boundaries were recognised under international treaties.\(^{159}\)

The inter-war period is presented as characterised by the signing of many treaties. Romania is presented as actively involved in European politics. It signed a number of agreements with countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. At the same time, the Romanian government intended to establish close ties with great powers like Britain and France, the main guarantors of the Paris peace treaty.\(^{160}\) Following its initial international recognition, the Romanian state is described as a politically active European player. In the political life of inter-war Europe, Romania was able to represent its interests at the League of Nations; we see this emphasised in all textbooks. This organisation was the most important international structure during this period, bringing together influential figures from the fields of politics, economics and diplomacy. Moreover, the president of this organisation was a Romanian politician, diplomat and foreign minister. This is presented as a point of pride. The national spirit is felt in Nicolae Titulescu’s statements on foreign policy included in one textbook: “Romania’s foreign policy is not founded on a monopoly of one man, nor on the prerogative of a party. It is a profound national policy, whose rules, methods and purposes originate in the homeland’s interests”.\(^{161}\)

As this period continues, it is marked by the duality between two political systems: democracy and dictatorship. Europe is presented as a battlefield for these social, political and economic systems. A comparative table including the main features of different political systems is provided, allowing students to more easily understand and categorise them. After the rise to power of Fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, and the Communist regime in Russia, Europe is presented as divided into two parts.\(^{162}\) In the eve of war, the question of Romania’s standing in relation to this duality was rendered

\(^{159}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^{160}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^{161}\) Ibid., 21.
quite complicated. This was a difficult time for Romania’s foreign policy as it was dicta-
ted by the fear of the state losing independence, as both sides had territorial claims
against Romania.\footnote{Vizer and Nagnibeda-Tverdohleb, \textit{Istoria Românilor}, 50.}

The end of the war is represented in the context of accounts of international con-
ferences.\footnote{Anatol Petrencu and Maia Dobzeu, \textit{Istorie Universală: manual pentru clasa a IX-a}, Chişinău: Ştiinţa, 2011, 42.} The phrase ‘liberated Europe’ is included in the textbooks. The indirect
message of this phrase is the idea that totalitarian, dictatorial regime is incompatible
with the true values of Europe, which excludes the Soviet regime. Soviets troops are
described as hostile in the textbooks; their purpose is to dismantle the Romanian state,
including Moldova.\footnote{Vizer and Nagnibeda-Tverdohleb, \textit{Istoria Românilor}, 57.}

**The Communist period in national history: post-war Europe and the Cold War**

In Moldavian textbooks the situation in post-war Europe is presented through an ac-
count of peace treaties between the wars’ victors and the defeated parties, including
the Paris Peace conference from July to October 1946. Particular mention is made of
the peace treaty between Romania and the Allies: “with the defeat at Stalingrad, it be-
came clear that Germany had lost the war. Romania sought a way out of the war”.\footnote{Ibid., 57.} One of the most painful consequences of the war was the loss of Bessarabia, which
included the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR). “New political tensions
emerged across the world after the Second World War, triggering the Cold War and
divergences between the former allies; this created an extremely unfavourable situa-
tion for Romania”, making the Romanian delegation’s job at the conference extremely
difficult, not least with regard to the Bessarabia problem.\footnote{Ibid, 57.}

**Sovietisation of Central and South-Eastern Europe**

Special attention is given to the study of the Sovietisation process in Central and
South-Eastern Europe. This process came in many forms, such as Titoism, Maoism
and that of the Ceauşescu regime, which was closely linked with Stalinism. At the
same time, anti-Communist resistance and national movements in Central and South-
Eastern Europe are featured in the textbooks. Examples include revolts in the GDR and Budapest, among other states.\textsuperscript{168}

Moldavian textbooks also describe movements between Communism and the democratic system, through the situation in European states suffering under Soviet influence. An example is the topic called “post-war Germany”, an example of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy.\textsuperscript{169} Reference is made to the western part of Germany, in which there was established a democratic political regime based on the principles of sovereignty of the people, separation of power and a multi-party system. A special case study in Moldavian textbooks is the Berlin Wall, which has already entered into the consciousness of students as a symbol of the Cold War. It is also indicated by the name ‘Wall of Shame’.

The territory between the Dniester and Prut rivers was again occupied by Soviet forces in 1944. This reorganised the political and economic life of the province. In these areas a totalitarian regime, a version of Soviet colonialism, was established. Soviet occupation is perceived as a negative phenomenon which caused economic, cultural and social harm. Strong emphasis is placed on the most heinous crimes of the Communist regime in the MSSR: social transformation, organised famine and deportations to Siberia and the Kazakh steppe.

Europe appears in these textbook narratives as a symbol of freedom: this can be seen in the accounts of the radio station Free Europe. It is important to note that the phrase ‘Free Europe’ appears in Moldavian textbooks in accounts of anti-Communist movements.\textsuperscript{170} The image of Communism is presented as standing opposed to European freedom. Its expansion into Central European countries is seen as a military threat. Even in Western Europe, Communist propaganda spreads as economic difficulties rekindle social struggles and the democratic government is challenged. The textbooks provide examples of Communist expansion into Western Europe: in Great Britain during the post-war years, there arose an exceptional situation in which two Communists were elected to the House of Commons. Additionally the proportion of votes obtained by French and Italian Communists increased.\textsuperscript{171}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{169} Enciu, \textit{Istorie, Epoca Contemporană}, 56.
\textsuperscript{171} Enciu, \textit{Istorie, Epoca Contemporană}, 140.
\end{flushright}
In essence, the image of post-war Europe in these textbooks is not greatly different to that of inter-war Europe. The Soviet regime is seen as in many respects no different to any other totalitarian regime; this is of course an oversimplification. Case studies on the repression of the Prague Spring and the invasion of Czechoslovakia serve in these textbooks as a condemnation of Communism.

**National history and perceptions of Europe during the collapse of the USSR**

The last years of the Soviet Union are described in the terms of revolutionaries. The national spirit was worn by internal crises, low standards of living, acute economic crisis and food crisis. The national liberation movement was amplified. Such movements grew in strength across the Communist world, other than in Cuba and Korea. The hope for radical change penetrated Romanian society. These different national movements are presented with a spirit of solidarity. Romania and the MSSR were two separate states, but their national movements supported one another.¹⁷²

The textbooks describe a crisis which, in a domino effect, spread to all Communist states in Europe. An account is given of the establishment of the first non-Communist government in Poland in 1989.¹⁷³ Hungary opened its borders to East German refugees, and tens of thousands of people emigrated from East Germany to West Germany. Social transformations occurred in many other countries in Eastern Europe. In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell: the symbol of the Iron Curtain and the Cold War.

In Moldavian textbooks the Soviet vision of the “common European house”, headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, is presented as a new project which fits the new political mentality. Europe is understood as a whole even as it is recognised that numerous different social and political orders co-exist within it.¹⁷⁴ It is presented in the textbooks as an attempt to build political and economic bridges between Europe and the Soviet Union; a new war would be catastrophic for Europe, given its atomic stations and chemical plants. The new approach in Europe is the result of security concerns.

At the same time, Moldavian textbooks describe in detail events in the final period of the Soviet Union’s existence. Economic and social policy is heavily criticised, and the fight for a state language and for the use of the Latin alphabet intensifies; this is described in the context of revolutionary movements. This period of national history

---

¹⁷³ Ibid., 94.
¹⁷⁴ Petrencu and Dobzeu, *Istorie Universală*, 93.
heavily features European history; the national becomes more universal. This can be observed in the textbooks’ emphasis on common European phenomena, in the form of national movements in a context of governmental and economic crisis.

The period of democracy: national history in the first years of the Republic of Moldova’s independence

Following Mikhail Gorbachev’s removal from power, favourable conditions were created for Soviet Union republics to declare their independence. The Republic of Moldova declared its independence on 27 August 1991. The new state’s early history is described in textbooks as a time of hope and new possibilities, a time for affirmation as a state. The wide international recognition that followed Moldova’s proclamation of independence created the possibility for the state’s inclusion in the European system. Europe’s image undergoes a transformation; now it represents a standard in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres.

Romania and the Republic of Moldova – Europe’s new image

The Romanian state has a very important position in Moldavian textbooks, not only because of a common past, tradition, and language, but also due to both state’s foreign policy ambitions with regard to Europe. In specifying the direction of Romanian foreign policy, Moldavian textbooks clearly denote the Romanian desire to be a part of the European Union. This includes, according to the textbooks, the desire for Euro-Atlantic integration, meaning membership of the European Union, NATO, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe, along with security cooperation on a sub-regional level, the development of bilateral relations and increased involvement with international organisations, among other aims.

The official request from Romania for accession to the European Union was presented on 22 June 1995. Romania was among the first states to consign the European Council’s instruments of ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In the same period, Romania established strong relationships with NATO. The Moldavian textbooks’ inclusion of all this information on post-socialist Romania denotes the importance to Moldova of its neighbour’s desire to be

---

175 Vizer and Nagnibeda-Tverdohleb, Istoria Românilor, 103.
176 Ibid., 103.
177 Enciu, Istorie, Epoca Contemporană, 174.
178 Ibid., 174.
part of a wider European family, in which human rights, democracy and collective security are seen as essential elements.

Moldova’s own relations with the European Union are given also given special weight in the country’s history textbooks. In the years following the state’s independence, the Republic of Moldova became a member of several prestigious international organisations, such as the United Nations (on 2 March 1992) and the Council of Europe (on 14 April 1995). The relationship with the European Union is described as a strategic priority. Mentions of the EU in the textbooks demonstrate its high popularity in Moldavian society (the textbooks also list other organisations such as NATO, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the United Nations). The textbook topic called “European Integration at beginning of the third millennium” again features the EU as part of the new course for the state. Here the European Union’s ultimate image as a standard or etalon is particularly clear. Many articles about the EU are brought together in the textbooks; one of them states that any European state can request membership, but that it must meet the following criteria: democracy, respect for human rights and respect for minorities’ rights, among many others.

A good example demonstrating attitudes towards Europe can be found in a case study in a history textbook for the ninth grade, entitled “European Integration of the Republic of Moldova”. The following question is presented as part of an effort to correctly inform students about the European Union: “what does the European Union represent?” This is part of the authors’ introduction to the EU as the primary economic and political power on the European continent, composed of 28 states. In parallel to the EU’s current developments, the origins of the EU (in the European Coal and Steel Community) are presented. The second chapter presents Europe as the principal point of reference in the external politics of the Republic of Moldova. Recently there was a Moldavian coalition in government called the “Alliance for European Integration”, including three political parties. In this chapter, we can also see that in the first year of this pro-European government, Moldova is described as a model for

179 Ibid., 174.
181 Ibid., 112.
182 Ibid., Seitenzahl?
183 Ibid., Seitenzahl?
other states, particularly for members of the Eastern Partnership; the Moldavian government is called a success story.\footnote{Ibid., Seitenzahl?}

It is important to remark that in the final chapter covering this topic, the students’ attention is focused on comparative analyses of the European Union and the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.\footnote{Ibid., Seitenzahl?} Here students are required to develop their cognitive-analytical skills, while learning to identify the common and distinctive features of these two unions. The image of the Customs Union in this textbook is based on its ability to offer natural gas and a marketplace for Moldavian wines.

In another textbook by Enciu Nicolae, the EU is presented foremost as a political power that monitors and supports the Republic of Moldova in its times of crisis.\footnote{Enciu, \textit{Istorie, Epoca Contemporană}, 178.} As an example, the author describes the attitude of the European Union and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe towards internal tensions in the Republic of Moldova in the year 2002.\footnote{Ibid., 178.} Textbooks include EU recommendations for the Moldavian government, such as “establishing a real dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition [and] the announcement of a moratorium on certain historical issues and the obligatory study of the Russian language”.\footnote{Ibid., Seitenzahl?}

Students are also presented with a table of the results of a survey of citizens, in which participants were asked to express their opinions on various international organisations:

\textit{How do Moldavian citizens view international organisations? (2003)}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{How do you view each organisation?} & \textbf{Proportion of respondents who answered “positively” or “very positively”} & \textbf{Proportion of respondents who answered “negatively” or “very negatively”} & \textbf{Proportion that did not respond} \\
\hline
NATO & 37\% & 23\% & 40\% \\
OSCE & 41\% & 11\% & 48\% \\
International Monetary Fund & 46\% & 11\% & 43\% \\
Commonwealth of Independent States & 49\% & 15\% & 36\% \\
World Bank & 52\% & 19\% & 29\% \\
Council of Europe & 54\% & 5\% & 41\% \\
United Nations & 58\% & 7\% & 35\% \\
European Union & 65\% & 5\% & 30\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
Conclusion

History textbooks represent the general perceptions any society has of the past. At the same time, the authors of these textbooks shape future societies. Undoubtedly, Europe is present in Moldavian textbooks in many different forms, encompassing diverse concepts and impressions. As I have outlined, the concept of Europe in Moldavian textbooks appears in broadly three stages: the period of nationalism, the Communist period and the democratic period. Each of these periods has a distinct approach to and view of Europe. Recent history is covered in the Moldavian curriculum only in grades nine and twelve. The images of Europe here are clearly influenced by the fact that the concept of the Europe is of great relevance and significance for students. The textbooks examined here were published since the year 2009, and thus display a different approach to the past to history textbooks produced before 2009, under the Communist regime.

Writing history textbooks is a challenge. I do not wish to make a determination as to whether or not the authors in question rose to this challenge; there will always be unhappy parties when it comes to the representation of history. My concern is with tracing the development of images of Europe as these authors see fit to present them. In the period of nationalism the central theme is the Great Union of Moldova and Romania. Here the authors identify Romania as a European state. It is period of treaties in which every pact with a European state provides an opportunity to present oneself as European. The Romanian state is presented as actively involved in European diplomacy in the inter-war period.

It is interesting to remark that in the totalitarian period, the period of Communism, Europe is at all times either depicted as parallel to the Soviet Union, or set against background images of the Soviet Union or Russian Federation. In my opinion, this practice may be perfected such that in future, phobias of Russia or Europe may be avoided, even with the current confrontation and media war between Russia and Europe and the US. At the same time, this comparative method is a successful one more generally speaking, as it creates the opportunity for students to understand the common and distinctive elements of different systems.

In the Cold War context, Eastern Europe under Communism is presented as a collection of totalitarian states in which human rights and freedoms are violated. Parallel to this, there are topics in which European states (Great Britain, Germany, France and others) are presented as powerful, with the potential for great development. Building
on this image, Europe finally achieves its newest image, the image of etalon, in the period of democracy which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ultimately the greatest factors determining concepts of Europe in these textbooks are the political and economic.

**Bibliography**
What Images of Europe Arise out of Georgian Textbook Narratives?
(Nodar Shoshiashvili)

Introduction
The subject of my research is images of Europe in Georgian history textbooks. During the 1990s, world history and Georgian history were taught as separate subjects in Georgian schools. Students in the ninth grade, for instance, studied world history, while students in the tenth grade were taught Georgian history. This division continued until the beginning of the twenty first century. With the educational reforms of 2006, history became an integrated subject. Thus the world history taught in upper classes included Georgian history. My research is divided into two parts: the first treats Europe’s portrayal in the narratives of textbooks dealing in Georgian history, while the second covers images of Europe in world history textbooks.

Representations of Europe in Georgian narratives
History textbooks written during the Soviet period contain old narrative stereotypes, according to which in the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries, prior to the incorporation of Georgia into Russia, the entire history of the Georgian people was a struggle to defend their national identity against Islamic powers, particularly the Ottomans and Persians. Due to this, the textbooks state, Georgia could not become part of Europe in that period. At the same time, the Georgians are stated to have succeeded in maintaining their religion, and to have attempted to make ties with Christian Europe.

