The constructions of Self and Other in the history textbooks of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in relation to the War of the Pacific
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Introduction

*Man has no internal sovereign territory; he is all and always on the boundary; looking within himself, he looks in the eyes of the other or through the eyes of the other* [Mikhail Bakhtin, quoted in Der Derian 1987, p. 168]

After more than a century, the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) is far from being considered a completed matter in the Pacific-Andean region of South America. The consequences of this armed struggle, especially the remaining maritime issue, on which this investigation will focus, play an influential role in determining the way each of the countries involved at that time construct the others; they continue to mutually conceive of one another according to a pattern of rivalry (Wehner 201; 2014). Within the terms of peace and conflict studies, the region of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru is generally classified as a ‘zone of negative peace’ (Kacowicz 1998) or a ‘zone of violent peace’ (Mares 2001). This means that unsolved issues relating to borders and boundaries continue to convulse relations between the countries and constitute potential for conflict, although an armed escalation is considered improbable (Wehner 2010, p. 5). Since the border between Bolivia and Chile was definitively marked in 1904 and the landlocked status of Bolivia was confirmed by the bilateral treaty between Chile and Peru in 1929, *reintegración marítima* (maritime reintegration) has been the major objective of Bolivia’s foreign policy (Wehner 2014, p. 6). With its economy showing steady growth in recent years and with its export volume expanding (ECLAC 2015), there is a growing demand in Bolivia for a sovereign oceanic corridor to give the country greater autonomy in controlling its foreign trade. Bolivia is conducting a judicial offensive at international level in relation to its port and maritime aspirations. In 2011 it created a special body to deal with the issue, and since 2013 it has been seeking at the International Court of Justice to bring Chile to the negotiating table on the issue of sovereign access to the Pacific. The Bolivian state also promotes its maritime policy internally. In 2014 *El Libro del Mar* (The Book of the Sea) was released, a historical account of the issue from the Bolivian perspective, which, in addition to attempting to reconstruct the relationship of mutual belonging and interdependence between Bolivia and the Pacific Ocean, determines Bolivia’s effectively landlocked status to be a cause

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1 A short report on Bolivia’s non-sovereign maritime outlet and its port disputes with Chile can be seen in the documentary *Bolivien: Kriegsmarine auf dem Titicacasee*, produced by Karin Feltes (Das Erste 2014).

2 DIREMAR (*Dirección Estratégica de Reivindicación Marítima*, in English Strategic Direction for Maritime Revindication), attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
of its poverty. In the same way, 23 March has been set as *Día del Mar* (Day of the Sea), a date established to commemorate Bolivian resistance to what is perceived as the Chilean invasion and promote ‘maritime consciousness’ in Bolivians (DIREMAR 2016). Peru, which, although in smaller proportions, also suffered territorial losses in the war, was the first to pursue a case against Chile in The Hague; the matter ran from 2008 to 2014 and revolved around the determination of the baselines of its maritime domains.\(^3\)

These disputes and rivalries are not limited to the juridical and political sphere with respect to the international relations of these countries. The issue, traversing generations, is also a matter of educational concern. One of the purposes of this paper is to bring academic analysis closer to the discourses circulating in the school environment. To this end, the study addresses the question of how textbooks in the three countries, in their differing perspectives on the conflict, construct identities of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ through the reproduction of narratives relating to the highly sensitive subject of the War of the Pacific. Theoretically, the research is grounded in post-structuralism, a powerful tool for reflecting on and questioning the formation of identities and making visible the quotidian discourses of exclusion and marginalisation which reside in school literature. Thus equipped with the poststructuralist approach, this study not only suggests the link between foreign policy and identity which appears in the textbooks of the three countries, but also infers through the analysis of text from the textbooks that the legacy of war contributes to the creation of what we might term mental maps. In categorising the textbook, for the purposes of this analysis, as a literary genre, and placing it at the centre of peace and conflict studies, this research expands the concept of the textbook beyond educational concerns and seeks to cast light on the interlacements between education and politics. At the least, the analysis attempts to visualise the ways in which textual constructions lead readers to interpretations of facts which do not necessarily reproduce historical truths. Thus, in pointing to textual appropriations of history, it argues for historians, educationalists and policymakers to engage in the deconstruction of unilateral points of view and the essentially ideological adjustments to which they subject the textbook narratives, and calls for a transformation of discourse in favour of the purposes of peace.

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The narratives of the War of the Pacific to be found in the textbooks analysed here also represent a universe full of fantasies. Replete with naval battles, fights in the desert, and heroic characters, these textbooks ignite the imaginations of children (and adults) through symbolisms and mystification of the endeavours of compatriots past. Yet this is the story of a mutual estrangement of closely-related nations, written by a stranger living in a strange country. If I might here make a personal declaration of interest, my interest in this matter emerges from my discomfort with the education system in my country of origin (Brazil); this study, then, manifests my discontent with the education I received under a school curriculum with a long military and neoliberal tradition behind it. In the hope that its weight, in terms of both facts and analysis, does not lead this ship to strand on an academic sandbank, this paper aims to support the improvement of ‘language critical awareness’ (Fairclough) and, if possible, contribute to identifying alternative ‘outlets’ in the field of peace and conflict studies through which critical reflection about the discursive production being transmitted to students can also be practised.

1 Key Concepts of Post-structuralism
.Poststructuralist authors on international relations have incorporated philosophical concepts and ideas from the study of world politics in their writings. Adapting the basic literature on the basis of the work of Lene Hansen (2006; 2011), we will first outline four key concepts of the theory: discourse, deconstruction, productive power, and intertextuality (Hansen 2011, p. 169). We will follow this with a definition of and reflection on the concept of identity in its interrelationship with foreign policy and conclude by detailing the models proposed in the poststructuralist literature with regard to the formation of identities (the construction of the self and the Other) through the process of ‘othering’
1.1 Discourse

There is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favor. We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case as practice we impose on them [Foucault, quoted in Shapiro 2012, p. 29]

Language is the central element through which we can achieve an analytical comprehension of post-structuralism and understand its constructions. The poststructuralist approach asserts that the only way to obtain direct access to objective reality is through discursive constructions, which means that ‘reality’ is conceived in the act of discourse, that it is discontinuous and thus not pre-fixed. Following this line of thought, post-structuralism rejects the explanations given through metanarratives and focuses on small local narratives (Lyotard 1984). This is because ‘all the truths’, in the words of Diez, ‘are dependent on our communicative contexts – on the texts that we read, write and hear’ (Diez 2008, p. 188). Close in its manner of proceeding to textual hermeneutics, poststructuralist analytical work is based on the centrality of the text, and brings into the focus of study not a reality presented as such, but rather different representations of reality (ibid., p. 190).

In post-structuralism, language is understood as ‘social’. In the words of Lene Hansen, ‘to understand language as social is to see it not as a private property of the individual but as a series of collective codes and conventions that each individual needs to employ to make [him- or her]self comprehensible’ (Hansen 2006, p. 18). This idea originates from the conceptualisation of ‘discourse’ by Michel Foucault (1971; 1996), who defines discourse as a linguistic system that organises statements and concepts. Language does not function as a neutral transmitter of ideas, but rather as a producer of meaning (Hansen 2006; 2011). In the political arena, language and its production of meanings play an essential role. Actors need to legitimise their external policy to internal and external audiences, and do this discursively. The words employed by these actors are selected to the detriment of others and according to their need, so that the message reaches the amplitude and political implication that the actors seek to effect. This does not mean that things do not really happen. The War of the Pacific itself was a real event, which left marks of violence and real consequences. However, within the poststructuralist view, the essence does not lie within the war per se, but rather within its discursive meanings.

4 All quotations originally in German have been translated by the author.
1.2 Deconstruction

Within the poststructuralist approach, words acquire meaning only in relation to other words (Hansen 2011, p. 170). To obtain an understanding of the term ‘war’, for example, we need the association of other words. In this understanding, then, ‘death’, ‘terror’, ‘chaos’ might all be vocables (or terms) synchronised with the word ‘war’. Moreover, we can understand the word by comparing it to something that it is not, to something opposed to it; an example in the case of ‘war’ might be the term ‘peace’, which is associated with the words ‘life’, ‘order’, ‘tranquility’. This idea originated from the philosopher Jacques Derrida (Hansen 2011, p. 171), who called language ‘a system of differential signs […] meaning is established not by the essence of a thing itself but through a series of juxtapositions, where one element is valued over its opposite’ (Derrida 1976, quoted in Hansen 2006, p. 19).

Thus the juxtaposition of words gives meaning to the word and likewise assigns to it values of superiority or inferiority. Accordingly, linguistic (de)construction is conducted through the identification of binary oppositions, where the first term is the term normatively valued, while the second term is in opposition to it; there is, in the words of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), ‘a privileged side [on] one hand and a devalued one on the other’ (Hansen 2006, p. 19). In these terms, the binary opposition features a hierarchical element, as in the dichotomisations developed/undeveloped, civilised/uncivilised, good/bad, male/female, and so on (Hansen 2011). As an example of the application of these structural dyads in world politics, we can cite the discourses circulating around the drugs policies implemented by the governments of the United States in recent decades in relation to Latin America.5 Facing a huge domestic demand for drugs, instead of establishing measures to combat the distribution and internal consumption of drugs, these policies sought to combat drugs at their origin, consequently criminalising Latin American producers (Youngers 2005). In these terms, by positioning axiologically the origin of ‘evil’ in Latin America, this dichotomy determines the local US citizen as the ‘good’ to be protected.