Georgia’s annexation by Russia is represented in Soviet Georgian textbooks as a positive and progressive event, with Russia returning Georgia to Christian civilization. The 1990s were a period of great upheaval in Georgia, in which many state institutions and structures were dissolved, and the influence of anti-Communist circles grew. A history textbook released during this time, designed for the eighth and ninth grades, evaluates the union with Russia as follows:

“The constant wars and raids against the country decreased, and gradually it was able to overcome its fragmentation and develop its economy. The Georgian people joined the struggle of other peoples against Russia’s autocracy and serfdom. But the conditions for the rapid economic and cultural development of the country had already been created.” ¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁹ N. Asatiani, V. Guruli, M. Lortqipanidze and S. Meskhia, Saqartvelos Istoria 8-9 klas [History of Georgia Grade 8–9], Tbilisi, 1990, 286.
Here the incorporation of Georgia’s principalities by Russia is condemned, yet positive aspects of this process are also acknowledged. Such a representation of Georgian history is found in Georgian textbooks until the 2000s. Later, as the process of rapprochement between Europe and Georgia began, the existing narrative changed fundamentally. The foreword to a new edition of a textbook on Georgian history from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries contains the following:

“The main feature of this 117 year history of the Georgian people is its struggle against Russia’s colonial oppression. This was the struggle to save Georgia and Georgianism”.190

In these textbooks, Europe is accused of passivity and inactivity:

“In view of the total passivity of the Western European states, Russia succeeded in overcoming the political and military resistance of Persia and the Ottoman Empire and conquered Georgia in the early nineteenth century”.191

The old historical narrative is replaced by a new one in which Georgian development is hindered not only by Persia and the Ottoman Empire, but also by Russia, which wanted to destroy Georgian identity with its colonial policy. In these textbooks the independence gained by Georgia in 1918 is represented as an attempt to found a European state, one that was derailed by its annexation by Russia in 1921, which blocked the road to the European community.

The concept of development represented in Soviet and post-Soviet scholarship was based on a theory of the existence of several social forms: slavery, feudalism, capitalism and communism. In the Soviet period Georgia’s traditional “backwardness” was explained by the fact that the country was unable to repel the attacks of the Persians, Turks, Arabs and other Eastern peoples. This then became the reason why Georgian rulers were unable to overcome the old feudal system and introduce new capitalist conditions.

With Russia’s entry into this region, according to Soviet period textbooks, the highest social form, socialism, was established. Textbooks from the 1990s and 2000s on the other hand depict capitalism as the highest form of society, and the Soviet Union as the main evil, the cause of all erroneous developments and the source of many...

190 M. Vachnadze. and V. Guruli, Saqartvelos Istoria 9 klasi [History of Georgia Grade 9], Tbilisi, 2001, 3.
191 Ibid., 4.
grievances. Europe is represented as the only real and valuable model of development, one that should be followed by Georgia.

Georgian history textbooks published in 2001 for the ninth to the eleventh grades describe the grave socio-economic situation in Georgia after the restoration of its independence. In addition, they portray multiple attempts by Russia to inhibit Georgian’s integration into Europe.

“Eduard Shevardnadze was a politician whose foreign policy was vectored on the West. But because of the political instability that prevailed in Georgia during his reign, he was forced to turn to Russia […] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia was forced to join the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], which was established at the initiative of Moscow.”192

Regarding the achievements of Shevardnadze, two points are particularly emphasised in these books. The first is the adoption of the new constitution in 1995 and the second is the consistent foreign policy course of the Georgian government. In the opinion of the textbook authors, he had two priorities: namely to approach NATO, and to consolidate existing ties with the EU. Some major economic projects implemented in Georgia this period are also described. A great emphasis is, of course, given to Europe and the USA’s assistance to Georgia. Due to their support, the decision to withdraw Russian military bases from Georgia was pushed through at the 1999 Council of Europe summit in Istanbul. This is reduced in the narrative to a story of Europe helping Georgia in its struggle for liberation from Russian influence.

In the history books published in 2007 and 2012 the already existing narrative was supplemented by a new one. This new narrative could be termed the ‘return to Europe’ or ‘return home’. On 27 January 1999 Georgia became a member of the Council of Europe. Prime Minister of Georgia Schwania’s famous statement on the occasion is emphasised by the textbook authors: “I am Georgian, therefore I am European”193. Georgia’s Rose Revolution is represented as the final victory of the pro-Western foreign policy course of the country. Russia is a factor which consistently attempts to derail improving relations between Georgia and the West. One textbook includes the following:

“In 1991 Russia became the legal successor of the Soviet Union. The Russian government decided therefore to restore its influence over the former Soviet republics.

192 Ibid., 195.
193 Pirtskhalava, L., G. Sanikidze and N. Kiguradze. Istoria 12 (klasi) [History 12 (Grade)], Tbilisi, 2013, 9.
Every attempt by these post-Soviet nations to implement Western structures led to an extremely negative reaction from Russia.\(^{194}\)

In these textbooks, the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 is regarded as Russia’s revenge on Georgia for its efforts to become the part of the West.

“After 2003 Georgia’s efforts to join the Euro-Atlantic security system increased significantly. The tireless attempts by Russia to halt this process proved ineffective. The only thing Russia could do in this situation was to involve Georgia in a new military conflict. For this to work, Georgia had to appear as instigator of the conflict.”\(^{195}\)

In all Georgian history textbooks up to 2012, the opinion that Georgia managed to maintain its sovereignty only thanks to the support of the world community prevails. According to this narrative, Georgia now plays important role in the conflict between Russia and Europe or the West; Europe may no longer allow Russia to regain this region, as happened in the 1920s. Georgia, meanwhile must do everything in its power to return to Europe, where it can secure peaceful and rapid development.

**The evolution of images of Europe in Georgian textbooks**

Europe and the West generally are widely represented in Georgian history textbooks published in the period of Shevardnadze’s rule and after the Rose Revolution, and these representations are strikingly different. The chapters devoted to the history of Europe and the US are obviously lengthened. The ‘modern history’ textbook published in 2001 handles the events of a much longer period, namely from 1919 to 1991. The distribution of the topics looks similar to before, and the presentation of the history of the continents is more or less unchanged. From 2012 Georgian textbooks are much more Eurocentric in their approach to history. The majority of chapters are dedicated to the history of the United States and Western Europe, with some to Georgian and Russian history, and only six chapters covering the history of the rest of the world.

Structurally the textbooks published in the 1990s are compiled in such a way that each chapter is devoted to a single country and a given historical period. The 2012 textbook for the twelfth grade has a different structure. Chapters deal not with the history of one country but with general processes. These include such historical events and phenomena as, for example, Napoleon’s War, the First World War, the Second

\(^{194}\) N. Axmeteli, B. Kupatadze, G. Abdaladze and N. Murgulia, *Istoria 12 (Klasi) [History 12 (Grade)], Tbilisi: [PUBLISHER], 2012, 326.

\(^{195}\) Ibid., 328.
World War, totalitarianism, the Cold War and so on. The only exception is one chapter devoted entirely to a single country, namely Georgia.

The latest editions of history textbooks feature two narratives. The first one claims that German National Socialism and Soviet totalitarianism are equal evils with hardly any difference between them. The second narrative is that the Cold War was a conflict between the West on the one hand, championing freedom and human rights and promoting prosperity and economic development, and the totalitarian Soviet Union on the other. Georgia assumes a central place in this narrative. It is presented here as victim of oppression. Georgia was and is a bearer of Western values, as opposed the Soviet Union, and now Russia. Georgia is regularly punished by Russia for its efforts to achieve freedom and build democracy.

History textbooks for the ninth and eleventh grades published in 2001 explain the objectives of the EU similarly. The unification of Europe, meaning peaceful relations between European countries and the presentation of a united force in confrontations with world powers, is the prerequisite for Europe to become the third “world power”. Europe should be able to protect itself from both American economic dictatorship and Soviet expansionism. According to these textbooks, the promotion of economic development is the main reason for Europe’s unification. The so-called Schuman Plan plays a significant role in this.

“According to Schuman, the forming of such an alliance would lead to the reconciliation of France and Germany and a new war between the two nations in future would be not only unimaginable but materially impossible”.197

The books list various European structures and institutions and provide brief descriptions of them. The focus is on efforts to maintain common economic interests. There is little mention of shared values or culture.

In textbooks published from 2007 to 2012 the EU is represented quite differently. It is not treated in isolation but rather in a sub-chapter dedicated to the topic of globalisation. According to these textbooks, the goal of globalisation is the formation of a common market based on the principles of free trade and bolstered by unified worldwide political administration. Common systems for the protection of human rights and defence are set up additionally. The authors of these textbooks consider the formation


197 Ibid., 79.
of the EU to be the highest achievement of globalisation to date. In this respect, Europe and the USA are treated as equal. The authors also maintain that it would be impossible to halt the process of globalisation. They underline the positive elements of this process: as they see it, continuous economic growth and the spread of prosperity.

The textbooks contain one main primary source. This is the Treaty of Maastricht, which laid the foundations for the formation of EU. The Treaty contains three conditions which must be met by EU member states. They are as follows: the state must first have stable institutions, maintain democracy and the rule of law and safeguard human and minority rights; the state must have an efficient market economy; and finally the state should be able to meet its obligations under EU membership. The later textbook authors stress that democracy and the protection of democratic values are much higher priorities for the EU than economic factors.

In the textbooks released in the 1990s and 2001, topics such as Western society or culture are omitted completely. These texts deal exclusively with political and economic history. In the textbooks published in 2012, modern society and culture are analysed from different perspectives. One contains a chapter entitled “Modern Society and Culture”. Here only European and American societies and cultures are featured. The textbooks have the same basic structure. Issues such as youth movements, the struggle of African Americans against segregation and women’s movements are discussed.

Youth movements are evaluated differently in different textbooks. One highlights the hippy movement’s renouncement of capitalist lifestyle. In another this movement is analysed in the context of “left-wing movements”. In general, the textbooks describe the decline of youth movements as “a natural phenomenon”. Feminism is connected with the “sexual revolution”; however the textbooks leave this “sexual revolution” entirely unexplained. According to these textbooks the ultimate result of feminism was the “assertion of the image of businesswoman and its protection in society and in law”. The authors present some positive phenomena of Western mass culture, including some of its representatives, such as Elvis Presley and the Beatles. Numerous quotations by prominent personalities are provided in the chapter devoted to mass cul-

198 Ibid., 304.
199 Abduladze, G., B. Kupatadze, N. Axmeteli and N. Murgulia. Istoria 12 (klasi) [History 12 (Grade)], Tbilisi, 2012, 315.
ture; these are positive assessments of its development. However high school textbooks entirely omit such topics as sexual minorities, multiculturalism, welfarism and secularism, along with all of those aspects of European society which the researcher of European culture John McCormick identifies as Europe’s main values.200

The following conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of these textbooks: students are presented with the general notion that there is a conflict between the West and Russia, and that in this conflict, Georgia represents the interests of Europe. That is why Georgia is in conflict with what the textbooks depict as Reagan’s “evil empire”201. In this narrative, Europe is synonymous with democratic values and a free economy. NATO and the EU have taken the place of communism, and the archenemy of Georgia is no longer the capitalist system, but instead Russia.

Bibliography

Textbooks

Abduladze, G., B. Kupatadze, N. Axmeteli and N. Murgulia. Istoria 12 (klasi) [History 12 (Grade)], Tbilisi, 2012.


Axmeteli, N., B. Kupatadze, G. Abdaladze and N. Murgulia. Istoria 12 (Klasi) [History 12 (Grade)], Tbilisi, 2012.


Medzmariashvili, E., T. Papasqiri, M. Papashvili and R. Daushvili. Istoria 8 (klasi) [History 8 (Grade)], Tbilisi, 2012.


Pirtskhalava, L., G. Sanikidze and N. Kiguradze. *Istoria 12 (klasi)* [History 12 (Grade)], Tbilisi, 2013.


**Other literature**

The “Europeans of the Orient”: The Relationship between Armenia and Europe in Armenian History and Geography Textbooks

(Mikayel Zolyan)

When addressing representations of Europe in Armenian history and geography education, it is useful to distinguish three aspects of the issue: Europe’s delineation as a geographical or civilizational entity, the role of Europe in Armenian history and Europe considered as a contemporary political project. Such a division of course involves a certain degree of simplification, as these three aspects of the representations of Europe often overlap. Nonetheless it will serve as a helpful analytical tool.

Armenia: Europe or Asia?

When it comes to defining Europe as a geographical entity, Armenians face a serious dilemma: can Armenia be considered part of Europe or not? Geographical entities are social constructs, and that is especially true of the European ‘continent’. Traditionally most definitions have treated the Greater Caucasus mountain range as the border of Europe, which would mean that while the North Caucasus is technically a part of Europe, the South Caucasus, or, to use the more Russian term, Transcaucasia, is not. To this day, different international organizations and private corporations hold a variety of views on the issue of whether the South Caucasus is part of Europe; some list Armenia and the other South Caucasus countries as part of Europe, while others list them as part of Asia.

There is no objective geographical basis on which Armenia or other South Caucasus countries can be identified as part of Europe or Asia. However in political terms these countries are increasingly seen within the European context. The accession of Armenia (and Azerbaijan) into the Council of Europe (CoE) in 2001 has acted as a major piece of evidence for the ‘European’ side of this debate (Georgia was accepted into the CoE even earlier, in 1999), as has the inclusion of the South Caucasus in the Eastern Partnership. However the debate has not been resolved on either an international scale, or within Armenia itself.

Armenian geography textbooks place Armenia and other South Caucasus countries in South-West Asia.\(^{202}\) At the same time the textbooks remind students: “we should always remember that the dividing border between Europe and Asia is a conventional

---

The “Europeans of the Orient”: The Relationship between Armenia and Europe in Armenian History and Geography Textbooks

border, which is only pictured on maps […] no such border exists in nature”.203 One of the most recent geography textbooks, in its treatment of South-West Asia, states that “historically, the countries of the South Caucasus have also been part of this region”.204 The word “historically” leaves open the question of whether the South Caucasus should be considered currently part of Europe or Asia.

Textbooks also stress the borderland nature of Armenia’s geography, identifying it as part of the region connecting Europe to elsewhere: “the Republic of Armenia is situated at the crossroads of international transportation routes, connecting Europe to Central and South Asia, and Russia to the Middle East”.205

Somewhat curiously the textbook also states that “Armenia is situated in the zone of mutual influence of three civilizations: the European, Oriental and Slavic”, with “Slavic” apparently acting as a euphemism for “Russian”, and considered a separate “civilization”.206 To add to the confusion another textbook lists the following “civilizational regions”:

“Western Europe, East-Central Europe, the Russian-Eurasian region, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia, South-East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America, Australia, Oceania”, without making clear in the passage to which of these regions Armenia should belong.207 At one point it is mentioned in a Middle Eastern context: “in Armenia and other countries of Western Asia, grain, grapes and other cultures were cultivated”.208 Elsewhere the textbook asserts that the Commonwealth of Independent States, which includes contemporary Armenia, is part of the Russian-Eurasian region.209 Yet it also states that Armenia, among other countries, is trying to instil “European values” into its political, economic and cultural systems.210

Thus, when it comes to geography, textbooks place Armenia outside of Europe, though at the same time stressing that the border between Europe and Asia is a conventional one, leaving space for other interpretations. Textbooks also highlight Armenia’s connections to Europe and other regions and ‘civilizations’, and its historical role

203 Ibid., 9.
206 Ibid., 27.
208 Ibid., 127.
209 Ibid., 128.
210 Ibid., 127.
as a borderland and crossroads of civilizations. As a result, in the mesh of symbolic geography to which Armenian students are exposed in their education, an image emerges of Armenia as an entity that cannot be decisively included in Europe, or the ‘Oriental’ or ‘Slavic’ world, but which at the same time is closely connected to all of them.

The help that never came: European powers in Armenian historical narratives

It has been seen that from the point of view of geography, Armenia’s relation to Europe is a matter of debate in which textbooks are more inclined to see Armenia as part of Asia. However it is a different matter when it comes to defining the place of Armenians and Armenian cultural heritage from a historical perspective. Here Armenians are seen as a people and culture closely connected to Europe, in spite of geographical distance; Armenia may geographically be part of ‘the Orient’, but Armenians are ‘the Europeans of the Orient’. Such perceptions have led to narratives of Europe ‘abandoning’ Armenia, failing to offer help at times when such help was badly needed.

In order to better understand the place of Europe as a historical entity in Armenian history education, something must be said of the image of Europe and Europeans in the Armenian national historical narratives that evolved during the Armenian ‘national awakening’, and which became the basis for current narratives of national history. As in much of Eastern Europe, a process of national revival began in the late eighteenth century, in which the modern paradigm of Armenian national identity was created through the efforts of intellectual and political elites. There is a saying attributed to the Russian ‘Slavophiles’ that sums up one of the approaches of the Russian tradition: ‘Russia is in Europe, but not of Europe’. Armenia’s relation to Europe as it was imagined by late nineteenth century Armenian intellectuals (and more widely) can be described as the inverse of this approach: Armenia may not be in Europe, but Armenians are a European people. The characterisation of Armenians as ‘the Europeans of the Orient’ is common among both Armenians and others.