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5 The ‘war on drugs’, launched in 1971 under Nixon’s administration; the Plan Colombia initiated in 1998-99 under Bill Clinton’s; and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative launched under the aegis of George W. Bush in 2005, illustrate this case.
1.3 Productive Power

In its understanding of the concept of power, post-structuralism once again differs from the approach advocated by classical theories, which, following a logic in which state authority is central, concentrate their analysis of power on the economic and military capabilities of the system (Hansen 2011, p. 171). For post-structuralism, power is ‘neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and [...] only exists in action’ (Foucault 1980, p. 89, quoted in Rix 2005, p. 195). The ontological meaning of power is not something pre-established, but is set up on discursive constructions and their reverse, which is the ‘action’ referred to by Foucault. In the words of Diez, power is not to be found solely as explicit, physical oppression, but already begins in the way we conceptualize the world. Since we do not have access to the reality outside the discourse, it lies in the discursive construction of reality as a fundamental power that allows certain views and actions or let[s] them appear as nonsensical (Diez 2008, p. 193).

Thus, in accordance with the poststructuralist view, power is ambivalent and its discursive constructions occasion inclusions and exclusions. This means that power is highly involved in the constructions of subject positions. This understanding of power comes from the studies of Foucault, more precisely from his concept of ‘genealogy’ (Hansen 2011, p. 171) which deals with the question, among others, of which discourses are excluded at the expense of others. For Foucault, power acquires a productive force insofar as it achieves legitimisation of a particular speech act in the eyes of its audience (Foucault 2001). In his work Foucault sought to analyse the institutionalisation of specific ‘domain structures’ ruling within civil society, such as that of the power of the psychiatrist over the mental patient, of medicine over the population, of the administration of a given country over people’s way of life (Foucault 2001, p. 234). Foucault found in these studies a determinant relationship between ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’, which he called régime du savoir (ibid., 235). Here, knowledge bears the mantle of authority, which legitimises, to refer to one of the examples cited above, the psychiatrist’s domain over the mental patient. Thus ‘the madman is one whose discourse cannot circulate as the discourse of the other’ (Foucault 1996, p. 10); that is, madness is determined by the exclusion of its discourse. Therefore, in consonance with Foucault, poststructuralism defines power as a form of discursive domination, where ‘the exercise of power is not simply a relationship between individual or collective “partners”; it is a mode of action (domination) of some over others’ (Foucault 2001, p.
In this study, the concept of productive power contributes to our reflection on the authority of the state and educational institutions in establishing themselves as possessing knowledge and systematically reproducing history’s discourses and narratives. Following this approach, these institutions constitute a clear instance of power.

1.4 Intertextuality

The concept of intertextuality was developed by Kristeva based on the pioneer studies of Mikhail Bakhtin, who was one of the first to conceive of ‘a model where literary structure does not simply exist but is generated in relation to another structure’ (Kristeva 1980, p. 64-65, italics in original). For Bakhtin, a word does not have ‘fixed meaning’ (ibid.); instead, it is an intersection of textual surfaces, a dialogue among several writings. ‘Bakhtin’, affirms Kristeva, ‘does not see dialogue only as language assumed by a subject; he sees it, rather, as a writing where one reads the other’ (Kristeva 1980, p. 68, italics in original). For Bakhtin, language is dialogical, that is, everything that people say is a linguistic construct formulated in response to something that has already been said and in anticipation of what will be said in response (Kristeva 1980). People do not produce language in a vacuum. To Bakhtin and Kristeva, language is related to a process of endless redescriptions of the world (ibid.).

In more concrete terms, Kristeva’s theory on the intertextual generation of meaning asserts that ‘no text is written without traces of previous texts, […] a text is simultaneously drawing upon a textual past and constructing this past into a unique new text’ (Hansen 2006, p. 56). The concept of intertextuality is theoretically and methodologically significant for the discourse analysis of foreign policy. This importance is found in the property of intertextuality which means it ‘highlights that texts are situated within and against other texts, that they draw upon them in constructing their identities and policies, that they appropriate as well as revise the past, and that they build authority by reading and citing that of others’ (Hansen 2006, p. 55). Making use of intertextual analysis enables us to expand our range of research literature and place texts from different genres into interrelationship with one another. In Hansen’s words,

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6 See also Der Derian (1987) and Shapiro (1989).

It [intertexual analysis] points analytically, politically, and empirically to seeing official foreign policy texts – statements, speeches, and interviews – not as entities standing separately from wider societal discourses but as entities located within a larger textual web; a web that both includes and goes beyond other policy texts, into journalism, academic writing, popular non-fiction, and, potentially, even fiction […] (ibid.),

We propose in this study to add another type of text to Hansen’s list by introducing textbooks to the intertextual web/space of analysis of the War of the Pacific.

1.5 Identity and Foreign Policy

We can recognize ourselves only in the presence of an Other, and on this the rules of coexistence and submission are based. But it is more likely that we find this Other intolerable because to some degree he is not us. In this way, by reducing him to an enemy, we create our hell on earth [Umberto Eco 2013, p. 21]

Identities always require an Other against which they are constructed; an Other which they thus construct at the same time (Hansen 2006; Diez 2008). In the literature, this process is also called *estrangement*, *alienation*, or in German *Entfremdung*, and determines a *self* through the exclusion of an *Other* (Der Derian 1987, pp. 12-13). Following Campbell,

[…] the seemingly intransigent structures of history are effects (although very powerful effects) of a variety of uncoordinated practices of differentiation that serve to constituent meaning and identity through a series of exclusions. In this context, the imposition of an interpretation on the ambiguity and contingency of social life always results in an other being marginalized. Meaning and identity are, therefore, always the consequence of a relationship between the self and the other that emerges through the imposition of an interpretation, rather than being the product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own preestablished identity (Campbell 1998, p. 23).

As thus explained by Campbell, we see that the discursive articulations of self and Other produce meaning and identity. This phenomenon, according to post-structuralism, occurs due to the political and social essence of language, which allows it to be seen as a site for the production and reproduction of particular subjectivities and identities while others are simultaneously excluded. Lene Hansen defines language as

[...] social and political, an inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference. The productive nature of language implies that policy discourse is seen as relying upon particular constructions of problems and subjectivities, but that it is also through discourse that these problems and subjectivities are constructed in the first place. Policy and identity are therefore conceptualized as ontologically interlinked (Hansen 2006, p. 17).

7 As Hansen explains, ‘when poststructuralists write about identities as constituted in discourse, they usually use the term subjectivities or subject positions to underscore that identity is not something that someone has, but that [it] is a position that one is constructed as having’ (Hansen 2011, p. 177).
‘Policy’, within the approach presented here, does not differ in practice from ‘foreign policy’. We can therefore say that foreign policy is, while ‘the policy of making things foreign’ (Campbell 1998), is due to the ontological similarity also interconnected with the identity. Central is the spatial location of the reference object on which the identity, through the process of differentiation, will be constructed. Fundamental is the reference that is being alienated. According to Diez,

[...] the characteristics of the domestic sphere are presented as existing prior to the external threat, but in fact they are constructed in this very statement – there is no homogeneous and clearly delineated ‘inside’ to be defended against the ‘outside’ apart from a historically contextual representation of social relations infused with power and distinctions between ‘self’ and ‘other’. Foreign policy, from such an angle, is not the representation of the nation to others as a pre-given object, but a construction of the nation in the very moment of representation (Diez 2005, p. 627).

Evidently, ‘identities are simultaneously a product of and a justification for foreign policy’ (Hansen 2006, p. 26). Both are correlated and complementary; each one is a fundamental component of the other. ‘Foreign policy’, ponders Hansen, ‘rel[ies] upon representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced’ (Hansen 2006, p. 1). Foreign policies are relational, and constitute the identity of the self through the construction of menaces, threats, hazards, dangers, and challenges that consist in the Other(s).

In this sense, the goal of foreign policy discourse is to create a stable link between representations of identity and the proposed policy (Der Derian 1987; Shapiro 1988; Hansen 2006). Formulating this link requires ‘internal discursive stability between identity and policy and for the external constraints imposed on the discourse to be addressed’ (Hansen 2006, p. 18). Post-structuralism argues that foreign policy must be understood as a discursive practice because discourses of foreign policy articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas to such an extent that the two become inseparable – ‘[i]deas, in the words of Marx, become material forces’ (Laclau 2000, p. 47). Further, it argues that policy discourses are inherently social because policymakers address both the political opposition and the public sphere in order to legitimise their political choices and to institutionalise their understandings of identities (Campbell 1998; Hansen 2006).
1.6 Othering – Constructions of Self and Other

Identities are not necessarily constructed through a juxtaposition of an Other radically different and threatening to the self (Wehner 2010, p. 8). Constructions of identity can take on different degrees of ‘Otherness’, ranging from fundamental difference between self and Other to constructions of less radical difference. The forms of otherness pinpointed in the literature (Neumann 1999; Diez 2005; Hansen 2006; Wehner 2010) permit us to identify and distinguish the ways in which textbooks construct the self and the Other. Summarising these authors’ findings, we can identify four different ways in which the Self/Other nexus is constructed:

(1) Representation of the Other as an existential threat. Here, textual compositions strive to portray the Other as dangerous, untrustworthy, expansionist and in pursuit of its national interests. As we will see, this view of the Other as a threat is how Bolivian and Peruvian texts represent Chile.

(2) Representation of the other as inferior. Here the textual move consists in constructing a Self superior to the Other. The dichotomisation counteracts the negative characteristics of the state being othered and emphasises the positive, laudable qualities of the Self. This view is partly found in Chilean classifications of Bolivia due to Bolivia’s perceived inability to secure administrative structures in the region and to explore and exploit the territory.