According to this view, important elements of culture and historical heritage separated Armenians from their Muslim neighbours in the Caucasus and Ottoman Empire, and united them with Europe. Among these elements, the most important, though not the only one, was Armenia’s Christian heritage. Armenians take pride in being ‘the first Christian country’, and by the end of the nineteenth century, ‘Christianity’ came
to be seen as a synonym for ‘Europeanness’. This view of Armenians as an essentially European people translated into a political programme, which aimed to bolster the ‘national liberation’ of Armenia with help from Europe, represented by the so-called ‘Great Powers’. When it became obvious that the Great Powers were in no hurry to assist in liberating the Armenians, and, moreover, were unwilling or unable to save Armenians from massacres and genocide in Ottoman Turkey, Europe came to be seen in a different light. The idea emerged that Europe had betrayed the trust of Armenians, encouraging their hopes of “national liberation”, but failing to offer assistance when it was required.

In textbooks this idea is seen in accounts of numerous episodes of Armenian history, with blame distributed to varying degrees between ‘naïve’ Armenian leaders and the ‘West’, ‘Europe’ or the ‘Great Powers’. This pattern of narrative is reproduced in descriptions of various historical epochs. The first time the narrative is dominated by this paradigm is in an account of events of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia was engaged in a mortal struggle with its mostly Muslim neighbours, namely the Sultanates of Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt. Cilician Armenia cooperated with the Crusaders; however when the Crusader states were overrun by the Muslim sultanates, Cilician Armenia found itself in grave danger. One of the ways in which the Cilician kings tried to secure their state was in appealing for help from the Pope in Rome and Western European kingdoms. Help was promised, but never materialized. Eventually, the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia was conquered by the Mamelukes of Egypt. This is how this episode is assessed in one textbook:

“...The Armenian court sent requests for assistance to Western states and the Pope of Rome, but these requests brought nothing about. European countries were unable to organize new crusades to alleviate the difficult situation of Cilician Armenia. Under these circumstances the Western European states and the Pope of Rome in fact made false promises to the Armenians. They stubbornly demanded that Armenians accept Catholicism, thus inflaming the clashes between “unitors” and “anti-unitors” [i.e. proponents and opponents of union with the Catholic Church]. The internal unity of Armenians was undermined, and the state could hardly resist the attacks of the enemies.”211

The same paradigm (Armenians requesting help from Europe; Europe promising help, yet doing nothing) is reproduced in the sections of the textbooks that deal with the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Here the textbooks briefly depict Armenia as deprived of its independence, divided between Muslim rulers (the sultans of Ottoman Turkey and the shahs of Safavid Iran), and suffering under a foreign yoke, with constant wars among their Muslim sovereigns. At the same time the national liberation movement is described, with the most space devoted to telling the story of various “missions” to Europe, which aimed at securing assistance in the “liberation of Armenia”, but ended without results. This is the part of the narrative in which Russia enters the scene: one of the “ambassadors”, Israel Ori, who failed to receive assistance from various European monarchs, among them the Elector of the Palatinate Johann Wilhelm, ends up in Russia, and receives a promise of assistance from the Russian Emperor Peter the Great. Peter the Great eventually also fails to help the Armenians after concluding a peace treaty with Iran. The textbook describes these events in neutral terms, without offering any moral assessment of the Russian’s failure to help the Armenian cause.

The episode in which the moral failure of Europe is greatest from the point of view of the Armenian national narrative is the extermination of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: specifically, the massacres of Armenians under Sultan Abdul Hamid, and the Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916, as well as the massacres and ethnic cleansing of Armenians of 1917–1923. It is in relation to this period that the harshest judgement is passed on the role of Europe in events depicted, in one of the textbooks from the mid-2000s:

“The Allies cheated the Armenian people [...] their pro-Armenian position was insincere [...] the hopes of the Armenian people were futile and groundless, particularly the hopes that the West would help”.

Thus in discussion of the late medieval, early modern and modern periods, when European powers enter the narrative of Armenian history, they are presented as unreliable friends who have failed to protect Armenians from the threats they face. Interestingly this narrative rests on the assumption that it was the moral duty of Europeans,
from the Crusaders and the Pope in the Middle Ages, to the ‘Great Powers’ of modernity, to aid and to protect Armenians. This reveals a perception of Armenians as members, or at least as close relatives, of European ‘civilization’, defined mostly in terms of Christian heritage.

**Europe today: a successful project with its difficulties**

Finally, the third dimension of the image of Europe in the Armenian textbooks is contemporary Europe considered as a social and political project of integration. One geography textbook explains the European Union in the following way:

> “[the EU is an] economic union of 26 European countries and one Asian country (the Greek Republic of Cyprus) with roughly similar economies, which aims, through the implementation of common policies, to counter competition from other centres of international trade – the USA and Japan. Conditions are put in place to allow the free movement of goods, capital and labour between the members of the EU, and a common currency has been introduced.”

Economic development is apparently one of the most important features of the image of contemporary Europe in Armenian textbooks. European countries, especially Western European countries, are treated explicitly or implicitly as a standard of socio-economic success. In this respect it is quite telling that in an excerpt explaining the concept of geo-economics, the textbook uses the example of Western Europe as contrasted with Armenia’s neighbours in an explanation of Armenia’s unfavourable geo-economic position:

> “[…] the geo-economic position of the Republic of Armenia is not beneficial in this respect, since neighbouring countries do not have the desired high level of development, as, for example, Western European countries do”.

Economic efforts are not the only aspect of the contemporary European project that Armenian textbooks present. One history textbook sums up the process of European integration as follows: “since the 1950s the idea of a united Europe has materialized step by step”, yet “the process of the creation of a united Europe, however, has its difficulties […] specifically, the serious issue of how to combine national and pan-European values”. Given the recent rise in right-wing populism and nationalism in EU countries, the discussion of difficulties relating to the question of “how to combine

---

218 Ibid., 71.
national and pan-European values”, written in 2008 when the textbook was published, seems almost prophetic.

One geography textbook, in a chapter entitled “Processes of Political and Economic Integration in Western Europe”, starts its treatment of the “historical prerequisites of European integration” with a discussion of the ancient roots of “Western European civilization”. It states that “the formation of Western European civilization took place under the long-standing deep influence of ancient Greco-Roman cultural heritage”, and proceeds to describe how the “Barbarian tribes of Central and Northern Europe” found themselves taking on “cultural influences” and undergoing “assimilation of peoples” during wars against Southern Europe, “which had been under the influence of Ancient Greece and Rome”.220 Then it gives an account of the period of feudalism, up to “the formation of an industrial capitalism that became a stimulus for the development of Western European civilization, aided by the Reformation and the wide influence of Protestant Christian norms”, referring also to Enlightenment philosophy.221 The textbook proceeds to describe more contemporary realities, focusing on the post-war process of European integration:

“The unification of the coal and steel industries of France and Germany, based on a project developed by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Shuman and the French economist and political scientist J. Monnet, is considered the beginning of the “construction” of a united Europe.”222

European integration is divided into four stages, with the contemporary period as the fourth:

“The fourth stage of the development of European cooperation (from the mid-1990s to the beginning of the twenty first century) was marked by the creation of a united economic space […] and by the signing of the Treaty on European Union […] This was a qualitatively new stage of European economic integration. The EU is a political alliance, which envisions not just inter-state economic, financial and humanitarian cooperation on a high level, but also coordination on issues of foreign policy and security.”223

In general, history and geography textbooks offer a positive picture of the European Union, presenting it as a largely successful social and political project, despite certain difficulties in its implementation. Armenia’s cooperation with the EU is stressed

221 Ibid., 39.
222 Ibid., 40.
223 Ibid., 42.
by the authors; however the textbooks do not touch upon the issue of whether or not Armenia may undergo integration into Europe in the future. As such the overall attitude to the European Union represented by Armenian textbooks can be assessed as positive, but cautious. Thus the geography textbook describes the relations of Armenia (and other post-Soviet countries) to the EU as follows:

“Since independence economic and political relations between the EU and Armenia have been advancing. Since 1991 within the framework of various programmes our country has received aid of about 700 million euro. Today the EU is Armenia’s largest trade partner: in 2008, 35.3% of Armenia’s foreign trade (1,698 USD) was with the European Union. The Republic of Armenia is participating in a new initiative adopted in 2009, the EU Eastern Partnership, along with 6 other Commonwealth of Independent States countries. This is a new programme of EU-Eastern integration.”

In another textbook, the relations between Armenia and “Western European civilization” are explained in the following way:

“Many countries, including Armenia, which are involved in various European structures, strive to integrate their political, economic and even cultural systems with those [European] values”.

In such matters the authors of this and other textbooks deal with what is evidently a politically difficult and even potentially dangerous topic, given Armenia’s recent political shifts between relations with the European Union on the one hand, and relations with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union on the other. Armenia was involved in negotiations for an Association Agreement with the EU, which also contained provisions for the establishment of a common free trade area (a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area), but made a U-turn in September 2013, announcing its decision to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (which later became the Eurasian Economic Union) instead. However in spite of joining another economic bloc, Armenia continued to pursue a policy of developing cooperation with EU, and by the end of 2016 was involved in new negotiations for an Association Agreement (albeit without the free trade area provisions). These oscillations reflect the complicated internal and external settings of Armenian politics. It is apparent that the authors of

---

224 Ibid., 43–44.
225 Manasyan, Geography: tenth grade, 127.
the textbooks had to tread carefully when dealing with the topic of Armenia-EU relations.

Thus, while Europe is seen as a successful political, economic and social project, the textbooks refrain from clearly defining Armenia’s relation to that project. There are a number of questions surrounding what that relation is or should be. Should Armenia be part of the European project? Should Armenia follow the European model without being part of its project, or can that model apply to Armenia at all? The textbooks leave such questions unanswered, and, for the most part, unasked.

Bibliography
Self-Orientalisation as a Practice of Europeanisation: Images of Europe in Azerbaijani History Textbooks
(Sergei Rumyantsev)

Introduction

In contemporary Azerbaijani historical narratives, “the West” and ‘Europe’ are categories which coincide to a great extent. The West, a construction of the discourse around civilization, is of course greater than Western Europe. In certain periods of the Azerbaijani historical narrative, the West is associated with the ‘Christian bloc’, which, according to the authors of such narratives, consisted of the Byzantine Empire, along with lands ruled by Armenian and Georgian feudal lords. Alternatively it is associated with ‘the north’: the Russian Empire. The USA, evidently part of the West, very rarely appears in the pages of national history textbooks.

In the outline of historical events featured in these textbooks, the imaginary collective of the West is most frequently cast in the role of external enemy or opponent. It can decide the ‘success’ of Azerbaijan; it can impede the nation’s progress or inhibit independence or modernity. But it does not possess enough power to stop these processes entirely. In the long run, according to the authors, the talented and courageous Azerbaijani nation will persevere; it will triumph in every imaginable predicament or conflict with the West.

226 As Alexander Etkind states: “West and East are not geographical concepts, but cultural constructions in which the changing configuration of historical powers is expressed”. Alexander Etkind, “The Shaved Man’s Burden: Internal Colonization”, in: Ab Imperio 1 (2002), 265–298, 269. According to Vera Tolz, the categories of East and West are not based in objective reality; rather they are cultural and political constructions. Vera Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient: the Politics of Identity and Oriental studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 5.
Relations with Europe or the West (more broadly conceived) are relegated to the periphery of the historical narrative. The political successes and cultural achievements of the Azerbaijani people and nation are presented as having been produced independently of “Western influence”. Europe and the West appear rarely in the narrative, and in this way they are marginalised. Yet at the same time, Europe is present in the textbook as a political and cultural reference point, against which Azerbaijan might analogously build its own political or educational systems. However this may be pursued only upon the condition of the compulsory preservation of Azerbaijan’s own ‘spiritual values’ and ‘national traditions’.

The influence for the orientalist language of the narrative, which claims the intellectual power of the West over the East, need not be mentioned explicitly. The narrative compensates for leaving the borders of the West vague by confidently assigning Azerbaijan to the East. In language inherited from Soviet times, the historical narrative employs the method of retrospective teleology, whereby the myth of the millennia-long struggle for the independence of the Azerbaijani nation, which reached its climax in the modern independent nation-state, is asserted.

The path implied by the orientalist discourse that penetrates the whole narrative is a gradual transformation from an oriental Azerbaijan into a European Azerbaijan: a process that is considered a kind of “normalisation”. However this vision of a normalisation is not easily accommodated by the language and discourse that surround self-orientalisation. Azerbaijan, as a country and a nation, has always been, and remains, in the East. Thus it achieves in its narratives a status equal to that of any Western European country by casting Azerbaijan as the most “progressive” country in the Muslim East in its historical myths. Azerbaijan completes its normalisation, in the authors’ opinion, by transforming into a European country. However, this transformation myth’s reliance on the language of orientalism ensures that a hierarchy of countries is maintained.

228 It can be said that with any story of ethnogenesis, whether Soviet or post-Soviet, we are dealing with what Pierre Nora calls a “cult of continuity, the confident assumption of knowing to whom and to what we owe our existence”. Nora indicates “the importance of the idea of ‘origins’, an already profane version of the mythological narrative, but one that contributed to giving meaning and a sense of the sacred to a society engaged in a nationwide process of secularization. The greater the origins, the more they magnified our greatness. Through the past we venerated above all ourselves”. Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, in: Representations 26 (Spring 1989) 7–24, 16. While for Nora and France such continuity might no longer hold, for Azerbaijani historians it remains quite resilient.
The orientalist discourse that determines the framework of Azerbaijani-European relations in these textbooks undergoes very little change from Soviet to post-Soviet times, as compared, say, to the dynamics of public policy. In general in Azerbaijan, relations with Europe and the wider West have become more and more topical in recent years, and open anti-Europeanism has become more widespread.

**Political context: the official anti-European discourse**

The authoritarian practices of the country’s rulers reflects the confidence of the regime in its ability to manipulate public opinion. The regime faces little difficulty in its sudden choices to pursue friendly or hostile relations with other countries. At the same time it strives to inform its population about its often rapidly changing preferences.

After two and a half decades of Azerbaijani independence, the imaginary collective of the West, which in the 1990s was perceived as the source of democracy, and a cultural and social standard, has gradually been transformed into a threat to Azerbaijani prosperity. Nowadays Europe and the West are seen as greatly influenced by the Armenian lobby. They are the main sponsor of the “fifth column”, Azerbaijan’s internal enemy: a construction of government ideologists and the mass media, which consists of the so-called “radical opposition”, independent human rights activists and, in general, any critics of the regime.

By the spring of 2015 anti-European and anti-Western discourse had become extremely influential. Print and online news, and especially tabloids, have in the recent years have been dominated by stories on the double standards of European Union policies. Ordinary Azerbaijani citizens are informed of the prejudiced and unjust attitude of the West towards the practices prevailing in their country by means of numerous speeches by the President, interviews with public officials of the highest level and deputies of the National Assembly (Milli Majlis), articles, headlines and analytical texts. The reason for this latest excitement of anti-Western mood can be found, paradoxically, in an all-European event for which the county’s government had been preparing: the first European games were held in June 2015 in Baku. The previous out-
burst of anti-European mood observed in 2011–2012 arose in a similar situation when Baku hosted the Eurovision competition. This pattern is easily explained. By hosting a prominent all-European event, the country, and the authoritarian regime ruling it, calls more careful attention upon itself. Any criticism accompanying recognition by Europe is especially painful for the Azerbaijani regime.

This strong and often hostile criticism has not revealed real intentions of breaking economic, or even cultural, ties. For example, the Heidar Aliyev Foundation has sponsored the renovation of artworks and restoration projects in the Louvre, Versailles and the Cathedral of Our Lady in Strasbourg since 2007. Monuments to various famous Azerbaijanis have been erected in European countries. One of the first was the monument to the composer Uzeyir Hajibeyov in Vienna, erected in May 2006. In 2012 a monument to the twelfth century poet Nizami appeared in Rome. A monument to the former president Heidar Aliyev was erected in Bucharest in 2004. The current president, Ilham Aliyev, the son of Heidar Aliyev, has attended numerous European events and made official visits to Western European countries.

Anti-Western and particularly anti-European discourses are constructed in response to the criticism concerning human rights violations and the harsh suppression of the political opposition in Azerbaijan. The official position, repeatedly expressed by the president and his closest associates, is to demand acknowledgement of the democratic reforms and transformations made by the country. Any attempts to contradict government statements are classed as the hostile rhetoric of “supporters of the Armenian lobby” and the powers of “the fifth column”, who strive to organise a “colour revolution” or “political spring” in the country, and to overthrow the legitimate government. Thus according to the official discourse, statements regarding undemocratic character of the Azerbaijani regime can be heard only from enemies of the country and its people.