(3) Representation of the Other as violating universal principles. Diez classifies this form of othering as ‘a stronger variation of the second strategy’ (2005, pp. 628-629). Here, the standards of the Self are seen not simply as superior, but as of universal validity, with the consequence that ‘the other should be convinced or otherwise brought to accept the principles of the self’ (ibid.). This form of othering is present in Chilean representations of Bolivia and Peru;

(4) Representation of the Other as different. This manner of othering differs from the other three by not placing an obvious value judgement on the Other. The Other is represented neither as inferior nor as a threat, but merely as different. Nevertheless, this
is not an innocent practice, because it still imposes identities on others. This form of othering was not directly identified in the textbooks analysed, yet merits a mention here as a further variant of the construction of the Self/Other nexus.

2 The War of the Pacific (Overview)

[...] in order to wage war, we need an enemy to fight [...] the inevitability of war is linked to the inevitability of identifying and creating an enemy [Umberto Eco 2013, p. 18]

The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) saw the republics of Peru and Bolivia on one side and the Republic of Chile on the other, locked in a military dispute over the control of the natural resources in the Atacama Desert. The conflict ended with Chile’s victory and territorial aggrandisement through the annexations of the Arica and Tarapacá Provinces from Peru and the entire Bolivian Pacific coast, leaving Bolivia as a landlocked country in the Andean plateau. After each attaining independence in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the three Andean republics entered the international global market as suppliers of raw materials to the industrialised countries (Hobsbawm 1996, p. 63). Although they thus occupied their a customary position in the international division of labour, the three republics were now located in a global economic structure which was no longer colonial but imperial. Eric Hobsbawm elucidates this period as follows:

The imperialism of the late nineteenth century was undoubtedly ‘new’. It was the child of an era of competition between rival industrial-capitalist national economies which was new and which was intensified by the pressure to secure and safeguard markets in a period of business uncertainty; in short, it was an era when ‘tariff and expansion become [sic] the common demand of the ruling class’. It was part of a process of turning away from a capitalism of the private and public policies of laissez-faire, which was also new, and implied the rise of large corporations and oligopolies as well as the increased intervention of the state in economic affairs. It belonged to a period when the peripheral part of the global economy became increasingly significant (Hobsbawm 1996, pp. 72-73).

After the end of Spanish colonialism, the young South American republics, led by their local oligarchies, had become dependent on foreign capital – mainly English, in a minor part of French and US origin – in order to promote the exploitation of local natural resources and their ensuing export, which was central to their economic survival (ibid., p 119). These republics were therefore characterised by state capitalism, and the incessant search for a material basis for this system was crucial. The growing interest in

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8 Chile became independent in 1817, Peru in 1821, and Bolivia in 1825.
the wide availability of material resources in the Atacama region – guano, nitrate, copper and silver – became the central cause for the conflagration of the War of the Pacific (Bravo Quezada 2000, p. 26).

Interest in the Atacama first arose in light of the discovery of guano deposits in the region in the late 1850s (Burr 1974, pp. 108f.). Since the 1840s, Peru had exported this fertiliser on a large scale to Europe, attaining a dominant market position in this period (Bonilla 1994, p. 735; Hobsbawm 1996, p. 181). In 1842, the Chilean government, based on the findings of an exploration commission sent to the Atacama Desert, declared as its property all guano deposits on this coast, which at the time was Bolivian territory (Caivano 1883, p. 27). Without the financial and military means to undertake a campaign in the desert, Bolivia was limited to judicial protest until 1862, when its parliament finally approved a declaration of war against Chile (ibid., pp. 27-28). The declaration was ultimately not carried out. The occupation of the Peruvian islands of Chincha by the Spanish fleet in 1865 led the republics of the South American Pacific to form a quadruple alliance, consisting of Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, in order to repel the new Spanish assault on the continent (ibid., p. 28). In 1866, motivated by a temporary friendship forged through fighting side by side against a common enemy, Bolivia and Chile signed a border treaty making the 24th parallel south the frontier line between the two republics (ibid.).9 Bolivia also accepted a mutual assistance treaty with Chile which recognised a virtual common domain of the two countries in the Atacama Desert region between the twenty-third and twenty-fifth parallels of southern latitude (ibid., p. 29; Bravo Quezada 2000, p. 27).10

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9 According to Caivano, the Andean republics were to keep the internal colonial borders as national boundaries after their independences. In this way, according to the Uti Possidetis, the instrument of public law in place at the time, the border between Chile and Peru would stay being the ‘despoblado de Atacama’ (Atacama’s uninhabited area), as it had been between the Viceroyalty of Peru and the Captaincy General of Santiago (Caivano 1883, p. 19). Later Bolivia (formerly Upper Peru), formed from a portion of the Viceroyalty of Peru and the Viceroyalty of La Plata, would occupy this region as its border (ibid., p. 19–20). As we shall see, the precedent colonial arrangement has not served as a legal guarantee for the upholding of the borders.

10 According to Robert N. Burr, ‘the treaty of 1866 […] gave to Chile […] virtual condominium with Bolivia over the territory between the 23rd and 24th parallels, the region possessing the Atacama’s most valuable known resources. Under the condominium provisions Chilean business enterprise was assured equal rights with that of Bolivia, and the Chilean government was guaranteed half of any tax revenues realized from the production and sale of mineral resources’ (Burr 1974, pp. 118-119).
The invention of dynamite by Alfred Nobel in 1866 gave greater impetus to the exploitation of nitrate in the region.\textsuperscript{11} The Bolivian population in the region was in the minority and composed mostly of workers who came from the countryside to provide public administration services, mainly police and customs (Bravo Quezada 2000, p. 25). Hence Bolivia lacked the technical preconditions for the exploration and exploitation of the nitrate mines and had to proceed by granting concessions to Chilean companies, often associated with British capital (ibid., p. 23). With a condominium granting to it fifty per cent of the fiscal revenues, Chile quickly began to exploit the region; injecting great quantities of capital, technical and managerial skill, Chileans created a vast mining and industrial complex in the Atacama Desert (Burr 1974, p. 119). The commercial enlargement of this complex proceeded with relative stability until 1871, when the National Assembly of Bolivia ousted President Mariano Melgarejo from power, annulling the treaty of 1866 which he had negotiated (ibid, p. 119; Caivano 1883, p. 32). To safeguard its rights of exploitation, the Chilean government sent the chargé Santiago Lindsay for direct negotiations to La Paz in 1872. The ‘Mission Lindsay’ also had orders to include in the treaty to be negotiated the newly discovered silver mine of Caracoles (located outside the area of the condominium), and, should Bolivia accept, to seek to purchase the entire region (Burr 1974, p. 121).

Chile’s increasing involvement in the region’s trade, its political aspirations and the fortification of its navy caused growing fears of military action in both Bolivia and Peru, culminating in 1873 in the two governments’ signing of a secret defence treaty which also aimed to incorporate Argentina, a country which was experiencing border disputes with Chile in Patagonia (Burr 1974, p. 124; López Urrutia 2008, p. 6). In 1874, after a year of difficult negotiations, Bolivia and Chile signed a treaty confirming the basis of the old treaty of 1866 (frontier line at twenty-fourth parallel, joint sovereignty between the twenty-third and twenty-fifth parallels) supplemented by a guarantee clause fixing taxes on Chilean exports over the next 25 years (Burr 1974, p. 130).

In 1878, Colonel Hilarión Daza assumed power in Bolivia and increased export taxes on the main Chilean company, the Antofagasta Nitrate Company (López Urrutia 2008, p. 8). Chile protested, and accused Bolivia of violating the treaty of 1874 which

\textsuperscript{11} The deposits of nitrate in the area, as well as serving as a source for a key ingredient of the famous explosive, were able to act as an advantageous replacement for guano in the manufacture of agricultural fertilisers. The saltpetre (a mix of nitrates) present in large quantities in this desert was also used for the manufacture of ammunition and gunpowder (Razoux 2012, p. 108).
had placed a moratorium on tax increases. The Bolivian government responded by ordering retroactive taxation on all exports in 1878, whereupon Chile proposed to submit the matter to a court of arbitration. President Daza refused and threatened with the expropriation of the company if Chile refused to pay (Burr 1974, p. 135; Urrutia 2008, p. 8). On 14 February 1879, the deadline determined by La Paz for the payment of taxes, a Chilean battalion of infantry landed in the Bolivian city of Antofagasta, the main port and centre of all trade in the Atacama Desert (Caivano 1883, p. 38; Burr 1974, p. 135). The Peruvian government sent its representatives to Santiago and La Paz in a failed endeavour to seek a diplomatic solution. The occupation of Antofagasta activated the treaty of 1873 between Peru and Bolivia and positioned both countries in a defensive alliance against Chile. In March, Bolivia declared war on Chile; in April Chile officially declared war on both Bolivia and Peru (Razoux 2012, p. 111). This war, the War of the Pacific, which thus had its official beginning in the Chilean occupation of Antofagasta, ended after more than four years of hard fighting with the signing of the Treaty of Ancón\textsuperscript{12} in October 1883, which sealed victory for Chile and saw Bolivia and Peru cede territory. Comparing the forces (see Table 1) reveals that Chile had a large military advantage over Peru and Bolivia (López Urrutia 2008, pp. 9-11); in addition to its more numerous and better equipped naval force, Chile also possessed a better trained army, well-armed with modern artillery (Razoux 2012, p. 111).\textsuperscript{13} In contrast, Peru, despite maintaining a large regular army, was armed with outdated equipment and its navy was damaged (López Urrutia 2008, pp. 10-12), while Bolivia had a limited and unstructured army\textsuperscript{14} and no navy (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{12} After its signing in 1883, the Treaty of Ancón was ratified in March 1884.