Neither individual European countries nor Europe as a whole, as an imaginary united cultural community, are reckoned to be such enemies. Rather the enemies of the prosperous Azerbaijan in Europe are various international human rights organisations and foundations, individual unsympathetic politicians and members of parliament, and the mass media where critical videos or text appear. However the Azerbaijani regime does not accept that there is freedom of the media, and thus judges all critical films and publications to be officially sponsored.
This anti-Europeanism provides a background against which the developments of textbook narratives in the post-Soviet period, and the role of Europe in them, can be placed. On the one hand, the modern official anti-European discourse has had little influence on the content of the latest version of these narratives. Europe, like the West in general, remains on the periphery of key processes and events that are presented as determining the history of Azerbaijan. The textbook authors cannot keep up with the dynamics of political preferences. On the other hand, the rare mentions of Europe or European countries in the history textbooks as a rule carry negative connotations. As they are infrequent and non-emotive, these mentions most frequently do not contradict official anti-European discourse.

The Azerbaijani history curriculum in the post-Soviet period

In early 1990s, almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR, there began in Azerbaijan a process of developing and publishing new national history textbooks. The new curriculum was based on texts produced in the USSR. The further the narrative delved into past centuries, the more its revision consisted merely of changes in the tone of descriptions of events. It barely altered the array of heroes, political figures and cultural personalities first constructed by Soviet specialists. Two forms of post-Soviet nationalism, as defined by Rogers Brubaker, influence the contradictory content of these national history narratives. On the one hand, there are features of ‘‘nationalising’ nationalism’, whereby “the core nation is understood as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state, which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation”.230

These textbooks exhibit traces of traditions that stem from institutionalisation in the times of the USSR, when a number of the dominant groups (including the Azerbaijani) acquired the status of ‘titular nations’. At the same time, the situation in post-Soviet Azerbaijan to a certain extent has features of a ‘‘protective, national-populist nationalism that seeks to protect the national economy, language, mores, or cultural patrimony against alleged threats from outside’’.231 Important here is not only protection from ‘outside’ influences, but also compensation for the time when Azerbaijani language and culture held, to some extent, a subordinated position in the hierarchy of

231 Ibid., 238.
languages and cultures officially recognised in the USSR. It is in light of this that textbooks should be analysed: with an understanding of the specifics of Soviet national policy and post-Soviet nationalism.

Most considerably revised were the events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the arrival of the Russian Empire to the South Caucasus and the establishment of the Soviet regime. The modern conflict with Armenia for control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region has had a remarkable influence on the entire narrative. The tone of the narrative changes as historical events are interpreted no longer through the lens of class struggle, but rather through one of the centuries-long uncompromising struggle for national state independence. As with all historical narratives created for similar purposes, in the case of Azerbaijan, textbook authors “speaking on behalf of their [...] lost and found again motherland are all situated in the centre of their own worlds”.232 With such an approach, the entire world outside the borders of Azerbaijan becomes periphery. External agents appear, as a rule, in the role of enemies or, much more rarely, of allies in the now millennia-old struggle for independence and statehood. European countries other than the Russian Empire are rare guests on the pages of national history textbooks.

Part of the narrative’s contradictory character consists in the juxtaposition of rare moments where Azerbaijan is assigned to the European region with frequent statements that it is in the East. This inconsistency reflects the dominant official discourse regarding the location of the nation, which places it between two different worlds, in the grey zone between East and West. This location allows association with Europe or the East in different contexts. The latter evidently dominates.

In Azerbaijan only one set of textbooks is approved for use in schools. Using Marc Ferro’s terminology, we might speak of a singular “institutional history”, “which dominates as it expresses or legitimises policy, ideology or regime”.233 In this case we must add to Ferro’s list the function of supporting the current Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. According to Michel Foucault, this institutional history will alongside the above-mentioned features remain the same indiscriminate and overwhelmingly political his-

232 Marc Ferro, The Use and Abuse of History: or How the Past is taught to Children, Moscow, 1992, 305–306.
tory of “governments, wars and famines”. The attempts of historians to systematise this inordinate history in accordance with, most frequently, ideological concepts and purposes, which they set for themselves, or the regime sets for them, contribute to even greater inconsistencies in the narrative. This is reflected to the fullest extent in the images of Europe that appear in Azerbaijani history textbooks.

**Azerbaijan as a European and Oriental country**

The national history course is intended to cover seven school years. The first lesson of the introductory narrative begins by assigning Azerbaijan to the European region:

“Prominent scientists across the world came to the same conclusion following extensive research, creating a valuable map entitled “The most ancient inhabitants of Europe”. There are many countries and nations in the world, but included in this map are only the names of countries with an ancient history and glorious past. One of these countries is our native Azerbaijan! Your nation is one of the most ancient inhabitants of Europe, one of the ancient inhabitants of the world – the great Azerbaijani nation!”

It is one of very few examples in which Azerbaijan is explicitly situated in the European region, and it is not further explained in any way, or repeated elsewhere in the text. In the textbook for the sixth grade, which again and in great detail recounts events from ancient history, Europe is not mentioned. Where the narrative touches on prehistoric times, Azerbaijan is called “one of the oldest places in the world”. In a further description Azerbaijan is depicted as a strictly oriental territory, the space of non-Europe.

One can find additional indications of Azerbaijan’s ‘Europeanness’ only in the textbook for the eleventh grade (the final school year). It is mentioned in the concluding paragraphs which tell of the economic collapse of Soviet Azerbaijan in the late 1980s and early 1990, and the subsequent political and economic achievements of presidents Heidar Aliyev (1993–2003) and Ilham Aliyev (2003 to the present). Here the authors include the second direct statement of Azerbaijan’s geographical Europeanness, listing among the losses Azerbaijan sustained as a result of the war with

---

Armenia the following: “107 hectares of forest situated in the Zangilan District of Azerbaijan, the second largest in the world and the first in Europe, was lost to the enemy”. 237

In the rest of the narrative relations with Europe appear mainly in the context of participation in political institutions and the establishment of economic and cultural ties. It is in this context that the authors determine the political and geographical position of Azerbaijan. In the same eleventh grade textbook students are informed of the key event which defined the status of Azerbaijani-European relations:

“The first days of the twenty-first century were marked with a special event in the foreign policy and diplomacy of Azerbaijan. At a meeting held by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 January 2001, the decision was taken to grant Azerbaijan full membership of the Council of Europe (CoE). On 25 January, the flag of our country was raised in front of the headquarters of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France. As a result, Azerbaijan became not only a part of the geographical Europe, but also a part of the democratic Europe.”

Thus the geographical situation of the country in the “south-east of Europe” by the textbook authors finds, at last, significant confirmation in the political field. Azerbaijan, which under the Aliyevs’ rule achieved the culmination of the development into statehood, whereby “independence assumed a staunch and irrevocable character”, is finally transformed from an Eastern country into a European one. This transformation is marked by more and more achievements in the political, economic and cultural fields.

“In spring 1997 [Azerbaijan] joined the European Cultural Convention. […] After becoming a member of the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan joined the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms. From that moment the country undertook the responsibility for improving of national legislation in accordance with European standards. […] Azerbaijan integrates into the Euro-Atlantic space at an accelerated rate. […] With the extension of the European Union into the east in 2004, Azerbaijan, as a country of the South Caucasus, was included in the European Neighbourhood Policy in the framework of the EU policy of “enlargement”. It further developed good neighbouring relations between our country and the European Union,

________________________

creating the basis for a new level of cooperation. [...] The result of the extended partnership of our country with NATO is the admission of Azerbaijan as an associate member into the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Prague Summit in November 2002. [...] In January 2014 the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev participated in the International Economic Forum in Davos and successfully defended the interests of Azerbaijan.”238

Finally Azerbaijan’s belonging to Europe is confirmed through the discourse around the high level of its national culture. Within the oriental discourse, the quality of cultural achievements is measured by recognition in Europe:

“...At the first international film festival which took place in France in 1996, the feature film “Yarasa” was recognised as “the best full-length European film”. [...] In 2011 the Azerbaijani contestant won the “Eurovision” competition, and as a result our country hosted the next song contest.”239

In the discourse that propagates Azerbaijan’s transformation from an Eastern country into a European one, the textbook authors finally abandon euro-critical rhetoric. They champion Azerbaijan’s development from the “first state in the East” into a part of Europe at the turn of the twenty-first century. With this sentiment the authors conclude the narrative of the long history of the country’s normalisation: the history of its successful transformation from Eastern colonial country into modern European nation. However the implicit message is that the country achieves normalisation only thanks to recognition by Europe and the West. Despite this discourse of recognition employed by the authors of the narrative, Azerbaijan remains an Eastern country, even as it is called one of the first European ones.

Bibliography

Textbooks

---

239 Ibid., 198, 213.

**Other literature**


Ferro, Marc. *The Use and Abuse of History: or How the Past is taught to Children*, Moscow, 1992.


In the last quarter century in Russia significant changes have taken place both in general perceptions of Europe and in the content of history textbooks. In the 1990s Europe emerged as a kind of ideal in Russian public opinion, to which countries can and should strive due to its obvious superiority in the spheres of material and spiritual prosperity. At that time and in subsequent years a number of words with the prefix “Euro-”, indicating the high quality of the goods, services or values denoted, appeared in the Russian language. Constructions such as ‘Euro-repair’ (the repair of flats and offices with high quality materials), “Euro-windows” (double-glazed windows), ‘Euro-boards’ (high quality wooden planks for walls), ‘Euro-sofas’, ‘Euro-books’ and even ‘Euro-spoons’ were introduced into the vocabulary of Russian citizens. The majority of Russians considered their country to be a part of Europe, and the successful introduction of European goods into everyday life was a key to the equally successful integration of Russia into the European sphere.

In the 2000s attitudes towards the European Union began to change for the negative, although until the winter of 2013–2014 the index of this attitude remained positive, according to data released by the Levada-Center. In the year 2008, 56 per cent of Russians considered Russia a European country, but in October 2015 this proportion was reduced to 32 per cent. Until the beginning of 2013 the number of proponents of future accession into the EU exceeded the number of opponents, but this balance quickly flipped in favour of the opponents in the following months. Events in Ukraine and Crimea in winter and spring 2014, along with a rise in anti-Western propaganda in the Russian mass media, caused a sudden outbreak of anti-Western and, in particular, anti-European sentiment.

Changes in the content of textbooks take hold more gradually. In the mid-1990s Soviet textbooks were finally taken out of circulation and new textbooks were introduced into the educational literature market, soon numbering scores of titles. By the mid-2000s the market for history textbooks had stabilised, leaving no more than ten publishing houses producing for it. In 2013 President Vladimir Putin demanded that a

---

241 Ibid., 183.
242 Ibid., 186.
single unified textbook be produced to cover Russian history through the lens of a unified concept. At the beginning of 2014 this concept was constructed and called the “historical and cultural standard”. At the same time it was declared that this future Russian history textbook would not be the only such textbook: according to the results of an expert evaluation, the textbooks of three publishers were approved for use in schools. These three publishing houses have since then also monopolised the publishing of world history textbooks.

When analysing the image of Europe in Russian textbooks we should take into account the fact that despite attempts to unite the courses on Russian history and world history into a single course in the 1990s and 2000s, these are still taught as two different subjects. Thus it is more convenient to study perceptions of Europe by means of textbooks in world history, although Russian history textbooks also contain certain extracts pertaining to the image of Europe in public awareness or to the significance of Europe in Russian foreign policy. It is also worth mentioning that in Russian schools the textbook is still considered the primary and most reliable source of information. Modern teaching methods that aim mainly at the development of critical thinking and the ability to work with historical information have not been widely disseminated.

In Soviet textbooks the history of Europe, like world history in general, had first and foremost to be an illustration of Karl Marx’s theories of the succession of socio-political formations and class struggle. Little attention was paid to the history of Asia both due to traditions dating from the pre-revolutionary times, and due to its non-classical character which was not well enough accounted for in Marx’s rather vague theory of the Asian method of production. Attention was paid to such Western countries as France (depicted as a classic feudal state), Great Britain (the classic capitalist state) and the USA (an exemplary model of imperialism in the twentieth century). Two Marxist ideas were put into practice in the Soviet image of Europe, each contradicting and complementing the other. On the one hand, Europe was a model of progress, of forward movement from a system driven by slavery to the capitalist one, creating in this movement the preconditions for a transition to communism. On the other hand, this progress was reached by means of the ruthless exploitation of great masses of the population whose struggle contributed to the change of socio-economic formation. This duality is expressed in the satirical anecdote of the demonstration of slaves in
Ancient Rome under the slogan “long live feudalism, the radiant future of all of mankind!”\textsuperscript{243}

With the fall of the Communist regime and collapse of the USSR, Marxism was banished from Russian textbooks. In the 1990s the so-called ‘civilization approach’ became very popular. It replaced the rigid scheme of the change in socio-political formations with the marginally more flexible scheme of the change of civilizations. It might have been thought that the civilization approach would reduce the Eurocentrism of the world history course, however it did not do so. In contemporary textbooks the balance of chapters on European history and the history of other continents is still tipped in favour of Europe and North America.

Thus in the textbook covering the history of modern times from the late fifteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, out of 28 paragraphs only three are devoted to Asian countries, and other three paragraphs cover the great geographical discoveries in which, however, the principal actors are exclusively the European countries\textsuperscript{244}. Non-European countries only fare slightly better in the textbooks covering the history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: out of 28 paragraphs, seven are devoted to events outside of Europe, but, like in the previous textbook, the majority of Asian history appears in the context of European colonialism.\textsuperscript{245} In another textbook on this period the proportion is about the same (seven of 29).\textsuperscript{246} In a textbook on the ancient world, out of 55 paragraphs devoted to ancient civilizations, 18 are dedicated to the civilizations of the East.

The textbooks on medieval history exhibit a slightly different tendency. In textbooks produced by the publishing house Balass, out of 24 paragraphs, six are dedicated to the East and two others to relations between Europe and the East (the Crusades and the conquest of Byzantium by the Ottomans). The textbook by L. N. Aleksashkina is similar: eight out of 25 paragraphs cover countries outside Europe. In the textbook by Boytsov and Shukurov, which has the distinctive subtitle “Europe and the Rest of the World”\textsuperscript{247}, seven of 31 paragraphs deal with countries beyond Europe. Its narrative

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{243} Ibid., 189.
\bibitem{244} V. A. Vediushkin, \textit{World History: History of Modern Times}. 7\textsuperscript{th} grade: textbook, Moscow: Drofa, 2016.
\end{thebibliography}
begins, contrary to the well-established tradition, not from the Christian West, the barbarian kingdoms or the empire of Charles the Great, but rather from the “centre of oecumene”\textsuperscript{248}, Byzantium. The authors follow this with the origins of Islam and only later do they move to the empire of Charles the Great. The authors themselves account for their “rearrangement of early medieval material in favour of Byzantium at the expense of the old Germanic peoples” with their conscious wish to turn away from traditions borrowed from “nineteenth century French and German monographs and manuals”, and to begin the narrative on early medieval society with Byzantium, “the centre of early medieval Europe”. Only “since about the epoch of the Crusades”, in the authors’ opinion, was “the traditional ‘Western-centric’ model justified”.\textsuperscript{249} In summary we can state that European history takes up between one sixth and one third of the number of pages in contemporary history textbooks.

While there were no considerable changes concerning the proportion of space dedicated to Europe in the world history course in comparison to Soviet textbooks, the image of Europe has undergone a remarkable transformation. With the methodological abolition of class struggle as the basis for progress, European history was somewhat cleared of the burden of negative phenomena stemming from the eternal oppression of the working people.

In the textbook by O. V. Dmitriyeva, covering the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, the enclosures in England are described as a dramatic and even tragic history of the transformation of farmers into paupers. It is stated that “the cruelty with which the landlords and the state treated the farmers terrified many contemporaries, but pleas for those in power to heed their conscience did not have any effect”\textsuperscript{250}. Nevertheless, there is quite an optimistic conclusion to this story: “The enclosures created the conditions for the quick development of capitalism in England, since the paupers, deprived of their livelihood, were willing to be hired for any work”.\textsuperscript{251}

A considerable increase in attention paid to the history of everyday life also contributed to the refinement of the image of Europe. In the paragraphs devoted to this section of history in the textbook by Dmitriyeva, it is indicated that the development of technology, scientific knowledge and medicine reduced mortality and extended

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., 324–325.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., 132–133.
people’s lives, while improving living conditions for both the nobility and poorer classes. However the history of everyday life in this and other textbooks is confined almost exclusively to European countries.