\textsuperscript{13} According to Razoux, ‘the Chilean army possessed modern weapons, such as Winchester repeating rifles, Krupp cannons and Gatling and Nordenfeldt machine guns’ (Razoux 2012, p. 111).

\textsuperscript{14} As López Urrutia has commented, ‘Bolivia had a poorly equipped army, formed by indigenous [soldiers] wearing sandals or barefoot and having poor quality uniforms’ (López Urrutia 2008, p. 12).
The constructions of Self and Other in the history textbooks of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in relation to the War of the Pacific

The war is divided into a naval, a terrestrial and an occupation phase. The first phase of the conflict began with the advancement of the Chilean fleet towards the Peruvian harbour of Callao in May 1879 (Razoux 2012, p. 113). The Peruvian navy was commanded by President Pardo himself, who was also in charge of a squadron (ibid.). Bolivia, in the absence of its own naval forces, tried unsuccessfully to issue patents for corsairs with the intention of reinforcing the Peruvian defences from the Chilean advancement (López Urrutia 2008, p. 9). Battles for hegemony over the Pacific were fought over five months, concluding in October of the same year with the Battle of Angamos. Then, the monitor Huáscar, the most important warship of the Peruvian Navy, was captured by the naval forces of Chile, to be later restored and reincorporated into its squadron. The maritime hegemony over the Pacific was crucial in the further course of the war, as it enabled Chile to control the supply of its troops through the oceanic route, bombarding the port cities and boarding and disembarking troops all along the Pacific coast (López Urrutia 2008, p. viii).

The transposition of hostilities from the sea to the land marked the beginning of the second phase of the conflict. While the remains of the Peruvian fleet were commissioned to protect the main port of Callao, the Chilean general staff proceeded with the first attacks on land, which had as their goal the conquest of the Province of Tarapacá, rich in mineral resources (López Urrutia 2008, p. 40; Razoux 2012, p. 117). After the city of Pisagua, in the south of the province, was taken by the end of 1879, Chilean troops destroyed the defences of Peru and Bolivia in Tacna and Arica (to the north of the province) respectively in May and June 1880 (Razoux 2012, p. 119). The defeat in Tacna, on the route of direct access to La Paz, marked the withdrawal of Bolivia from the war. The War of the Pacific thus became a conflict between Chile and Peru (Manrique 1988, p. 87).

Table 1: The military forces of the three countries at the beginning of the war (in Razoux 2012, p. 112).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active soldiers</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militiamen and reservists</td>
<td>45000</td>
<td>35000</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
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At this point, the conflict in the South American Pacific was affecting the trade and investments of the European powers, which expressed their irritation with the prolonged hostilities (Razoux 2012 p. 120). In order to avoid European interference, the United States, making use of the Monroe doctrine, sent a diplomatic mission to mediate in the conflict. In October 1880, the cruiser USS Lackawanna moored at the anchorage of Arica and invited the belligerent parties to climb aboard and find a solution to the conflict (Burr 1974, p. 152). On the USS Lackawanna, the Chilean government accused the alliance of Peru and Bolivia of culpability for starting the war and demanded as compensation the whole coast of Bolivia and the Province of Tarapacá plus a sum of 20 million dollars (ibid.). Peru and Bolivia considered the Chilean conditions unacceptable. The Conference of Arica thus failed and the Chilean general staff continued preparations to attack Lima, the capital of Peru (Razoux 2012, p. 120).

Between November and December 1880, the Chilean navy landed approximately 26,000 soldiers on the Peruvian coast for the final offensive in Lima. With approximately 12,000 men at his disposal – half of them indigenous people hastily recruited and untrained in even the rudiments of war (Manrique 1988, p. 27) – President Piérola, commander-in-chief of the defence of Lima, ordered the mass uprising of all citizens above sixteen years in the hope of containing the incursion of Chilean regiments (Razoux 2012, p. 121). Lima fell in January 1881 with the defeat at the Battle of Miraflores, and in February the occupying forces commanded by General Patricio Lynch installed the puppet government of García Calderón in order to facilitate the signing of a peace treaty in accordance with the interests of Chile (Burr 1974, p. 154).

After the defeat at Miraflores, the Peruvian troops reorganised themselves in the surroundings of Lima and fled in the direction of Cuzco (Razoux, p. 123). Once the mercantile bourgeoisie of Lima – in charge of waging the war up to that point – was disempowered, the resistance to the occupying forces passed to the authority of the terratenientes serranos (landlords of the highlands). These terratenientes, under the leadership of General Andrés Cáceres, organised guerrilla groupings formed by indigenous peoples of the central sierra (Manrique 1988, p. 28). These groupings –

15 ‘A part of US foreign policy that states that the US will act to protect its own interests in North and South America. From the name of US President James Monroe, who first stated the policy in 1823’ (Oxford Learner’s Dictionary).
The term Montoneras refers to irregular forces who fought during the wars of independence in Peru and later against the Chilean occupation during the War of the Pacific (Rosario Candelier 2003).

17 The Chilean occupation of Tacna persisted until 1929 (López Urrutia, p. 125).

18 The total number of war-related deaths given in various sources ranges from 20,000 (Sater 2007, p. 348) to 16,000 (Razoux 2012, p. 107).
3.1 Peru

The educational plan issued by the Peruvian Ministry of Education provides for the study of the War of the Pacific in the fourth year of the second stage of school education (Peru 2016). The book produced by the Independencia publishing house (2012), which presents the war in the section *Tema 19 – La Guerra con Chile* in its book called *Historia, Geografía y Economía*, will be used for this discourse analysis. This book is the most recently published literature covering the War of the Pacific available at the Georg Eckert Institute (up to the point of conduction of this work in February 2016). According to the Observatorio Nacional de Textos Escolares (National Observatory of Educational Texts), a body of the Ministry of Education of Peru, this textbook published by Independencia is well disseminated across various regions of the country.

3.1.1 Othering Chile

As we will see in the textual extracts selected, the discourse on the War of the Pacific that appears in this Peruvian textbook constructs Chile as a clear threat. In this account, the dangers represented by Chile are many, starting with its geopolitical calculation to overcome its economic difficulties:

(1) *The Chilean economy deserves special attention, since it was from its origins a poor country in natural resources, in a territory with arid deserts, rivers of restricted flow and irregular course and with a rebel indigenous population (the Araucanos) [which it was] difficult to […] integrate. For that reason, [the state of] its economy was described as "extremely serious by the year 1878"; therefore it saw with good eyes [its'] neighbours' living crises and acute disorders (Independencia 2012, p. 101).*

(2) *[…] its oligarchy, conscious of its destiny and aspirations, organised aggressive development plans to promote patriotism and expansionism in order to escape from its limitations and become a powerful country. Therefore, the struggles and disputes over political power between Liberals and Conservatives were not very frequent and intense; the aggression, war and looting against [Chile’s] neighbours were not alien to their plans for a solution to their economic problems (p. 102).*

In the pre-war setting evoked by this textbook narrative, Chile, unlike Bolivia and Peru, is characterised by its mineral and geographical poverty and defined as an

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19 All translations from Spanish to English are by the author. The extracts are given in the original Spanish on pp. 68ff.
unintegrated society as regards its relationship with the local indigenous people. In this discourse, the severity of the economic crisis in the year before the outbreak of war places pressure on Chile to produce an alternative, in this case, to get closer to and make use of its abundant natural resources in neighbouring territories. Chile’s initial economic and political infiltration of, and subsequent warlike aggression towards Bolivia and Peru are facilitated by the ‘crises and constant disorders’ suffered by those two countries.

The Peruvian reading thus interprets the war as not an abrupt event, but rather a consequence of Chilean expansionism. Unlike in Peru, where internal disputes undermined the country’s development, the Chilean oligarchy, ‘conscious’ of its goals, mobilised its internal forces to carry out what we might call its master plan, i.e. external aggression. The war, from the perspective of Peru, was conceptualised and conducted rationally by Chile (poor in natural resources) to the end of overcoming its economic limitations through the seizure of territories from Peru and Bolivia (rich in natural resources).

The Peruvian textbook affirms that the expansionist policy of Chile had manifested itself from the earliest years of its independence

(3) [by Chile’s] opposing the principles of American brotherhood fostered by Peru;
(4) [by its] not agreeing with the federative plans of (Simón) Bolivar; therefore welcoming the creation of Bolivia, separating from Peru and Argentina;
(5) [because Chile] actively opposed the Peru-Bolivian Confederation;
(6) [and because] Chile not only had territorial ambitions towards the north against Bolivia and Peru, but also towards the south against Argentina, battling for Patagonia and the Strait of Magellan (p. 105).

The extract that follows these, in addition to once again referring to Chilean expansionism as the sole cause of the war, includes a new element, namely the alliance of Chile with English capitalism/imperialism:

(7) The fundamental cause for the intervention of Peru was also the expansionist policy of Chile to appropriate by force the territories of Atacama and Tarapacá, with its wealth (mainly the saltpetre) planned to resolve the economic crisis that Chile was facing, as well as its external debt. This intention was supported by Chileans and English capitalists, linked to English imperialism, to whom all kinds of benefits were offered if they supported Chile against Peru. As they did,
they created all kinds of difficulties so that Peru could not obtain war material in Europe (p. 106).

In this narrative, Peru is presented as the bulwark of American fraternity and an exponent of the ideals of Simón Bolívar. Chile is depicted at the other extreme, characterised by its malevolence (malevolence functioning here as essentially an antonym of fraternity), by its alliance with foreign capital (and its consequent denial of Bolivarianism), by its stand against the integrationist practices of Bolivia and Peru, and, finally, by the implication of expansionism as a quasi-natural characteristic of the Chilean Self, confirmed by its discursively constructed lust and greed in territorial disputes in the South with a third country, Argentina.