One of the obvious negative sides of the image of Europe is the colonial policy of European countries. However even with regard to this aspect the modern textbooks display more sympathy towards Europe than Soviet textbooks. The actions of Spanish conquistadors are called crimes, but it is stated that their contemporaries were ambivalent towards these actions. In particular monk-missionaries believed “that such wrongdoings were disgraceful to true Christians”, although they “could not stop these atrocities”.

In contemporary textbooks Europe is presented as having had the greatest achievements of modern civilization, in practically all spheres. Ancient Greece and Rome are proclaimed to be the founders of modern political and legislative systems: “ancient Greek democracy laid the foundations of the democratic tradition of the modern world”; the “Roman legal system became one of the most significant bases not only of all subsequent legal systems, but of European civilization itself, declaring the priority of humanistic values and human rights”. Modern European civilization is pronounced to be “the continuation of the Christian world of the Middle Ages”, because there the sources of its spirituality are found. The Renaissance formed “a new type of man, who was free in his aspirations, and able to discover not only new lands, but also new horizons of social development, fulfilling himself as a creator of the current historical reality”.

The preliminary results of processes of modernisation at the end of the nineteenth century were “economic prosperity, growth of welfare and culture and the security of the rights and freedoms of citizens”. A striking antithesis to the prosperity of European countries was the situation of countries which found themselves under colonial rule, “associated with grave tribulations and suffering among the people”. Nevertheless, colonialism “did not cause either a halt in their development or, much less, a backwards movement”. Quite the opposite: “the conditions of colonial domination created the prerequisites for progression from the stagnation in which many Asian and African

252 Ibid., 33–54.
253 Ibid., 22.
254 V. I. Ukolova, World History from ancient times to the late nineteenth century: Textbook for the tenth grade of secondary school. Basic and higher levels, Moscow: Prosvescheniye, 2012, 63, 98.
255 Ibid., 104.
256 Ibid., 186.
nations remained, for an overcoming of their economic and cultural backwardness as compared to the progressive countries of Europe and America”. Colonialism in turn promoted the establishment of the “united world civilization”, as well as changes in international relations such that the “right of all nations (and nationalities) for independent development” was recognised.257 Indicative in this respect is a remark made in one textbook that “in the twentieth century the least developed nations were those Asian and African countries which managed to defend their independence”.258

Europe of the twentieth century is presented in modern textbooks as the site of major achievements in all fields of life, in which “the principles of the legal state – democracy, the implementation of civil rights, freedom of speech and the equality of all people before the law were acknowledged”259 During this century “the middle class of society, with an interest in societal stability, democracy and the protection of the social and political rights of the individual, was reinforced [...] the social basis for (both right-wing and left-wing) radical attitudes was shrinking”.260 On the other hand, this was the site of the outbreak of two world wars, where between the wars, “crisis led to the establishment of dictatorships and the rise of totalitarian regimes”.261 The weakening of Europe as a result of the First World War resulted in the fact that it ceased to be “the active centre of world policy”.262

Recognition of the decline in the role of Europe in international policy means its responsibility for the actions of the West in post-war times, evaluated negatively by the textbooks, is reduced. The burden of the West’s negative decisions is shifted mainly to the USA. The Cold War is presented exclusively as a rivalry between two superpowers, although in the détente of the 1970s the most interested parties were European countries: “the withdrawal of France from the military structures of NATO in 1966, the rise to power of social-democratic parties in a number of European countries [and] the fall of the authoritarian regimes in Portugal (1974) and Spain (1975) [...] objectively weakened the previous standing of the USA in the European continent”.263 In contemporary politics Europe is not responsible for the deplorable actions of the West.

257 Ibid., 350.
258 Zagladin, Modern History, 222.
260 Ibid., 111.
261 Ibid., 66.
262 Ibid., 33.
263 Ibid., 157–158.
Whenever possible it is separated from or even opposed to the USA. For instance it is stated that “the military campaign of the USA and their allies caused a rapid increase in anti-American sentiments across the world”, while the “occupation of Iraq […] resulted in growing tensions within NATO. The old members of the alliance (first and foremost France and Germany) refused, in opposition to the new members (Poland, the Baltic countries) to fully support the unilateral actions of the USA”. The emphasised contrasting of two groups among NATO members reflects the distinction between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe.

Contemporary Russian textbooks indicate both Russia’s belonging to Europe, and its relative detachment from it. The Eurocentrism of the content remains almost unaltered in comparison with Soviet times, in spite of the declarative renouncement of the social formation approach in favour of the civilization approach in the development of the history curriculum. In this Eurocentrism one can still detect the model of historical process, typical of the Soviet school of thinking, in descriptions of Europe, especially its Western part. On the one hand it is implied that Russia is part of this process, but on the other it is separated from it. This is due to its own backwardness, caused by geographical factors, the tension of struggles with external enemies and economic and cultural isolation from Europe.

Liberation from the burden of Marxist-Leninist ideology allowed textbook authors to abandon the class perspective which compelled previous authors to regard the history of Europe almost exclusively from the point of view of the oppressed classes. It resulted in an altered evaluation in which the balance of achievements and their costs was shifted, thanks to which the darker side of the image of Europe reduced considerably. The increased focus on everyday history also contributed to this more positive image.

The disillusionment with Europe and Russia’s more European side observed by sociologists in public opinion has not yet been reflected in history textbooks. In the newest textbook, published in 2016, Europe is still presented as a dynamically developing region, and the European Union as an effective instrument for solving economic and social problems: “the high effectiveness of the economies of the countries of Western Europe and North America, and their ability to solve social problems, can be attributed

\[\text{Ibid., 176, 177.}\]
to the rapid development of their integration, among other factors.”

Regardless of attempts to discredit the European Union by means of propaganda in the Russian mass media, the textbook authors describe the mechanisms of integration as working effectively:

“Adopting a unique economic or social policy in a single country becomes impossible. Successful decisions are immediately borrowed by partners, and ineffectual ones cause capital outflow and thus are reconsidered involuntarily. In any case every participant in integration is obliged to implement the decisions of supra-national institutions, which also limits the field of socio-economic experimentation. It has become the most significant reason for rapprochement between political parties and systems across Western European countries, irrespective of their ideological and political characteristics.”

The image of Europe in Russian history textbooks remains attractive still.

Bibliography

Textbooks


---


266 Ibid., 373.


**Other literature**

This article presents a comparative analysis of the construction of images of Europe in modern history textbooks in the post-Soviet Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia, and the Eastern Partnership countries of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. The significant role of interpretations of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in these countries’ struggle for independence and in the formation of the European image in the Baltic states is noted. The discrepancies between these interpretations and estimations of the pact in textbooks produced by the Eastern Partnership countries are identified, allowing us to characterise the political system of the Soviet Union. Fundamental discrepancies in the results of the pact listed are shown in the comparative analysis of the history textbooks of Moldova and the Pridnestrovian Moldavian State. The role of the constructed image of Russia is revealed to be one of the key instruments in the process of constructing and understanding the image of Europe. Additionally factors such as the important role of the countries of Western Europe in the disintegration of the Soviet Union are identified and analysed as contributing to the construction of this image.

The textbooks analysed here come from a post-Soviet region in transition from a socialist model of government to a system of market economy and democracy. This process, which has no analogue in history, is accompanied by a number of active and dormant military confrontations founded on territorial and ethnic tensions. The post-Soviet region proved to be an area rife with conflict of interest, arising in the search for integration models in the countries of the Eastern Partnership. On the one hand there is a residual traditional model of integration with Russia, and on the other the economic and political integration of post-Soviet countries with the EU countries. Such integration is thought to be potentially dangerous. Thus, the question of the post-Soviet region’s path of transition is still open. In connection with this, the comparative analysis of images of Europe in the history textbooks of the post-Soviet Baltic states (Latvia and Estonia), which have completed their transition into the EU, and those of the Eastern Partnership countries (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine), which are at different stages on the path to democracy, appears urgent today.

I should begin by stating that in the post-Soviet region, a very important role is assigned to the history textbook in the process of establishing independence from the USSR and Russian nation and state. It is responsible for the formation of national
identity and the search for historical affiliations, for creating an urgency around the restoration of lost statehood, and for the formation of definite ideas about the state’s past in the USSR and, of course, its future in the world as an independent state.

The answer to each of these responsibilities necessarily involves reference to a constructed image of Europe. It is important to emphasise that the main tool for the construction and understanding of the image of Europe is the constructed image of Russia, as, curiously, its antithesis. In other words, to understand the image of Europe we must first of all understand the path of its development and its place in relation to the image of Russia in the construction of a global political order. Working with modern history textbooks from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Transnistria, Latvia and Estonia, we may identify the common and most prominent themes in the recent history of the post-Soviet countries, around which the images of Europe and Russia are formed.

One of the most significant and crucial questions in these textbooks, playing a special role in the formation of images of Europe and Russia, is the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and consequently its historical evaluation. The reaction to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is one of the main factors contributing to the development of the idea of the independence of the Baltic States. The famous and “hitherto across the world unprecedented action”267 called the “Baltic Chain” is worthy of mention. Two million people joined hands, forming a chain of 595 km from Tallinn to Vilnius. This event marked the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the pact, 23 August 1989. A special place is also given to the policy that instigated this action in the history textbooks of the Baltic countries. It was caused, first of all, by the presence of Western democracy, which contributed to continued Baltic emigration. At the same time, Western European support in the struggle for recognition of the illegality of collusion plays an important role in the image of Europe in these Baltic textbooks.

“Several generations of Latvians were born and raised in exile. Living in democratic societies, immigrants had the opportunity to found their own organisations and protest against Soviet occupation of the Baltic States. At the turn of the 1990s Western Latvians actively supported the restoration of Latvia’s independence; many of them were also involved in its political and economic life.”268

The result of the pact is membership in the Soviet Union, understood as nothing other than the forcible disruption of the historical and traditional ties of Baltic State

267 History for Primary Schools. Latvia in the twentieth century, Riga: Zvaigzne ABC, 2006, 158.
268 Ibid., 140.
peoples with the countries of Western Europe. The economic backwardness of the Baltic States as compared with modern European states is accounted for through the establishment of the Iron Curtain, as emphasised by the Latvian textbook authors:

“So...
with evaluations of the two regimes in other countries of the Eastern Partnership. The Ukrainian textbook states that “the treaty of 28 September 1939 put on one level the policy of the Stalinist leadership and that of the leaders of the Third Reich; that is why this document was hidden for many years from the general public”.273

Quite an interesting example from a research point of view of interpretational difference around the conspiracy between Hitler and Stalin is the assessment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the Moldavian Republic. Here the image of Europe is built mostly around the story of the Romanian state, including the unrecognised Transnistrian Moldavian state. For example, in the textbooks of the Transnistrian Republic the transfer of Bessarabia to the USSR as a result of the pact appears as a necessary step on the part of the Soviet Union, due to the anti-Soviet policy of Romania. The transfer of Bessarabia to Romania, which in the history textbooks of Moldova is treated as a “great reunion”, is understood here as “Romanian occupation”:

“The Soviet Union policy towards Bessarabia during the Romanian occupation, i.e. from 1918 to 1940, was constant and consistent. The Soviet government, unwilling to put up with military occupation and the violent annexation of Bessarabia by Romania, continued the fight for its return.”274

Bessarabia’s transfer to the USSR as a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is understood as “the impossibility of further delay in resolving the ‘Bessarabian question’”, which, as the authors of the textbook indicate, “was largely dictated by the situation in Romania after the establishment of the monarchist-fascist dictatorship of Charles II in February 1938”.275

An equally important tool in the formation of the image of Europe in the history textbooks of post-Soviet countries is the estimation of the widely recognised role of Western Europe in the collapse of the Soviet Union. However this question, like estimations of the causes and results of the Second World War, is perceived differently in countries that have pursued closer integration with Europe to countries that have chosen traditional close relations with Russia.

If in the Baltic countries the image of the new Europe has the traits of an ideal for which they should strive, then in Belarus, for example, this image is more hostile.

---

275 Ibid.
Speaking of socio-political life in the Byelorussian Socialist Soviet Republic and the transition to a multi-party system, the authors argue:

“With the help of West the opposition attempted to cause the collapse of the Soviet Union and destroy the existing order. To avoid accusations of meddling in the internal affairs of the USSR, many foundations, centres, councils and associations were established which were officially regarded as private, non-governmental organisations, when in fact they were under the control of Western intelligence agencies. Opposition organisations in the USSR received logistical and financial assistance from abroad: fax machines, copiers, computers, printing presses, telex, video cameras and other equipment, along with money to finance research and the preparation of textbooks, dictionaries, encyclopaedias, etc.”

Another Belarusan history textbook notes:

“In 1995–6 the political opposition, some deputies of the Supreme Council and members of the constitutional court sought to impose on society policies which would strengthen confrontation and anarchy, increase predatory privatisation, enrich shadow structures, induce the failure of the union with Russia and other CIS countries and re-orientate foreign policy primarily towards the Western States.”

Speaking about the period of Perestroika and its most important component, the policy of transparency, in other words, freedom of speech, the authors of the Belarusan textbooks provide a very dubious assessment of these processes:

“The policy of transparency proclaimed by M. S. Gorbachev sowed doubts about socialism as a modern system. […] The cult of profit, personal gain and violence began to promote those things which were considered humiliation for the individual and society in Soviet times. The notion that ‘Western countries will help us’ began to appear more often in the media, at meetings and in the offices of officials. The unscientific and pernicious conclusion that the Soviet system could not be reformed, and therefore must be destroyed, was reached. As we can see, anti-Soviet policy became an ideological weapon of M. S. Gorbachev’s political course, and transparency became part of an ideological war aimed at transforming the state and social system of the USSR.”

It is characteristic that the description of the period of Belarus’s independence is accompanied by the fact that “the Belarusan economy lost more than it gained”. “The destruction of existing production and economic relations and the sharp decline of production by more than 50 per cent in comparison to the end of 1980s” are separately noted.

---

278 Novik, Kachalov and Teplova, The History of Belarus, 191.
279 Ibid., 196.
In the Baltic States textbooks relations with the Western world and its influence on Baltic societies appear differently:

“One of the main channels which transferred information in that period was foreign radio stations. Some of them soon began broadcasting in the Estonian language. The first was the ‘Voice of America’, beginning in 1951 in New York. [...] In 1970 a special Baltic Department was created as part of the “Freedom” editorial, beginning to broadcast in the Estonian language. In 1983 this department became independent, and it joined ‘Free Europe’ a year later. The purpose of broadcasts in the Estonian language by foreign radio stations was to communicate uncensored information about events in the world, and also to broadcast news, comments, analyses and reports about what was happening in the Soviet Union and in the Estonian SSR. [...] Despite the fact that the transmission of foreign radio stations was regularly blocked, they remained the most important information channel for the residents of the Estonian SSR and helped to preserve spiritual opposition to the ruling regime.”

The following is noted in a section on the consequences of the Baltic countries gaining economic independence:

“The Estonian economy opened up to the West, and economic integration with Europe became irreversible. On 1 January 1995 the free trade agreement between Estonia and the European Union came into effect. [...] Privatisation, banking development, property reform and the transformation of the intensive Soviet agriculture system focused on country farms played significant roles in the transition to market economy.”

A characteristic feature of the history textbooks of the Baltic States is an unambiguous statement of the state’s aim to develop full independence from Russia, which is directly related to tighter integration with the West:

“Estonian foreign policy is oriented towards the West. Given Estonia’s geopolitical position, the surest guarantee of the preservation of its statehood is for it to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union”.

At the same time, relations with Russia are drawn negatively: “the concept of the so-called “near abroad” and Russia’s defensive foreign policy are unacceptable to Estonia. Russia has refused to cooperate in the economic sphere on political grounds.” The same trend can be observed in Latvian history textbooks: “one of the main foreign policy goals of the Republic of Latvia was its accession to the European Union and NATO. [...] Relations with its neighbour Russia are constantly in tension”.

---

281 Ibid., 147.
282 Ibid., 149.
283 Ibid., 149.
284 History for Primary Schools, 170.
The Belarusian textbook reflects a diametrically opposed policy to that of the Baltic textbooks. Here the supposedly characteristic values of the new united Europe, such as democracy, freedom, human rights, private property, legal state, market economy, integration into the world community and human values are characterised as a cover for right-wing radicals and supporters of the “discredited capitalism”. Capitalism is to blame for “two world wars, colonialism and plunder of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Oceania and Latin America, the exploitation of their own people etc.” At the same time the radical left movement is discredited, and a combination of “the best that has been developed by capitalism and socialism” is offered as the most attractive model of development. Movement in this direction is presented as the unique and unrepeatable experience of the Republic of Belarus, which “is able to provide and to ensure its future sustainability and independence”. For the Republic of Belarus and its people such unacceptable “fundaments of Western European capitalism” as “the inadmissible propaganda of the cult of money (greed), violence, sadism, speculation on human weakness and immorality” have been demonstrated.

In conclusion it should be noted not only that government policy in post-Soviet countries is reflected in textbooks’ assessments of historical events, but also that history teaching serves as a tool in the construction of the new independent state. The image of Europe in this process is either positive or negative, and this determines the perceived degree of necessary integration with EU countries. Presentation of the level and quality of political and economic reforms, the degree of borrowing from European institutions and the search for a model of existence and development in the global world is also directly connected with the evaluation of the project of the new united Europe, and with the values on the basis of which this political union was conceived and realised.

Alongside the image of Europe, the constructed image of Russia possesses the same importance in the presentation of the political processes of post-Soviet countries. And regardless of whether the image of Europe is positive or negative, the image of Russia is always opposed to it. Those countries that refuse to follow the path of European integration, as well as Russia, are characterised by the search for a model and jus-

---

286 Ibid., 223.
tification for their unique way of considering historical norms and traditions, which do not coincide with European ideas.

Bibliography


Europe: a problem of expression

Europeans seldom take to the streets to wave the European flag. The postulate of a “soul for Europe” invoked by Jacque Delors in the 1990s remains apparently unrealised. This restraint regarding collective expressions of emotion appears necessary, given European experiences of world wars fired by such emotions in the twentieth century. Europe is waking from its traumas; it is a “post-heroical society” that has learned from its own history and swapped the exclusion of the “other” for exclusion of its own former barbarism. If the national other, as a reflecting surface for the nation’s own properties, lay outside of the nation; then in the case of Europe the other lies within. It is European crimes, led by the civilizational fracture of the Shoah, which call doubt upon the collective. This emotional austerity, the modest range of European symbols and the restraint practiced towards them can be taken for evidence for an absence of European identity. However it need not be.

In this chapter, the scepticism around the presence of a European identity (whether this applies to Europe or the EU remains mostly unclear in the relevant discussions), as well as the call for an exclusive outline of the EU, is countered with the fact that European identity represents a new social construct, a new type of social tissue, due to the cultural-historical parameters of its development. It is inscribed not into the axiological order of a community, but rather into selfhood, into the “authenticity”

---


289 See Aleida Assmann, “Ku europejskiej kulturze pamięći”, in: Kultura Współczesna 1, 63 (2010), 36–49. Assman reminds us that the traumas of Western and Eastern Europe do not necessarily coincide.

290 „The ‘other’ that seems to be required for the formation of an identity can in fact persist only in the past, above all in the history of violence of the twentieth century […]”. Wolfgang Schmale, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2008, 178.
of the individual (bycie sobą). This construct is characterised by its lack of semantic clarity; it is based in internal multiplicity, fracture, fragment, polyphony, blurred external borders and dynamic overlap. It is nonetheless a matter of identity or at least of the social embeddedness of the subject. This means a self-reflexive positioning of the subject with conscious reference to relevant social entities. It does not involve belonging to a social category according the principle of ‘nation’. There is no emotionally loaded ‘we Europeans’ lying at its semantic core; rather there is a ‘weak’ subject, which can potentially be strengthened through dialogical competence. Its involvement in contexts of communicative action in the social space of ‘flexible modernity’ is altered as compared to that of the subject in the peak phase of modernity.

**Stable versus flexible modernity**

The distinction between ‘stable’ and ‘flexible’, ‘volatile’ or ‘liquid’ modernity held up here can be traced back in particular to Zygmunt Bauman, though it reflects an established division of modernity into the phases of ‘high’ and ‘post-’ modernity, however they might be labelled. Bauman denotes modernity as a time of soaring demand for classification and discrete categories, an epoch dominated by a compulsion for order, classification and discrete categories, an epoch dominated by a compulsion for order.
definition and unambiguity. With the increased secularisation of European societies, the providence of God lost ever more determining power. As a result, edifices of ideas had to be erected which could, through their stringency and the clarity of their definitions, offer a new security.

In Bauman’s *Culture in a Liquid Modern World*, flexible or liquid modernity is a phase of civilizational development in the West in which the ordering project of modernity is discredited. Modern efforts to manufacture order resulted in a baffling increase in ambiguity. It became obvious that there are multiple points of departure and thus just as many orders, and that it is impossible, and occasionally disastrous, to claim ultimate dominance for one order over possible others. The subject was set free. As its sole distinguishing mark gained from new relations all that remained was its mobility between different constantly changing orders. “The field of postmodernity” is “astonishingly homogenous” in its push for pluralism, understood as a consistent “rejecting totality”. Of course the coin of emancipation has two sides: the liberating and the hegemonic.

The liberating moment is the forcing open of the stores of power accumulated in external ascriptions, among which the nation represents the most prominent modern example. Identity affiliations are Foucauldian dispositifs of power, semantic prisons which supplanted the semantic prisons of pre-modern times (such as the fixed determination of social status by birth). The subject of flexible modernity is freed from categorial assignment; its social reality is complex, contradictory and incomplete, and its subjecthood is discursively splintered into a myriad of positions, from which only weak group allegiances follow.

The hegemonic moment arises as the subject stands alone in its involvement with an ever more complex world, beyond old hierarchies and securities. This involvement is now a matter for its individual responsibility, which can often amount to an excessive demand on the subject. This can result in a “drift” through a social reality that one perceives as fragmentary, paired with a feeling of personal meaninglessness. Such (self-)perceptions are behind the rise of right-wing populism in the Western world today. Flexible modernity calls for a concept of identity which would allow the

---

subject to rise to such challenges without having to relinquish itself. Welsch suggests a “work on differentiation” in the place of a “propaganda of indifference”. Hermans and Hermans-Konopka suggest work on identity in the sense of “developing the self”. Concrete examples from textbooks will show that such notions are already available in connection with the topic of Europe. As can be seen in Poland, where the party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [Law and Justice] is in power, nationalist right-wing populism is gaining currency, and working on its own solutions. It aims at forcing flexible modernity onto the defensive, but as far as its fundamental argumentational patterns may be identified now, it is itself based on the premises of flexible modernity.

**Categorial versus non-categorial semantics**

For our understanding of a nascent European identity it will be necessary to outline in greater detail the concept of categorial semantics that represents its foil. ‘Categorial semantics’ denotes a structuring of social reality written into the discourse, in which social groups make up the primary element. In this conception social groups are thought of as akin to logical categories, that is, as distinct sets of alike elements. In categorial semantics the binary opposition of the sort ‘A versus B’ represents the base case of social relations. Through the positioning of the subject in the blueprint of social reality offered, this oppositional schema is set against considerations of perspective, and converted into one of ‘us versus them’. The blueprint of reality built on categorial semantics is characterised by a relative stasis, which arises out of the tendency for the unalterability of the subject position.

The numerous discourse analyses of the 1990s that considered the construction of national identity through, among other things, school textbooks and educational discourse, have shown us how social categorisation and language interact. Linguistic

---

299 Welsch, *Unsere postmoderne Moderne*, 52.
elements such as the following were described as the textual mode of the construction of social categories: noun phrases designating groups, the generic singular, the personal pronoun ‘we’, juxtaposition and comparison of social categories, stereotyped predication and group descriptions, evaluations using adjectives and verbs but also nouns in the role of object, hyperbole and so on.302 These moments from the linguistic surface signal that the text contributes on the one hand to the construction of a certain social reality, and on the other hand to the positioning of subjects in this blueprint of reality. Thus the text contributes to the identity-formation of the participants in the discourse it forms part of, and does so along the specifications of the categorial semantic.

This theorising and discourse analytical practice lies along linear polar boundaries (even if cross-categorisation is possible, such as in Polish linguist who lives in Germany, mother of two children etc.), in agreement with the first phase of modernity according to Bauman, or the national “imperative of ‘Gleichschaltung’” in Gellner.303 This is illustrated in Figure 1. We cannot describe the social embeddedness of a subject that is aware of the constructedness of the imaginary ‘we’, or of possible ‘we alternatives’, or of its own discursive fragility, using such terminology. The social web of flexible modernity is differently constituted, it is not sewn together out of serially manufactured, uniformly patterned templates; rather it is spun, (inter)woven, netted and always in the process of becoming. The subject is at once a unique pattern worked into this material, and the diligent weaver. Figure 2 stands for these social and discursive relations. Mapped onto the reality of texts are two dimensions which enable the realisation of the self-reflexive, but socially embedded subject: authenticity, which has as its condition the dialogical.


Authenticity through the dialogical
The social philosopher Charles Taylor offers the ideal of ‘authenticity’ in response to late modernity’s signs of disintegration. He observes that late modern people champion themselves as the standard for a life well lived. They seek an ‘authentic self’ whose only mode is dialogical. That which counts as authentic is to be ascertained by the subject, although it still requires social recognition (Taylor speaks of the “dialogical character” of life). The negotiation of authenticity involves profound grounding or mo-

---

tivation (Taylor refers to “horizons of significance” in which such motivations must be embedded; Ferrara’s discussion shows how complex the matter is with for example the grounding of obligations)\(^{305}\). In this conception of authenticity it is not a matter of the “reality”, the one “true core” of the person, rather it is one of “coherence” as an ongoing result of successful exchange with the social environment. The self is understood not as the result of interaction with others, but rather as the site of the generation of significance, out of the interplay of different “voices”.\(^ {306}\) The self as “society of mind” becomes as heterogeneous as its social context.\(^ {307}\) Of course this is a bounded heterogeneity, as the individual voices lead a dialogue amongst themselves, meaning that they alter under the influence of one another (here we see too parallels with Münkler’s concept of the “post-heroical society”, which transforms through engagement with its own heroic past). Here the voices are already heterogeneous in themselves, facilitating their latching onto one another, and the creation of “effective coalitions”.\(^ {308}\)

In this sense the notion of authenticity is adopted into historical didactics: the ability to deconstruct myths and call conventional knowledge and habitual judgments and canons into question would allow school students to have “authentic experiences with themselves”.\(^ {309}\) The basic condition of such ‘authentic experience’ is openness to multiplicity. In Borries this is demanded for an understanding of otherness and perception of change.\(^ {310}\) It is built upon the didactical concepts of multi-perspectivity (viewing an object from diverse social standpoints), controversy (diverse judgements of states of affairs) and plurality (diverse visions of the future).\(^ {311}\)

### The dialogical and authenticity in the textbook

From the perspective of cultural studies the dialogical nature and authenticity of the subject can be seen as fundamental principles of modern Western didactics, in which a systematic shift in the responsibility of teachers and students can be observed since the

306 “[…] a dynamic multiplicity of positions or voices in the landscape of the mind, with the possibility of dialogical relationships between these positions or voices”. Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, *Dialogical Self Theory*, 81.
307 Ibid., 77.
308 Ibid., 70.
310 Ibid., 262ff.
311 Ibid., 292.
Late 1960s. In the late 1960s, the historian Hans-Jürgen Pandel demonstrated textbooks which consisted exclusively, with the exception of a few images, of a master narrative, presented by the author as “the way things were”, and which did not even contain tasks for the students.\footnote{Hans-Jürgen Pandel, “Was macht ein Schulbuch zu einem Geschichtsbuch? Ein Versuch über Kohärenz und Intertextualität”, in: Geschichtsdidaktische Schulbuchforschung, Saskia Handro and Bernd Schönemann (eds.), Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006, 15–37, 26. This was true also of textbooks under communism.} This has changed fundamentally in the West since then. Alongside text by the author,\footnote{In some textbooks this is labelled as such. In this way the author’s text is not in principle distinct from primary source text and excerpts from specialist literature. Authorial authority is softened; the voice of the author is one among many.} textbooks contain above all multi-perspectivally ordered sources, tasks differentiated by type of requirement, images which serve not just as relief or illustration of the text, but which are rather to be scrutinised in the lesson, diagrams as the basis for discussions, contrasting positions from specialist literature, tuition on method, pages for self-review and so on. Such textbooks are complex “nets of text types” (to use Kirsten Adamzik’s term, Germ. ‘Textsortennetz’), which offer the learning subject different options for its situation in multi-layered blueprints of social reality.\footnote{Kirsten Adamzik, “Textsortennetze”, in: Textsorten, Handlungsmuster, Oberflächen. Linguistische Typologien der Kommunikation, Stephan Habscheid (ed.), Berlin, NY: De Gruyter, 2011, 367–385. http://www.unige.ch/lettres/alman/adamzik/adamzik%20textsortennetze%20preprint.pdf, last access 4 August 2016.} There was a departure from an essentialist conception of knowledge towards a constructivist perspective. Knowledge is not conferred; rather it is developed. It is not a package which is imparted and need only be unpacked, rather it is a mutable complex of meaning which unfolds in (communicative) action.

Thus the focus shifted from a learning orientated around teaching material to the goals of education and ultimately the methods which the subject comes to know and purposefully employ to reach these educational goals (the subject orders its own knowledge and develops competence for different situations). ‘Dialogue’ in the textbook means the relation of different types of texts to one another, the intertextuality of the textbook narratives and mutual cross-reference, which are produced in the process of the textbook’s reception. The text contained in textbooks is often quotations or fragments which must be situated in one’s learning. The learning subject, as an active and determining participant in the communicative situation ‘learning’, deals with these fragments as the subject deals with the different voices in Herman and Herman-Konopka’s model above; it creates the connections between them. In this activity, in
allowing dialogue to take place, the subject is first truly realised. Only in this communicative activity does the subject gain Taylor’s authenticity.

The example of Europe

Let us consider a counterpart to Figure 2, taken from the edition “Europa. Stabilität und Krise” [Europe: Stability and Crisis] from the Cornelsen series “Kursthemen Politik und Wirtschaft” [Course topics: politics and economics].

It is a course book for the qualification phase of the upper grades of the Gymnasium that aims at the “practice of political judgment” through cooperative learning, using controversial material. Two pages cover the question “What is the core of Europe?” They consist in a short authorial introduction, a diagram (Figure 3), a source text, in the form of an excerpt from a text on educational policy produced by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and an additional diagram with textual input (Figure 4). Three tasks are associated with this section, one from requirement area [Anforderungsbereich] (AB) II and two from AB III.

Even the notion of the ‘core of Europe’ points to a legitimate lack of uniformity in the concept of Europe: wherever a thing has a ‘core’, there are parts of that thing which are more or less remote from its core. Yet talk of a ‘core’ of course always accompanies an essentialist attitude and generates asymmetry of power. In this case the plural (‘cores of Europe’ ‘core formations’) in the task section guards against this. Additionally Europe is thought of as a cluster, as a ‘European Onion’ (see Figure 3).

The European cluster is dynamic. In the excerpt on educational policy the historical background of the rise of the concept of the European core is depicted with verb phrases such as the following: [the EU] emerged [out of the rubble of two European world wars]; [community] grew; [a success story] came to a standstill; [a process] was hidden [in the crisis]; [the maxim of integration] lost power; [a model] prevailed (for a time); [a model] stands in opposition [to something]; [the European core] stands open [for remaining EU members]; [a concept] splits [the union]; [a concept]

316 Ibid., 3.
317 Ibid., 38f.
318 Requirement areas are uniform examination requirements defined by the Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs in Germany. AB I includes reproduction, AB II reorganisation and AB III reflection and problem-solving. The individual requirement areas are signalled through consistent usage of verb types.
creates [“a two-tier Europe”]; [the EU] is losing [“strategic ground”]; [the EU] is neglecting [its stabilising capacity]; [it is questionable whether ... the EU] can perceive [this function]; [the EU] must face [challenges]; [the EU] presents [a divided image]; [an argument] supervenes.319

It is striking that at first glance this appears a modest depiction of the beginnings of the European integration process (‘emerged’, Germ. ‘hat sich gemausert’). Although this beginning is indeed elevated emotively with the reference to ‘rubble’ and ‘world wars’, it is a troubled pathos. The talk is not of victory and heroism, but rather of destruction. There is no agreed enemy in the war; both wars are simply labelled ‘European’, such that the destruction is apportioned to the home domain. More than anything however, these verb phrases make clear that European integration is not self-evident; it can progress, and it can come to a halt. This halting itself evinces a certain dynamism; different constellations remain possible (‘stands in opposition’, ‘stands open’), and new arguments are added. With Figure 3 bolstered by the contents of this excerpt, we are met with a pluralistic and dynamic conception of Europe, close to that of Figure 2.

Figure 3. “Supranational associations in Europe”. Jöckel and Lange (eds.), Politik und Wirtschaft, 38.