In the Peruvian discourse, the Chilean association with English capital was not only a decisive causal factor in the war, but also a reason for Chile’s disproportionately greater military power, which played a crucial role in its course:

(8) The expansionist ambitions of Chile were not foreseen by Peru; on the contrary, [...] [Peru’s] military expenditure had been drastically reduced. Between 1849 and 1860 [...] it was 45% and fell to 18% in the fiscal crisis between 1879 and 1880. At the outbreak of the war, it [was] only built up to 28%. Added to this, [President] Pardo abolished military recruitment, reducing the [deployable military force] and cancelled the purchase of armaments. On the other hand, Chile had obtained maritime and terrestrial military superiority [...] The Chilean state could not afford these purchases [...] so that this was only possible thanks to the financial resources coming from English capitalism [...] (p. 106).

Here we have another explicit dichotomy: in opposition to a ‘martial’ Chile that (9) ‘had prepared for years for the war’ (p. 108), Peru constructs its image as non-martial, naive in its failure to predict Chilean intentions, and therefore unequipped to repel the invading forces. While Chilean expansionism is presented to students as premeditated and evil, it is during the description of the final battles of the occupation that the discourse seeks to unveil the full perversity and cruelty of the Chilean attacker:

(10) A cry from far away, like the crack that announces the earthquake, enveloped the people, heat and hissing, therefore, fire, tongues of fire and spirals of black smoke were born [emerged] overall in the village. Destruction and death were dancing. A group of children terrorised and exhausted by terror poured screaming into the gate of the "Garibaldi". Firefighters! Firefighters! Our house is burning. Everything is burning and they kill everyone[.] [The
Taking a poetic tone, this textual fragment (re)constructs the fire that took Lima during the Battle of Chorrillos in 1881, caused by the Chilean army at the beginning of its occupation (p. 108). Desperate children seek help from the Garibaldi firefighters and let themselves fall to the ground after finding refuge. Below the fragment, the textbook’s narrator, who here becomes an interlocutor and enters into dialogue with the reader, places the following question: (11) when at war, is it valid to commit all kinds of acts? Why? (ibid.) Obviously this question is rhetorical and presupposes a resounding no.

Children are ‘immaculate’ representations. In this structural dyad between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ produced by the Peruvian discourse, innocents are victimised by Chilean war crimes. It is not only children, in this discourse, who suffer from the atrocities of the invaders; the text also denounces the elimination of productive human capital, as this fragment about the Battle of Miraflores elucidates: (12) there died the best of the Liman population, young and adult workers, apart from the elderly and women (p. 111).

The Chileans’ conduct during the occupation is depicted as being full of atrocities. Not satisfied by having conquered Lima, runs the narrative, Chilean garrisons continued disseminating horror; Chilean forces harassed the defenceless (children, women and elders) and carried out systematic attacks aimed at dismantling the productive forces and what was left of trade establishments:

(13) [...] The Chilean Government organised an expedition [...] with strict instructions to destroy and loot [...] not only the commercial establishments of Peruvians but also [those] of foreigners, which triggered deep rejection on the part of the international community, even by England (p. 111).

The Peruvian discourse accuses the Chilean occupation implicitly of war crimes. The rejection of Chile’s actions expressed by the international community, even by England, here represented as an ally of Chile, operates as an express confirmation of the illegality of acts committed by the occupying forces.

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20 The Compañía de Bomberos Voluntarios Garibaldi N.6 (The Volunteers Firefighters Company Garibaldi N. 6) was an Italian-Peruvian firefighting corps based in Chorrillos, Lima.
3.1.2 Othering Bolivia

In the Peruvian textbook, Bolivia is represented by its inferiority, with accounts of political instability and lack of control over the economy intended to bring to light the fragility of the Bolivian state:

(14) Bolivia, a country accustomed to military coups which have given rise to hundreds of exiled [people] in Chile (p. 104).

(15) Bolivia could not be in a worse situation: its economy was still nascent, its main resource, the saltpetre, was exploited by the Chileans and English (p. 108).

In the Peruvian textual construction, Peru is dragged into the struggle by Bolivia, because [when] (16) Chile occupie[d] militarily Antofagasta’s territory […], Bolivia require[d] from Peru the fulfilment of the treaty signed in 1873 (p. 108). Peru honours the treaty and finds itself under an obligation to conduct a war together with an ally whose military is unstructured and which is politically and economically incapacitated:

(17) […] Bolivia had no navy and did not have a good army due to the political and economic crisis in which it found [itself]; then its participation in this stage [the maritime campaign] was symbolic (ibid.).

Indeed, more than merely being represented as a burden, Bolivia is considered responsible for tactical errors that caused the defeat of the allies in some of the battles, as in the Battle of San Francisco:

(18) […] the Chileans defeated 7,000 allied soldiers […] [through a] mistake made by Bolivians, who started [this] fight (ibid.).

3.1.3 Constructing the Peruvian Self

This Peruvian school textbook sets up a Peruvian identity through the representation of many selves which are configured in four dimensions: a self as the possessor of the sea, a self incapable of governing, a peace-supporting self and a heroicised self. The Peruvian narrative determines Peru’s maritime identity in a textual segment contained in the opening chapter of the War of the Pacific, in which Peru is presented and placed in its continental geopolitical context:

(19) For Peru, the control of the Sea should not only be considered a factor of national security, but is also closely linked to the development of its economy and
integration as a sovereign country. Our central and occidental location in South America determines a situation of exceptional strategic value in the events of our continent (p. 100).

As the text shows us, the idea of itself as a maritime country is a central and determining foundation for Peru, on which its economy, its sovereignty and its conceptualisation of its history as part of the South American continent directly depends.

The second of these selves or constructed identities is that of a self unable to govern, as exemplified by the depiction of the ruling elite of the time. This construction enters into indirect dialogue with an extract from the textbook’s opening chapter in which Simón Bolívar, on the verge of the campaigns for liberation from the Spanish crown, reflects (La Carta de Jamaica, 1815) on the local oligarchies’ capacity for government after independence:

(20) Will we be able to maintain in its true balance the difficult burden of a republic? Can it be conceived that a people recently unchained can launch themselves in the sphere of freedom, without, like Icarus, getting their wings melted and falling into the abyss [...] (p. 8).

The following excerpts can be interpreted as responses to this reflection:

(21) In [...] Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador the oligarchy was discussed in its disputes between Liberals and Conservatives; they both political wings demonstrated their ineptness to govern, which gave rise to the blows and counterpunches of caudillos [military landowners] without a national project for integration and development, to the point that they only thought that becoming President of the Republic was the last degree of their military career, to benefit from or squander the funds of the State with their relatives[;] these errors committed in the past affected our national history (p. 102).

(22) There were no leaders capable of imposing order in the face of growing instability through the dissatisfaction and continuous rebellions against the Government [...] (p. 104).

21 All emphasis is added by the author.
(23) The rulers did not have success in overcoming the crisis, nor did they offer the necessary guarantees to the capitalists to invest (p. 105).

We can see in the underlined passages that the narrator does not mention ‘our’ oligarchy, ‘our’ leaders or ‘our’ rulers. The representation of the ruling class in the third person indicates a distancing of the self, which here specifically appears estranged from its own past. According to the author, not only Peru, but also Bolivia and Ecuador succumbed to the vices and errors committed by their ruling classes in its own history (p. 102). Internal intrigues, caudillismo, corruption and administrative incompetence are some adjectives used here to construct the identity of these independent republics in response to Bolívar’s question at the same time as serving as a mea culpa for the defeat in the war. This points to a remarkable dichotomy in the textbook’s textual constructions of Chile; its virtues, including internal cohesion and administrative consistency, are here placed in a negative light for their serving of the interests of war.

The third Self found in this discourse constructs Peru as a proponent of peace. Here, the literature presents Peru as diplomatic, willing, and committed to persuading Chile to avoid war. See the image below:

![Image](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/71/Misionlavalle.jpg)

Figure 2: The Battle of Arica (Independencia 2012, p. 110). Painting by Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán.

(24) Legend: The Lavalle Mission sent to Chile: it could not persuade this country not to initiate the war; on the contrary, it was severely harassed by the Southern society (p. 106).22

A few weeks before the outbreak of the war, Peru sent a delegation to Santiago, headed by the plenipotentiary minister Jose A. de Lavalle (shown on the right in the picture) with the task of containing the Chileans’ impetus for warfare. The appeals for peace put forward by the delegation were denied, while the Peruvian delegation, according to the textbook, experienced opprobrium from locals. Peruvian diplomacy thus failed, as the textbook’s narrative recount, in dissuading Chile from its

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lust for the escalation of conflict. Here a dichotomy is constructed in which Peru wants peace and Chile war:

(25) *The goal [of the Peruvian mission] was to prevent the war in any way, something that was not achieved, since Chile was determined to implement its expansionist project[.] Chile required of Peru to maintain its neutrality; after [the] Peruvian refusal on 5 April 1879, Chile declared war on Peru and Bolivia* (p. 106).

The fourth configuration of Self found in this discourse constructs a heroic Peruvian identity by highlighting and glorifying the acts of individuals in the face of inevitable defeat. Through a textual composition full of periphrases and adjectives, the narrator creates myths around the key characters using narratives that elevate their bravery and perspicacity in confronting the superiority of the enemy. The first hero of Peru exalted in the textbook is Admiral Miguel Grau, the commander of the Peruvian navy and also the officer in charge of the monitor Huáscar. Admiral Grau is presented with the epithet ‘El Caballero de los Mares’ (The Knight of the Seas), so called because of his (26) [...] magnanimity to the defeated enemy and to defenceless peoples (p. 108). As a knight on his steed, Grau conducted heroic manoeuvres ahead of the Huáscar and led the naval resistance (27) [...] *outwitting the Chilean navy* (p. 109) until he was finally cornered and besieged by enemy ships at the Battle of Angamos:

(28) [...] *[his ship] was surrounded by the Chilean fleet [...] in Angamos; despite the "Huáscar" having covered the escape of the ship "The Union" and performed the first shot in combat* (p. 109).

(29) *Grau and all his command died, passing to immortality as an example of how to defend the motherland* (ibid.).

As we can observe, the first excerpt presents a situation of adversity, a tremendous disparity of forces over which the hero initially rises. By representing his bravery, the Peruvian discourse mythologises this historical figure through the reconstruction of his heroic action. Even surrounded, the Huáscar escorts the retreat of the confederate ship and even discharges the cannon first. In the second excerpt, the narrator, appealing to a sense of patriotism, consummates the construction of the martyr. The death is the zenith, and so Grau (and indirectly his command) are elevated to symbols of the nation and the greatest example of ‘Peruvianity’.
Turning from the sea to the land, another heroic representation is made from the example of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi, whose last moments in action are narrated in the painting reproduced below:

(30) Legend: The Battle of Arica (7 June 1880). The small garrison, headed by Francisco Bolognesi, defended with courage the last bastion that remained in the south: "Until the last bullet" (p. 110).23

Colonel Bolognesi, depicted at the centre of the painting, led (31) [...] 1,800 Peruvian soldiers [...] [that] resisted the attack of 7,000 Chileans [...] after several days of bombardments and rejecting the [Chilean] offer to surrender (p. 110). Here, the textual move follows the same pattern as in the case discussed above: In the face of the supremacy of the enemy comes the sacrifice, and the hero, already lying on the ground, offers resistance ‘until the last bullet’.

The third hero featured in the Peruvian textbook is embodied by the figure of General Andrés Avelino Cáceres, who (32) [...] in the resistance campaign earned the nickname of ‘El Brujo de los Andes’ (The Wizard of the Andes) for his tenacity and heroism against the Chilean invader (p. 112). Once more, the narrator highlights the character and mythologises him for his action in the face of many obstacles:

(33) His abilities and leadership detained the Chileans in the Sierra Central (p. 109), [but] the insufficiency of arms and ammunition was decisive (p. 109).

According to this textual construction, the shortage of arms and ammunition on the Peruvian side was the cause of the defeat at the Battle of Huamachuco. Having set up this premise, the textbook discourse engages in featuring intrinsic virtues of the heroes of Peru, as, for example cleverness, courage, and intrepidity.24

Another dimension of the Peruvian self-as-hero is personified by the ‘Peruvian woman’. The textbook, albeit very briefly, characterises the rabonas, the name given to

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23 Painting by Juan Lepiani (Español: Museo de los Combatientes de Arica) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons; https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6c/Batalla_de_Arica.jpg, accessed on 20 March 2017.

24 With the fall of Huamachucho, guerrillas (Montoneras) were formed in the sierra, which were commanded by General Cáceres. Though their ranks were basically formed of an indigenous contingent, the textbook does not mention this identity, meaning that the indigenous Peruvian self is absent from this narrative. The characterisation of Cáceres as a ‘Quechua speaker’ is the closest reference given to the indigenous component of the troops in the mountain resistance (Independencia 2012, p. 121).
the women who participated in the war, as brave and resourceful women who (34) on many occasions confronted the enemy with the gun in their hands (p. 114):

(35) The Peruvian women participated actively, although anonymously, making uniforms, healing wounds, obtaining information, carrying messages or spreading among the enemy alarmist information to mislead or surprise them (p. 114).

3.2 Chile
In the Chilean school curriculum (Minduc Chile 2011; 2013), the War of the Pacific is taught twice: in the sixth year of the first stage of education (ensino básico) and in the second year of the second stage (ensino medio). This discourse analysis investigates educational texts produced by three different publishers: (1) a book issued by the publisher Zig-Zag S.A. (2013), in which the theme in question is covered in Unidade 3 – La consolidación de la República, used in the first stage of education; (2) a book published by SM Chile S.A. (2013), where the theme is discussed in Unidade 3 – Conformación del territorio y sus dinámicas geográficas, económicas y sociales; and (3) a book published by Santillana del Pacífico S.A. (2009), which deals with the theme in Unidade 4 – Expansión Económica y Comercial. These last two books are use in the second stage of education. The three books originate from publishing houses established in the Chilean textbook market, whose products enjoy a wide national distribution (Mineduc; La Tercera). The books from the publishers Zig-Zag and SM were studied in digital versions; the book from Santillana was provided by the Georg Eckert Institute.

3.2.1 Othering Bolivia
The most common way in which Chilean textbook discourses on the War of the Pacific ‘other’ is by representing it as violating universal principles. The violation committed by Bolivia, according to the Chilean narrative, was the unilateral increase in taxes on saltpetre and the consequent break-up of the exploration agreement of 1874. The Bolivian non-compliance with a key clause of this agreement results in Chile justifying its actions as taken out of duty to defend its interests:

(1) In a context of economic crisis, in 1878 the Bolivian Government decided to increase the tax on the quintal of saltpetre to 10 cents [to be imposed on] the ‘Antofagasta Saltpetre and Rail Company’ [Compañía de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta]. The company refused to pay and the Bolivian president Hilarión Daza ordered the seizure of its property. In response, the
president of Chile, Aníbal Pinto, sent 100 soldiers under the command of Colonel Emilio Sotomayor to Antofagasta. [and] on the same day that Bolivia was going to confiscate the assets of the company [...] the soldiers disembarked in Antofagasta and occupied the city (SM 2013, pp. 200-201).

(2) [...] Bolivia decided to increase the taxes [this part of the passage is printed in red in the textbook] on the saltpetre companies by 10% [...], which directly affected the Chilean firms in the area and in turn, transgressed the agree[ments] of the treaty of 1874 [...] In turn, with this measure, the Chilean Government decided to protect their interests and decreed the military occupation of the area (Santillana 2009, p. 166).

(3) A year later, President Hilarion Daza broke up the treaty established with Chile in 1874, and Bolivia began to charge the Chileans ten cents per quintal of exported saltpetre. In the face of the refusal to pay taxes on the part of Chilean companies, the Bolivian government ordered that on February 14th, 1879 the Chilean possessions would be confiscated. The Chilean President Aníbal Pinto, to avoid the confiscation, occupied militarily Antofagasta[,] which at that time was Bolivian territory. As a result, Bolivia declared war on Chile. Then, after the secret treaty between Peru and Bolivia became known, Chile declared war on both countries (Zig-Zag 2013, p. 109).

(emphasis in each case authorial)

In each of these excerpts, Bolivia is represented as a clear aggressor, which constructs Chile’s actions and position in the lead-up to the war as simply a reaction in face of intransigence and of the breaking of rules by the Bolivian government. Following the Chilean textual argumentation, the Bolivian violation of the treaty of 1874 appears as the cause of the war. See the fragment below:

(4) By the end of the decade [beginning in] 1870, the Bolivian government [had] begun to implement tariff measures on Chilean companies installed in the area on the 24th parallel, a situation that gave rise to the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), in which Peru and Bolivia confronted Chile (Santillana 2009, p. 166).

The Chilean text constructs direct causality between the increase in taxes and the war. While Bolivia strikes with its ‘assault’ on the Chilean companies, Chile merely reacts to the inappropriate actions undertaken by Bolivia; this discourse creates the impression that the martial impetus came unilaterally from the rulers of the Bolivian plateau. Bolivia ‘attacks’ with tax increases; Chile reacts with the occupation of Antofagasta. Bolivia ‘declares war’ first, making the Chilean (actual) war declaration nothing more than a ‘simple’ reaction to the Bolivian position.
The Chilean textbooks also contain constructions of the Bolivian Other as inferior by virtue of its inability to secure administrative structures and ensure the presence of national populations in the region in order to manage mineral exploration:

(5) The area of the Norte Grande, especially the Atacama Desert, was largely unpopulated. Bolivia, which was founded as an independent state in 1825, had its outlet to the Pacific through this area, specifically by the Caleta of Cobija [the coastal village of Cobija]. The Bolivians had great interest in that place, because they wanted to develop a port in Cobija and exploit the mineral potential of the area; however the distance, the adverse natural reality and the small population hampered this project (ibid., p. 163).

As the fragment above insinuates, the Bolivians were not able to overcome the adversities imposed by the region in order to establish their domain there. The Chilean text admits the historical use of the territory by the Bolivians and to some extent the Bolivians’ control over some of these locations. The Chilean discourse, however, does not recognise the Bolivian official administration at the regional level. Here, the discourse on the lack of Bolivian sovereignty in the Atacama Desert features what we might call ‘textual mirage’; Bolivia appears to be present, but in fact is not. These textual moves are evidenced by the amorphous nomenclature employed when labelling the region as territorios al norte [territories to the north (SM 2013, p. 200)] Norte Grande [Big North (Santillana 2009, p. 163)], Depoblado de Atacama [[the] Depopulated [region] of Atacama (Zig-Zag 2013, p. 109)]. These terminologies construct the idea of inexactness, immensity and emptiness of human presence. The geographical uncertainty and the absence of the human component thus constructed do not allow the reader to conceive of the presence of any state structure, consequently of territorial sovereignty, in the place so constructed.