319 These are the verb phrases referring to the EU and the integration process. Italics are my own.
Figure 4 is an invitation to the subject to locate itself in this cluster-like, dynamic blueprint of Europe.

What particularly stands out in Figure 4 is the at first glance roundabout way in which this invitation is formulated. It is not simply asked whether the student is for or against a European core; rather two speakers are constructed, one of whom declares themselves for a European core while the other is against it. This apparent excess of form in fact serves a certain function. The statistic given in a pie chart in the same source is mapped onto subjects; ‘voices’ are constructed in order to encourage the learning subject to find their own ‘voice’. In this way this section underlines the dialogical character of the learning.

This is made even clearer in the task section:
1. In three groups, compile the most important ‘cores’ of Europe and present them to the class with the aid of a poster.
2. In the class, evaluate these cores’ contribution to European integration.

3. Discuss the points for and against the European core and take your own position.\textsuperscript{320}

Included here are such dialogical activities as group work, the presentation of posters in class, the presentation of evaluations in the class and discussion. Learning is thus based in the engagement with materials in the textbook and in the production of intertextual relations between these materials and one’s own stock of knowledge and experience (characteristic for the requirement areas AB II and III, which go beyond the scope of reproduction, although even the latter is dialogical). It is additionally based in an implied dialogue in the lesson, in different social constellations. The authenticity of the subject, its realisation, unfolds from this multi-layered dialogue.

That the realisation of the subject must itself be understood as dynamic is displayed in those areas where the decisions of the learning subject are marked as legitimately provisional. The so-called “lines of dispute and position”, one of over twenty “methods in social sciences”, depicted in the final chapter, should serve as an illustration here.\textsuperscript{321} Positions on a controversial question are presented along a line. After some explanation of the different opinions on each side, there is the possibility to change position: see Figure 5. The evaluation section thematises the question of which “bilateral relation […] dissent, diversity and identity” stand in.\textsuperscript{322}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\caption{Graphic depiction of the method lines of dispute and position. Jöckel and Lange (eds.), Politik und Wirtschaft, 256.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 256 f.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid., 257.
Conclusion

The conditions of flexible modernity account for the European identity’s inconspicuous presentation. It does not appear as a resilient group identity, based in symbolic power and collective expression. Rather it is a “hyphenated identity”, a “mélange identity”, a “patchwork identity”, a “nested identity” or a “marble cake identity”, contextualised in a lifeworld. Europe is not a static, homogeneous category. Talk of “the European”, of “our intellectual property”, “the common European stock of knowledge”, “our inner assets”, “common European property”, a form of expression that is closer to Delors’ demand for a soul for Europe than a clustered representation, can at most be cited as a historical source in a contemporary textbook.

Outlook

As has been stated, the hegemonic side of flexible modernity, the shift in responsibility onto the individual in the midst of a legitimate polyphony of voices, even in cases of basic understandings, can lead to overextension, to a feeling of having lost one’s social anchoring, and finally to withdrawal and marginalisation. That is the situation in which today’s right-wing populism, animated by nationalism, appears on the scene.

Right-wing populists tell a pretty (hi)story about ‘the people’. In these post-constructivist times the truth of this story comes in for justified doubt, but this does not mean that the story itself is challenged, as it satisfies strong, deep-seated desires.

---


324 Beck and Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa, 193.


328 “If we were to draw up a balance sheet for our intellectual property today, it would be seen that most of it does not stem from our own respective fatherland, but rather from the common European stock of knowledge. In all of us the European outweighs the German, Spaniard, Frenchman. Four fifths of our inner assets are common European property.” José Ortega y Gasset (1929), Spanish sociologist and philosopher: a source text in a geography textbook. Peter Köhler, Uwe Meier and Frank Morgeneuer, Seydlitz Geographie, Thuringia: Schroedel, 2009, 292.

329 Like in the novel Life of Pi by Yann Martel (2001, filmed in 2012). The young Pi tells how he crosses the ocean with a tiger in his raft, allowing the viewer to determine themselves whether the tiger is a metaphor for his will to survive; the viewer is willing to believe in the tiger version as the more beautiful version. See Eshelman’s notion of “performatism”: Raoul Eshelman, Performatism or the
This story is inaccessible to rationality; it is self-referentially self-grounding and evades discursive negotiation. Right-wing populism practices an idolatry of the people; it glorifies “an imagined people, created and represented by a leader and seducer of the people” that is always right and thus needs no democracy. This ‘people’ is not to be equated with the demos or the ethnos; rather it is akin to a cult community, restricted to that part of society that believes the “pretty story”.

For our purposes it is of particular importance that the “pretty story” of right-wing populists is removed from the dialogue. As it stands dialogue is being blocked through stereotypical images of the enemy and hate speech. With the means of expression provided in Figures 1 and 2, we arrive at the depiction of these new social and discursive relations in Figure 6.

![Figure 6. Social net of flexible modernity with monistic capsules of single right-wing populisms.](image_url)

---


331 See for example a number of characterisations of political opponents contained in a single article from a right-wing Polish publication with a circulation of over 100,000: “zdrający i złodzieje” [traitors and thieves], “konfidenti i kolaboratorzy” [informers and collaborators], “totalitarna opozycja” [totalitarian opposition], “lewacka medialna psiarnia” [radical leftist pack of hounds howling at the media], “prymitywna lewacka holota” [primitive radical leftist lowlifes], “poprzebierana w lukesowe garsonki i garnitury azjatycka dzicz” [an Asian horde dressed in the costume of luxury], “barbarzyńcy i wykolejeny z KOD-u” [barbarians and deviants from KOD (the Committee for the Defence of Democracy)], ”KOD-ziarskie bydło”, [KOD beasts], “lumpiarstwo i menelstwo” [a pack of good-for-nothing scoundrels]. Mirosław Kokszkiewicz, “Udaremniony zamach stanu”, in: *Warszawska Gazeta*, 30 December 2016 – 4 January 2017, 2–3.
With Figure 6 we remain in the webbed, interwoven material of flexible modernity. Right-wing populism does not deny that its “pretty stories” are a construction. Nevertheless it calls the power of deconstruction and dialogue to criticise ideology a lie.

Bibliography

Textbooks

Other literature


Images of Europe in Transition: In Search of a Common Denominator

(Agnieszka Pawłowska)

Throughout 25 and 26 November 2016 in Kiev, teachers and academics from nine countries came together for a conference on the images of Europe in history textbooks. Seven national cases were presented. Subsequent intense debate, sometimes marked by emotion, proved the deep engagement of the discussants with the issue. National presentations were grouped into four panels along geographical lines, but definitely not by common experience. The national panels were accompanied by a separate presentation devoted to the image of Europe in Russian textbooks. Panels were framed by theoretical introductions and conclusions. Especially the latter proved to be problematic, as the diverse experiences of the presenters could be hardly summarised in anything more than generic statements. Nonetheless I will try to go beyond generalisations and offer some remarks on the contributions presented in this volume, which arose out of the conference.

I

Although the national reports addressed the content of history textbooks written in different national political situations, the discussion around the title issue was marked by frequent reference to the current state of international affairs, characterised by the following dimensions: the internal crisis of the European Union resulting from a massive influx of immigrants from the Middle East, Brexit and the increased influence of nationalist parties in EU member states, contesting the current European order; the military conflict between the Russian Federation (RF) and Ukraine, caused by Russia’s seizing control of Crimea and attempts to do the same in the eastern part of Ukraine; and Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election, which might open a new chapter in relations between the US and RF. The rapprochement between the RF and US is of concern to those states that were once part of the Soviet Union, that is, all those states represented at the conference.

The importance of the current political climate for the perception of Europe in textbooks is noted by Sergei Rumyantsev in this volume, who points to the changing pattern of political discourse from pro- to anti-Europeanism in response to the state’s hosting of events (not necessarily political), in which “the country, and the authoritarian regime ruling it, calls more careful attention upon itself. Any criticism accompany-
Images of Europe in Transition: In Search of a Common Denominator

ing recognition by Europe is especially painful for the Azerbaijani regime\(^{332}\). This reaction, however, does not determine the economic or cultural relations of the country with EU member states. Rumyantsev further states that this official anti-European discourse has a minor effect on textbook narratives, as Europe and the West remain at the periphery of the Azerbaijani history described in textbooks.

Critical portrayals of Europe, dictated by current events, are contrary to the rapprochement policy towards Europe reflected in the textbooks, seen in Azerbaijan’s accession to the Council of Europe, membership of the EU’s Eastern Partnership and association with NATO. The message to students seems ambiguous: on the one hand, events which bring the country closer to Europe are highlighted; on the other, Europe appears rarely in the textbooks, and usually in a negative context. At the same time Europe is the subject of criticism by Azerbaijan’s political elites.

Uncertainty as to what image of Europe is to be presented in the historical narrative also appears in other countries. This image is subject to fluctuation depending on current political events and the general international climate. The changing image of Europe, resulting from historical transformations, is recognised by Alexander Shevyrev, who presents the Russian case. The author begins by discussing the Soviet historical narrative defined by Marxist ideology, in which Europe was seen as the site of universal oppression of the working class. This narrative changed in the 1990s, when Europe became a model of economic and social success worth following. It might be thought that the shift in power in the RF at the turn of the twenty first century and the more state-centric stance of the new president would affect the image of Europe in the textbooks; this did not however occur on a large scale. One change was that the previous multitude of textbooks was replaced by a single official history textbook. In any case, the authors of textbooks react with delay to changes in the official propaganda and the resulting change in public opinion. As Shevyrev writes, escalating anti-European sentiment since 2014 is not reflected in the latest history textbook published in 2016, in which “Europe is still presented as a dynamically developing region, and the European Union as an effective instrument for solving economic and social problems”\(^{333}\).

It seems that the most consistent view of Europe is presented in Ukrainian history textbooks, which also reflect the political turn in 2013 as the then President Yanukovych refused to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. Widespread opposition

\(^{332}\) 117.

\(^{333}\) 130.
of citizens to the president led to the events known as Euromaidan, which can be interpreted as Ukrainians’ choice of a political orientation around the EU. The symbolic move towards Europe is also a manifestation of the nation’s break with the past in terms of external power and independence. As Sergii Koniukhov writes in this volume:

“[…] the image of Europe in Ukrainian history textbooks depends to a certain extent on political processes in Ukraine. Today, as Ukraine strengthens its position as an independent state and is actively involved in European integration processes, the following factors are prioritised in the textbooks’ images of Europe: the representation of European values; the promotion of tolerance in the interpretation of past events; the development of relations with certain states […]”³³⁴.

II

The above reflections already display some simplification in Europe’s image. The more we move towards the twenty first century, the more the narrative of European history is related to a reading of two global superpowers; at the same time, Europe is gradually reduced to the European Union: Europe “as a contemporary political project”³³⁵, as Mikayel Zolyan calls it in this volume. The first tendency is described by Shevyrev, who observes a gradual change in the image of Europe in Russian textbooks as the result of the growing power of the United States, which during the Second World War ultimately abandoned isolationism and subsequently engaged themselves in a long conflict with the Soviet Union, both seeking to dominate in a bipartite international system.

Europe, which stands often for Western Europe, is encroaching on the symbolic boundaries of the East with the reunification of West and East Germany and the enlargement of the EU in 2004. After the collapse of the USSR it is presented as political, economic, social and cultural standard (as Andrei Antonov states in this volume). Denis Larionov writes that “Europe remains a sort of example and model”³³⁶. Sometimes Europe is identified with the generalised West (see Rumyantsev), and thus the attitude towards Europe is a function of wider attitudes to the West: Western economy, social and political principles, culture and values. As long as the enthusiasm following liberation from Soviet rule continued, the idealised image of Europe persisted. Nevertheless, the search for the state’s own national roots sometimes required a turn to the

³³⁴ 63.
³³⁵ 105.
³³⁶ 74.
longer-standing inspirations of the East, considerably different to those offered by the Western world.

Here we approach the origins of the cultural cleavage between East and West. In the majority of national cases presented the essential role of the division of Christianity into Roman and Byzantine churches is raised. In the oversimplified picture, Western Christianity appears as diversified, “rebellious”, occasionally questioning secular powers and, after the Reformation, forced to tolerate its numerous factions. Eastern Christianity, on the other hand, appears as monolithic, sanctioning the deeds of secular powers.\textsuperscript{337} The inheritance of the Orthodox Church is accompanied by the Cyrillic alphabet, which further “divides” Eastern Slavs from their Western counterparts. This was also a bulwark against the adoption of foreign (Western) vocabulary which is visible in Slavonic languages that use the Latin alphabet.

The political culture that formed as a result of autocratic traditions, supported by the subordination of the Orthodox Church to secular power, was reflected and enhanced in the totalitarian Soviet regime. Attitudes towards the heritage of the Soviet Union is another point of reference for the authors here. The overall assessment of this heritage is a complex issue. In the case of some countries it is intermingled with the issue of the preceding period of tsarist Russia, and for some nations liberation from the oppression of another regime.

The period of Soviet domination, especially after the Second World War, is not necessarily judged as a period of economic stagnation and cultural paralysis: for many it was a time of accelerated development, with some question only as to how this development might have proceeded more rapidly had their country had full sovereignty. The negative image of the RF, as the heir of the Soviet Union, materialises with the resurgence of the state’s imperial aspirations since the beginning of the twenty first century.

Interestingly, in the majority of national cases history textbooks present the given country as somewhere between East and West, exposed to the mutual influence of two (and in selected cases three) cultural systems. This is because of its geographical location (Belarus, but also Azerbaijan) and/or because of the intermingled influence of religious systems and related social orders. This is vividly presented by Zolyan, who in

\textsuperscript{337} For the record, splits also took place in the Orthodox Church (e.g. Старообрядчество [Old Believers]). Their aftermath for Eastern Christianity seems, however, not as great as that of the Reformation for its Western counterpart.
this volume comments on a textbook quotation with the following: “Armenia is situated in the zone of mutual influence of three civilizations: the European, Oriental and Slavic’, with ‘Slavic’ apparently acting as a euphemism for ‘Russian’, and considered a separate ‘civilization’”\textsuperscript{338}. With this we arrive at the issue of the positioning of the nation or state with respect to a generalised Europe, and, at the same time, the construction of its own identity.

III

The most complex problem under discussion at the conference was the narratives around the nation and state and their histories. In the cases discussed (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), the history of the nation does not entirely coincide with that of the nation state. In all cases analysed, the history of the particular nation was a dependent variable of the history of their ancestor state: in the case of Moldova, Romania and later the USSR; in the cases of Ukraine and Belarus, Poland and then the USSR; and in the cases of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Russian and then the Soviet empires (this is obviously a simplification which, for one, does not go into earlier periods). As the image of Europe is in turn a dependent variable of the narrative of national histories, the question of the construction of this narrative arises. The issue is tricky, and the authors of history textbooks must ask themselves some basic questions: how to talk about the history of a state which has been sovereign not much longer than a quarter of a century? What achievements of the larger state of which our nation was part shall be recognised as our own? To what extent should we identify with the history of other countries and nations to which we were tied? And ultimately to what extent can we distinguish “us” and “them”?

The authors in this volume provide several examples of approaches to the above questions. A very interesting example is Moldova. Andrei Antonov writes about the place of Romania, the state-predecessor of Moldova before Soviet times, in Moldavian history textbooks. Their authors tend to “cheer on” Romania in its EU aspirations. Antonov writes that the “inclusion of all this information on post-socialist Romania denotes the importance to Moldova of its neighbour’s desire to be part of a wider Euro-

\textsuperscript{338} 106.
Agnieszka Pawłowska

Images of Europe in Transition: In Search of a Common Denominator

pean family, in which human rights, democracy and collective security are seen as essential elements.339

Moldova’s past association with Romania clearly constitutes a point of reference for assessments of the later period in their history, that is, in the framework of the Soviet Union. Martin Alm makes an interesting point in his article on Europe’s image in American history textbooks:

“History is ultimately an existential endeavour: we use it to construct an identity and to orientate ourselves in the world. That said, identity is developed in tandem with difference; knowing who we are also entails knowing who we are not. Our self-image is frequently contrasted with an ‘Other’, a counter-image that illustrates qualities and values which we do not stand for.”340

Although we are dealing here with fully developed nations, the process of identity formation gained a new momentum with the foundation of nation states with sovereign authority. Since that moment the states deemed it necessary to elaborate their own narrative about their post-Soviet heritage, about the heir to the Soviet empire, i.e. the RF, and about the part of the world to which they wish to belong, in most cases Europe.