The text of the Santillana textbook goes more deeply into the issue and asserts that Chile’s need for territorial demarcation was related to economic interests, refusing to admit the validity of any territorial argumentation based on the Bolivian historical presence in the zone:

(6) The interest in investing and exploiting the mineral resources in the area of Antofagasta made both the Chilean and the Bolivian government concerned to limit the territories of that zone (Santillana 2009, p. 164).
The Chilean educational texts construct Bolivian territoriality as fragmented. While they recognise the Bolivian retention of particular locations – as in Cobija and in Antofagasta –, their textual compositions do not allow readers to visualise a territorial continuity. Similarly, the textual trope of the absence of humanity and of the fragility of the Bolivian administrative apparatus in the Atacama implies the non-existence of sovereignty on the axis La Paz – Pacific Coast, i.e. a disconnection between the province and the Bolivian seat of government.

3.2.2 Othering Peru

The Chilean literature depicts the Peruvian Other, like the Bolivian, as violating universal principles. The violation committed by Peru was its signing of an alliance with Bolivia in 1873, which committed Peru to acting in favour of Bolivia in the case of external aggression. In addition, Peru is characterised as a ‘manipulator’ which had Bolivia under its influence and in this way underpinned its territorial aspirations:

(7) [...] Due to the existence of a treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia, signed in secret in 1873, the Chilean Government requested from Peru guarantees that it would not intervene in the conflict. As Peru did not accede to this demand, Chile declared war on the two countries on 5 April 1879 (SM 2013, p. 201).

(8) The government in Lima urged the Bolivian government to rescind the Treaty of 1866 and regained its complete sovereignty over the contested territories. This was the origin of the Secret Treaty of 1873, whereby Peru and Bolivia undertook to support each other in case of war. [...] The three countries began accelerating military preparations, and the government of Chile had no more confidence in the attitude of the two allied nations (ibid., p. 204).

According to the Chilean interpretation, the existence of agreements concluded in secret has affected the credibility of the Peruvian state, and thus, lost confidence in relation to their intentions. The discourse further contends that the refusal of Peru to maintain its neutrality in the face of the conflict’s escalation obliged Chile to respond by proceeding with the declaration of war.
3.2.3 Constructing the Chilean Self

The educational texts studied here construct Chilean identity through the definition of different types of self. The first of these constructions is that of a superior self. The textual segment below, excerpted from a speech given in the pre-war period and used to open the chapter on the War of the Pacific in the book published by Santillana, portrays the successful development of Chile in an exercise of comparison with ‘other peoples’ to:

(9) [...] Observing the path we have travelled compared with that [which] at this time other peoples have gone, we cannot turn a blind eye to the extraordinary development that has [been experienced by] our [people] in all the spheres of its activity [D. Marcial Gonzáles, 1871 (Santillana 2009, p. 156)].

The second self identified in these discourses depicts Chile as rational, prudent, temperate, logical and consistent in its actions and decisions. As shown in the segment below, the Chilean text denies the existence of an expansionist ‘master plan’, which, as we have seen, is one of the arguments put forward by the Peruvian texts:

(10) [Chilean President] Pinto was not convinced of the need to bring the war to Lima. However, the United States encouraged Peruvians not to cede territories, while selling Peru weapons, because they considered the Chilean triumph [would be] an advance of British imperialism in South America. Pinto accepted the idea of occupying Lima, recognizing that Bolivia would otherwise not accept the Chilean conditions (SM 2013, p. 202).

As the text above formulates, the decision to invade Lima was only taken after an evaluation of the circumstances, and is presented as the *ultima ratio*. The Peruvian position, according to this construct, did not permit Chile to make a different choice. Another evident dichotomy in the segment above refers to the involvement of the great powers in the conflict of the Pacific. While the Peruvian text denounces the association between Chile and Great Britain, the Chilean text deals similarly with the alliance between Peru and the United States.

The third self identified in the textual extracts represents a construction of a victorious Chilean identity, formed through the use of adjectives such as ‘efficiency’ and ‘competence’. If Bolivia was unable to establish its sovereignty in the region, Chile found itself perfectly capable of implementing all its exploratory paraphernalia in order to establish infrastructure for exploiting the conquered territories, which permitted the
immediate generation of wealth there. The three segments below produce an interpretation of the war focusing on economic aspects. The texts, concentrating on the outcomes of the war, conduct a brief analysis of the conflict, in which the waging of war is interpreted differently according to whether it relates to the ‘victorious side’ (right choice) versus the ‘defeated side’ (wrong choice). In textual discourses presented by and for the victorious side, the war is seen as positive not only because of the spoils it yielded, but also for its heating of the internal market:

(11) The War of the Pacific [...] had important economic consequences for Chile. The annexation of territories rich in saltpetre attracted new capital that gave impulse to the industrialisation process initiated in the 1860s, and at the same time accelerated social transformations with the emergence of the working classes and the middle classes. The increase of the fiscal coffers allowed, in turn, the greater involvement of the State in the economy of the country (SM 2013, p. 201).

(12) The victory of Chile over Peru and Bolivia brought favourable consequences for the country. The greatest benefit was the incorporation of the territories of Tarapacá and Antofagasta into the national sovereignty, areas of great mining wealth that generated a new economic cycle, that of saltpetre, which helped to reactivate the national economy. In addition, the mobilisation of large [numbers of] troops reactivated the economy of various sectors. The need to supply the army with food and equipment induced the dynamisation of trade and agriculture in the central zone to be able to provide it [...] (Santillana 2009, p. 167).

(13) The political stability and the economic boom converted Chile to a great power in the Southern Pacific (Zig-Zag 2013, p. 112).

The fourth self unveiled in the Chilean textual compositions – and equally recurrent in the school literature of the three countries here analysed – constructs a heroic identity, in relation to which, through the glorification of specific central figures, the narrator seeks to create an emotional bond between the reader and the feats and accomplishments achieved by the great figures of the nation. Every hero has an arch-enemy, and textual productions for schools appear to be no exception, calling for the existence of a villain to help the audience identify the hero. The textual moves by which this is done consist initially in an aggrandisement of the enemy. The narrator strives to employ a lexicometry that emphasises the proximity of defeat, with examples being the sentences (14) Everything ha[d] been arranged for a major catastrophe (SM 2013, p. 203) or (15) There were shots of cannons everywhere (ibid.). In the midst of the
imminent devastation and the success of the enemy, the narrative then produces a textual turn, and the unexpected, the salvation, bursts out: (16) [...] the heroism of our mariners has saved us (ibid.).

The Chilean woman is also heroised in the textbooks. In the figure of the cantineras (canteen women), the representation of the feminine is mythologised for her bravery, as well as being distinguished for fulfilling the classically male functions of wielding the rifle and waging war alongside the exercise of the typical nursing and other auxiliary roles. The primary literature cited in the Zig-Zag textbook praises two women specifically. The first is Filomena Valenzuela, characterized as a (17) brave woman who lost her husband and children in the war... [and] [p]articipated together with his companions in the Atacama Regiment in the Battle of Tacna (Zig-Zag 2013, p. 110). The second is Irene Morales (figure 3), likewise a cantinera, who is described as (18) the example of a Chilean woman (Zig-Zag 2013, p. 110) and also ennobled by her participation in the battles.25

The image of Irene Morales communicates the bifunctionality of the cantineras in the War of the Pacific. Here, the idealised feminine representation of the heroised Chilean self consists in adding a garment of virility to the woman while preserving her femininity at the same time. Her war garb transcribes this binary aspect with precision; along her skirt, hat and earrings, as traditional female garments, she wears a military dolman in the colours of the regiment, a male garment. The same happens in relation to the accoutrements of combat shown in images in the textbook. Alongside the canteen, with which she assists the soldiers with water (female role) (memóriachilena 2016), she wields the rifle and the so-called corvo (crow), the Chilean dagger, demonstrating masculine-connotated readiness for combat. Her countenance also shows her conviction

and resoluteness about the tasks ahead of her, attributes again frequently associated with masculinity.

3.3 Bolivia

The school curriculum of the Plurinational State of Bolivia stipulates that the War of the Pacific is to be taught in the fifth year of the first stage and in the fourth year of the second stage of education (Bolivia, 2014). However, we note that textbooks for the fifth year of the second stage also feature content on the war; this is the case in two of these books used in this analysis, one (Historia del Hombre – 5 secundaria, 2015) published by La Hoguera and another (Ciencias Sociales – 5 secundaria, 2015) by Santillana, both publishing houses whose products have a significant share in the Bolivian textbook market. Further, an edition (Ciencias Sociales – 4 secundaria, 2016) produced for the fourth year, also published by La Hoguera, is investigated in this analysis. The study could not find access to a textbook for the fifth year of the first stage of education. Instead, we incorporated into the analysis El Libro del Mar (The Book of the Sea, 2014), a publication issued by the Bolivian government and used in classrooms (Telesur 2015; Minedu 2016) to introduce to pupils, including those at primary school stage, the issue of the sea (Dávalos 2016). All the books were acquired in Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

The Book of the Sea is made available in digital form by the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3.3.1 Othering Chile

The othering of Chile that takes place in the Bolivian school literature we analysed primarily posits the country as a threat. According to the textual compositions we find in these textbooks, Chile’s greed for the mineral wealth of the region motivated its actions, which led ultimately to premeditated territorial aggression in an act of violation of laws:

(1) [...] from the decade of [the] 1840[s] [there took place] a series of aggressions on the part of Chile, which had as their sole objective the misappropriation of the Atacamean lands. The ten-cent tax was a pretext for putting into practice a well elaborated plan (La Hoguera 2015, p. 127).

(2) The uti possidetis juris [...] sets [out] the unquestionable rights of Bolivia to the Atacama and its Pacific coast. [...] Chile did not question these rights until
1842, when immense deposits of guano were discovered in [the] Mejillones. Since then, the Chilean government began to be interested in the region, creating the Province of Atacama in Chile, investing capital, bringing population [to the region] and maintaining a diplomatic policy favourable to its interests (Santillana 2015, p. 104).