The acquisition of independence by the nations in question is inseparably associated with the rejection of their Soviet past. It shields their national identity from questioning, allowing them to conform to the definition that each fully formed nation deserves to be sovereign.341 Emmanuel Lévinas expresses it definitively:

“The sovereignty of the State incorporates the universe. In the sovereign State, the citizen may finally exercise a will. It acts absolutely. Leisure, security, democracy: these mark the return of a condition, the beginning of the free being. This is why man recognises his spiritual nature in the dignity he achieves as a citizen or, even more so, when acting in the service of the State. The State represents the highest human achievement in the lives of western peoples.”342

339 92.
341 I do not discuss here the complex issue of the difference between nation and ethnic group, although this is a crucial question in multi-national Europe. It is especially so in regions inhabited by a large social group, consistent in terms of ethnicity, language, culture, and sometimes religion, which is distinct from the dominant majority: even more so where this group is seeking to secede from the state in which it finds itself and create its own state.
342 Quoted in Neumann, Uses of the Other, 18.
Rejection of the Soviet past is the first step in the self-definition of these nations: the negative definition, the identification of that which they are not. This involves reference to the Russian state that has legally announced itself to be the successor of the Soviet Union. Elaborating the stance towards the Soviet past is relatively easy when confronted with images of the RF. It has already been mentioned that this image is to a large extent dependent on current international politics, but it also depends on economic relations and, needless to say, cultural ties.

The image of the RF in the countries in question is far from universal. In the case of history textbooks it must be remarked that the school courses in history for any grade rarely keep up with current politics; after all, they are history courses. If contemporary political issues are discussed at all in schools, this probably takes place in civics lessons.

Undoubtedly, narratives constructed around relations to the RF are dependent on the historical narratives of the Soviet past. As Antonov remarks in this volume: “Europe is at all times either depicted as parallel to the Soviet Union, or set against background images of the Soviet Union or Russian Federation. […] this practice may be perfected such that in future, phobias of Russia or Europe may be avoided […] At the same time, this comparative method is a successful one more generally speaking, as it creates the opportunity for students to understand the common and distinctive elements of different systems.”

The above citation includes two important points: firstly, that the image of Europe is constructed in opposition to images of the USSR and RF, which reflects a kind of Russia-phobia that will disappear over the years; secondly, as I understand it, the USSR and RF constitute a point of comparison for values incorporated in the term “Europe”. This corresponds to the statement quoted by Zolyan that “Russia is in Europe, but not of Europe”.

The above Moldavian example displays an attitude towards the RF that is somewhere between the negative and the neutral. On the other hand, Belarusian textbooks show the “European aspirations” of the nation without opposing it with any image of the RF, although the Soviet past is analysed. As Larionov notes, the authors of the textbooks refer with some pride to events that took place in the period when the territory of Belarus was within the limits of Poland, recalling the achievements of this country in the Enlightenment age, such as the National Education Commission (a kind

\[\text{\textsuperscript{343}} \text{95.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{344}} \text{107.}\]

\text{urn:nbn:de:0220-2017-0213}
of Ministry of Education, the first on the European continent), or the Constitution of the 3 May 1791 (the first constitution passed in Europe). Numerous citations from the textbooks provided by Larionov show the determination of their authors to convince readers of the Europeanness of Belarus, although the current president’s style of exercising power is far from European standards. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the complex situation of Belarus; it is economically and politically connected to the RF, which, moreover, has in the past provided Belarus with assistance when the EU was unwilling to do so due to its aforementioned authoritarian regime. Furthermore, Belarus can benefit from the embargo imposed on the RF by the EU, becoming an important trading partner for both. The example of Ukraine, which turned towards the EU, was also important for Belarus. Politically, however, the country is divided; opposition parties are strong supporters of rapprochement with the EU, while others are for the union with the RF. This is another issue common to a number of countries discussed in this volume: societies are divided in terms of their attitude towards the RF, which are determined by that state’s loaded image as presented in textbooks, in media and by politicians.

A very modest attitude towards the RF is presented in the contribution of S. V. Koniukhov, who writes about references to tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union in Ukrainian textbooks in the early 1990s, trying to balance the advantages and disadvantages of Ukraine’s membership of the USSR. Relations between independent Ukraine and the RF are not referred to in Koniukhov’s article, which reflects the difficulty of the issue of teaching modern history during a grave conflict between two countries.

While the attitude to generalised Russia in Belarusian and Ukrainian textbooks can be, according to the material in this volume, assessed as neutral, in Georgia there is a negative narrative around Russia, beginning with the Russian Empire which conquered Georgia in the early nineteenth century. Since then, as one textbook states “the main feature of this 117 year history of the Georgian people is its struggle against Russia’s colonial oppression” (quoted by Shoshiashvili in this volume). Georgia again lost the chance for Europeanisation in 1921, when its newly regained independence was interrupted by the Soviets. As Shoshiashvili puts it, the predecessor of the RF is presented in Georgian textbooks as “the main evil, the cause of all erroneous developments and the source of many grievances”. According to the textbook authors, even after the collapse of USSR, the domination of Russia was prolonged as “Georgia was
forced to join the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], which was established at the initiative of Moscow”. Finally, Shoshiashvili states, the Russian-Georgian War “is regarded as Russia’s revenge on Georgia for its efforts to become part of the West”.

This simplification of the problem paints the RF as the successor of the Soviet Union and “the enslaver”; its antithesis is Europe, the “land of plenty” in concrete and symbolic terms. It is however worth mentioning that Europe can itself appear as antithesis. Alm notices this in the image of the Old Continent shared by many Americans: “in the American historical imagination, Europe might conceivably function either as something to be identified with, as part of a Western Euro-American civilisation or as an Other with which to contrast America. The literature mostly indicates the latter […].”

In some respects, Americans share an image of Europe with several of the nations discussed here. Americans characterise Europeans as unreliable. A feeling of abandonment and disappointment is also observable in some of the history textbooks analysed in this volume. Larionov provides an example from one textbook:

“The hopes of some Belarusian public figures for Western European help were revived after the First World War and Russian Revolution of 1917, when the Belarusian People’s Republic was established. However this time Europe again failed to provide diplomatic or military assistance.”

As Zolyan states, the authors of Armenian textbooks speak in the same vein:

“When it became obvious that the Great Powers were in no hurry to assist in liberating the Armenians, and, moreover, were unwilling or unable to save Armenians from massacres and genocide in Ottoman Turkey, Europe came to be seen in a different light. The idea emerged that Europe had betrayed the trust of Armenians, encouraging their hopes of “national liberation”, but failing to offer assistance when it was required.”

He quotes from one textbook’s account of the Armenian Genocide: “the Allies cheated the Armenian people […] their pro-Armenian position was insincere […] the hopes of the Armenian people were futile and groundless, particularly the hopes that

---

345 CIS is the organisation through which nine former Soviet Republics cooperate in the fields of economy and security. Georgia left CIS in 2008 as a result of the military conflict with the RF.
346 Alm, “Europe in American World History textbooks”, 239.
347 Ibid., 237.
348 108.
Shoshiashvili notes some resentment in Georgian textbooks, including the following textbook quotation: “in view of the total passivity of the Western European states, Russia succeeded in overcoming the political and military resistance of Persia and the Ottoman Empire and conquered Georgia in the early nineteenth century”351. The Georgian narrative however changes in respect of the turn of the twenty first century (showing “Europe helping Georgia in its struggle for liberation from Russian influence”352). Shoshiashvili notes that “from 2012 Georgian textbooks are much more Eurocentric in their approach to history”.

Thus the authors of history textbooks face a difficult task of reconciling two images of Europe: a Europe that is self-interested, sometimes selfish and entangled in the politics of world powers, and one that cultivates values of freedom, democracy, human rights, prosperity, and so on.

IV
There are several other remarks that I wish to make on the basis of the contributions to this volume and the debates that took place during the conference. The first, although I make it with some reservations, regards the way Europe and history in general is presented. Textbooks analysed are too focused on “hard” history, that is, on politics and military conflicts. Not enough attention is paid to the culture and values behind this history; although it appears that this situation is changing.

Why does culture deserve more attention? An interesting picture emerges from the research on the image of Europe among Polish university students conducted by Jerzy Bartmiński and Wojciech Chlebda in 2010. It was based on a questionnaire in which students were asked what the term “Europe” means to them. The following proportions gave the following answers (only the answers that appeared in more than ten questionnaires were presented): culture: 14.24 per cent; continent: 6.29 per cent; different countries: 6.29 per cent; long history: 5.96 per cent; integration: 4.96 per cent; tradition: 4.30 per cent; geographical location: 4.30 per cent; economic development: 4.30 per cent; international cooperation: 3.64 per cent; the rules of coexistence: 3.31 per cent; European Union: 3.31 per cent. The identification of Europe with culture was

351 M. Vachnadze. and V. Guruli, Saqartvelos Istoria 9 klas [History of Georgia Grade 9], Tbilisi, 2001, 4. Quoted from this Volume, 98.
352 100.
most prominent, while only 3.31 per cent of respondents identified Europe with the EU.\footnote{Jerzy Bartmiński and Wojciech Chlebda, “Problem konceptu bazowego i jego profilowania – na przykładzie polskiego stereotypu Europy”, in: Etnolingwistyka 25 (2013), 69–95, 83–84.} If similar studies were carried out in other Eastern European countries, the results might be different. But nevertheless it is important to note that for the younger generation being European means belonging to a particular culture. This shows the crucial role of the teaching of cultural values, including in the history lesson, in shaping the image of Europe.

Another noticeable issue is the attitude to the textbook itself. Does the textbook constitute the guideline that the teacher is to follow; or is it a tool subordinated to the teacher’s plan? In this context the issue of the curriculum arises. What is the logic behind it? Does the curriculum contain the minimum information the teacher is to communicate to students or is it exhaustive? And how is it interconnected with curricula in other subjects? History does not stand alone when it comes to communicating socially important values; it is accompanied by other lessons anchored in the humanities and social sciences (literature, both native and foreign, artistic education and civics). Together they should form a coherent image of Europe; otherwise students will be at the mercy of the abridged picture offered by the media or the biased picture offered by politicians.

Last but not least, it should be remarked that history is a political issue. This has already been referred to in the beginning of the present chapter in the context of the changing image of Europe in the face of recent events. The image of Europe is dependent on the politics of history adopted by the governments in question. The politics of history is a long-term project aimed at the development of historical consciousness through interpretation of past events and processes, but determined by the present interests of the state as defined by the governing politicians. As Patrice M. Dabrowski and Stefan Troebst write: “[t]he rulers as much as the ruled use and abuse the past, primarily to create a collective identity, to legitimise and strengthen power or to mobilise against it”.\footnote{Patrice M. Dabrowski and Stefan Troebst, “O używaniu i nadużywaniu historii. Polityka historyczna i kultury pamięci w Europie Środkowo- i Południowo-Wschodniej (1791–1989)”, in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 1 (2015), 15–61, 15.} History curricula, as well as the contents of history textbooks, are decided by politicians but they are not the only thing shaping historical consciousness. Political parties, social movements, churches, media, NGOs, academics, as well as ordinary people through their memories of the past participate in collective identity for-
mation. So in talking about the role of history textbooks in shaping the image of Europe, we must admit that the school is one of many actors. The prominence of educational policy in all political systems, however, indicates the importance of this particular actor.

V
Returning to the title issue, the lowest common denominator of the image of Europe can be identified as Europe as the antithesis to the totalitarian regimes experienced by all the nations discussed here; and as an effective economy and fair political system, where freedom and social justice are high in the hierarchy of values. How idealised this image is depends on the particular experience of the country in its past relations with Europe, but also with Russia, and the role this empire played in the history of each country even before the period of the USSR.

Another common denominator in the debate on the image of Europe is, paradoxically, the construction of national identity and how it is related to what can be labelled “Europeanism”. I see this as the most challenging issue for the authors of history textbooks. Being a function of unstable politics, the image of Europe might fluctuate as well. Occasionally Europe appears a scapegoat, but only superficially. Still, dealing with national identity can be truly dangerous, as it usually awakens the demons of nationalism. Any time nationalism has taken root in Europe it has had terrible results.

Although Europe is currently facing turbulent times, it still exhibits the core value of human dignity, in every possible sense: economic, social, political and cultural. But when it comes to national interests, Europe resembles a collage. The EU can harmonise only a part of those interests, and its foreign policy towards other states gives way to the national interest of member states from time to time. For Europe is not just ideals, but also pragmatism; it is worth remembering the image of the Old Continent in history textbooks cited above.
Bibliography

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.928024, last access 20 April.


Contributors

**Andrei Antonov** is a PhD student at State Pedagogical University „Ion Creangă“, Moldova, Chişinău, Historical Faculty. Study in special the Phenomena of the Nationalism in post-soviet Moldova. andreiantonov90@gmail.com

**Prof. Dr. Bodo von Borries** is a retired professor of History Didactics at Hamburg University. He published alternative school textbooks about innovative topics (colonial, gender and environmental history, history of mentalities and human rights) on the one hand and empirical studies (qualitative as well as quantitative ones) among children, young people, university students, grown-ups, teachers in Germany and Europe on the other hand. bvborries@aol.com

**Prof. Dr. Frank Golczewski** is a retired professor of East European history at Hamburg University. He concentrates on the 19th and 20th centuries history of Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. His main interests lie with European political history, nationalism, minority issues. Frank.Golczewski@uni-hamburg.de

**PhD. Sergii Koniukhov** - teacher at History of Ukraine and ethnic communications department in National University "Lviv Polytechnic", Ukraine. He has published on textbook research, oral history and museum studies. koniykhovs@ukr.net

**PhD. Denis Larionov** is an assistant professor at the Belarusian State University History Faculty where read lectures on history of Latin America, history of Catholic Church, various aspects of contemporary history and politics. He is an author of several research works and teaching materials. He makes research in the post-Vatican II Catholic Church and the Catholic Traditionalism. dglarionov@yandex.ru

**Dr. Robert Maier** heads the research department ‘Europe. Narratives, Images, Spaces’ at the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig, Germany. He is an editor and author of teaching materials and guidelines. He has published on international textbook research, history didactics and acoustic memory. maier@gei.de

**Dr. hab. Agnieszka Pawłowska** heads the Institute of Political Science at the University of Rzeszów, Poland. Her research refers mostly to local governance, public ad-
administration, political sociology. She is an author of articles and books on comparative local governance, cross-sectoral partnerships and civic participation. apawlowska@r.edu.pl

Dr. Sergey Rumyantsev is a sociologist and research fellow at the Center for Independent Social Research - CISR Berlin. In 2003-2014 he was a research fellow at the institute of Philosophy, sociology and law at the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan. His main research interests are: migration and diaspora studies; historical education, nationalism and conflicts; memory politics, historical narratives and myths. sergnovator@yandex.ru

Prof. Dr. Alexander Shevyrev works at the Faculty of History in Moscow State Lomonosov University. His main interest is in Russian history of the 19th century. He is an author of school textbooks and teaching materials and has also publications on textbook analysis. london7579@yandex.ru

Nodar Shoshiashvili is historian and a lecturer at the Georgian-American University in Tbilisi. His research profile is Georgian history of the 19th and 20th century, but also the relations between Europe and Georgia in the mentioned period. In his researches he concentrates on Georgian narratives. nshoshia86@gmail.com

Dr. Magda Telus studied Polish, Slavonic languages and German at the University of Wroclaw and the Ruhr-Universität Bochum. From 1997 till 2000 she coordinated a project at the Georg Eckert Institute on new history and social studies textbooks in the non-Russian states of the CIS. She teaches Polish language at Saarland University and is the chairwoman of the Federal Association of Teachers of Polish. Her main research areas include social stereotypes and linguistic construction of social identities. m.telus@mx.uni-saarland.de

Prof. Dr. Polina Verbytska is head of Department of History of Ukraine and Ethnic Communication of Lviv Polytechnic National University. The main field of her interests is historic and civic education of youth. Polina Verbytska is an author of school textbooks, teaching materials, and a number of scientific publications. She heads All-
Ukrainian Association of Teachers of History and Social Studies “Nova Doba” since 2001. polinaverbytska@gmail.com

**PhD. George Zakharov**, student, researcher of the political processes of the Post Soviet countries. george.zakharoff@gmail.com

**Dr. Mikayel Zolyan** is a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the Armenian National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, as well as an assistant professor at V. Brusov Yerevan State University of Languages and Social Sciences. His published works include articles on politics of memory, textbook analysis, as well as issues of ethnic conflict, nationalism and democratic transition in Armenia and post-Soviet region. mikayelzolyan@gmail.com