(3) There [was] not only an invasion of Chilean companies and other nations to exploit the wealth of the Atacama, but also a true exodus of Chilean population [from Chile into the region] that soon became a majority [...] (ibid.).

The excerpt cited first above does not regard the tax increase of ten cents per quintal of saltpetre to be a justifiable cause for the invasion. According to the text, Chile operates in this period following a ‘Machiavellian’ rationale. The war was engineered with the ultimate and sole purpose of domination:

(4) [...] Balmaceda, [a] notable man of the Chilean state and later President of this Republic, said that on the Pacific coast of South America there were two centres of action and progress – Lima and Callao, Santiago and Valparaiso – and that it was necessary that for one to rise the other would have to fall. For our part, added the cynical and brutal statesman, “we need Tarapacá as a source of wealth and Arica as our most advanced point on the coast. That is why the people of Chile claim Arica and Tarapacá” (La Hoguera 2016, p. 202).

In this passage, the narrator selects a public figure and gives prominence to his expansionist verve. By highlighting the impossibility of coexistence of the two economic axes, the statesman, claiming that ‘the people of Chile claim Arica and Tarapacá’, positions himself as heralds of the (alleged) ‘will of the nation’, in this case the Chilean. Analogously, it was with the will to defend itself against this Chilean expansionism, the Bolivian literature argues, that the secret alliance between Bolivia and Peru was sealed in the pre-war period. Whereas the Chilean literature presents the secret treaty as one of the reasons for the declaration of war on Peru, in the textbooks of Bolivia the treaty is described as a movement in self-defence against the emergent Chilean threat:

(5) The obvious expansionist intentions of Chile led Bolivia and Peru to sign a secret treaty [bold in original] in February 1873, by which the two countries committed themselves to become allied in the case of a military attack by Chile (ibid., pp. 199-200).

3.3.2 Othering Peru

The Bolivian discourse refers to Peru in three basic ways. In the first of these, a textual dyad is constituted between Chile and Peru, which therefore temporarily dislodge the Bolivian self from the position of semantic centrality. This textual construction is
another clear dichotomy, which at the same time highlights the Chilean bellicosity while implying diplomatic nobility on the part of Bolivia’s then ally:

(6) [...] Peru tried to settle the conflict through diplomacy, but all was in vain because the Chilean war machinery – which had been prepared for some time - was already on the march (La Hoguera 2015, p. 128).

The second textual representation classifies Peru on an equal basis with Bolivia as militarily weak and laments the excessive confidence Bolivia had invested in the potential of its ally, Peru:

(7) [...] the error of relying excessively on the military power of the ally, especially at sea, since Bolivia lacked even a gunboat, and the war was to be decided in the naval operations. Peru was not better than Bolivia in regard to the preparations for war, despite the fact that it had a small fleet (ibid., p. 129).

Finally, the Bolivian school text recognises the commitment and the losses of its ally in the venture of war. In the text, resentment towards Peru emerges in relation to the signing of the peace treaty with Chile. To the extent that the text accuses Peru of unilateralism in regard to the treaty, the textual move here determines the proportions of blame to be assigned to the Confederates (Bolivia and Peru) over the territorial and maritime secession of Bolivia:

(8) Peru came to this end after having confronted the most painful and terrible situations of an unjust war and an occupation of several years in which their sons fought with heroism and courage against the invader. But Peru signed separately[,] without consulting its ally[,] the Treaty of Ancón which [produced the worst result] for Bolivia (ibid., p. 131).

(9) [...] the fact that Peru ceded the district of Tarapacá "involved as a tacit result the situation of [the] Bolivian coastline located in the south" [(Quejerazu (ibid., p. 130)].

3.3.3 Constructing the Bolivian Self

The Bolivian textbooks construct many selves. The first of these seeks to define its territorial identity through the reconstruction of the historical relationship of local peoples with the Atacamean territory:

(10) The link between the Andean region and the coast of Atacama goes back to ancient times when the indigenous territoriality was connected permanently to the ocean. [...] The Inca Empire reached[,] in the south-west of its domains[,] to
the Atacama Desert. The Aymara people always had interaction and communal presence of agriculture and cattle in geographical areas that connect the Andean highlands to the coast. This relationship was respected by the colonial order, the basis on which Bolivia was founded with an extensive and rich coast in the region of Atacama, exercising sovereignty in that territory until in 1879 the Chilean invasion modified its geography and its history (El Libro del Mar 2014, p. 15).

By reaffirming its Andean identity, the text validates a historical continuity of the Atacama as part of Bolivia, whose territorial outline was respected even by the colonial power. Here we have a point of total disagreement in the discursive encounter between Chile and Bolivia. While in the Chilean texts, the relationship of Bolivia with the region is almost non-existent, in the Bolivian text the region and its Pacific coast are constitutive and intrinsic parts of the Bolivian geopolitical identity. Another point of disagreement involves the question of the ‘ten-cent tax’. While for the Chilean text, the unilateral raising of taxes breaks a universal rule, the Bolivian text presents this as a necessity in order to combat the effects of natural disasters:

(11) In 1877 an earthquake followed by a tsunami (estimated at 8.8 on the Richter scale in subsequent measurements) swept the Bolivian coast, devastating that territory. As if this was not enough, in 1878 a terrible drought affected important sectors of the Bolivian territory. As a result of these natural disasters, the Government of Bolivia requested [...] the payment of [an additional] 10 cents per quintal of saltpetre exported, in order to generate resources for facing the natural disasters that had affected the region (ibid., p. 20).

As we can observe, this tax increase, which in the Chilean argumentation was the main cause of the landing of troops in Antofagasta, is presented in the Bolivian textual construct as a necessary measure for the alleviation of the damage wrought by the tsunami and drought.

The second identified Bolivian self illustrates the contemporary ineptitude of the Bolivian state, which is to be found in various sectors. The fragility and inadequacy of the administrative structure is made clear in the extracts below:

(12) [...] The Bolivian governments, concentrating on internal strife and in developing the economy of the highland [altiplano] and the valleys, did not have the capacity [to create] a greater economic presence and populational presence in the [Atacama] region (Santillana 2015, p. 104).
(13) [...] The province of Atacama, in which the independent life of Bolivia was born, had been totally abandoned by the central axis La Paz-Sucre (La Hoguera 2015, p. 126).
On the same level, the military inadequacy of Bolivia is also emphasised:

(14) *It was a poorly equipped army; was formed by mestizos in their great majority, because the indigenous population was exempted* (ibid., p. 129).

(15) *Bolivia could reject victoriously an aggression in the very heart of its hinterland, and would have defended inch by inch its inheritance, between its cliffs and its dangers. But now it had to go to the desert and distant coast, equipping an army that lacked capacity of mobilisation and even adequate armaments* (ibid., p. 129).

In addition to detailing the structural problems to which the Bolivian armed forces were subject, the textbook demonises the political and military authority of Chile during the war, or, more precisely, the figure of the President and Chief of Staff Hilarión Daza:

(16) *In spite of the courage and patriotism of the soldiers, the ground campaign was disastrous, in large part attributable to the ineptitude of the military commands* (ibid., p. 130).

(17) *[…] The total ineptitude of Daza, which verges on betrayal, caused the Bolivian troops not to reach their destination* (ibid.).

The image to the left is a portrait of President Daza (Figure 4), whom the Bolivian discourse finds to be to blame for the debacle in which the war ended for Bolivia. In the background of the painting we can see metaphorical figures of defeat: to the right, holding the ruined and fallen flag of Bolivia, the desolate *colorado* soldier, and to the left, represented in the female figure of a sea nymph, the sea coast trapped in chains.

As we can see in the fragments above, by othering the military authority through demonisation, the narrator exoneration the Bolivian soldier of any guilt, gives him a positive reputation and moves the national Self to his side. Despite all the military’s structural weaknesses, in the exoneration of the combatants of any blame for the disastrous military campaign, a textual basis is established on which, the heroic identity of Bolivia can be exalted. This is the third Bolivian self found in these compositions:
The disaster was inevitable, but nobody understood this, however. They were still thinking that the value of the soldier was sufficient to contain the foreign aggression. And Bolivia launched itself into the fight without probability of success (ibid.).

A Chilean division attacked the population. Despite a heroic defence, Calama was taken. The last combatants gathered on the Topáter bridge led by a remarkable person of the place, Eduardo Alvaroa. They resisted until the last breath trying to defend national sovereignty (ibid., p. 128).

A group of civilians headed by Ladislao Cabrera resisted the attack. Eduardo Avaroa, distinguished citizen in the defence of the city, died heroically (ibid., p. 128).

As we have seen, this textual tactic is also present in the literature of Peru. Here, in the Bolivian discourse, the textual movement consists in selecting and highlighting individuals in order to evidence their heroic and brave acts in the midst of the disaster. Excerpts (20) and (21) elucidate the perversity of Chileans for attacking ‘civilians’; the exaltation of some heroic figures implies noble resistance on the part of the Bolivian nationals.

The Bolivian discourse, in a similar way to that in which it characterises Chile as bellicose and expansionist, depicts the Bolivian self as possessing a diplomatic identity:

Since 1846, the Bolivian government [had] accredited diplomatic missions to Santiago to define the issue of the borders, but without results (ibid., p. 104).

Here, the text, in emphasising the long tradition of Bolivia’s sending diplomatic representatives to the capital city of the aggressor, constructs a Bolivia ‘historically’ committed to peace, in opposition to Chile.

The last Bolivian self identified in this study is a resentful one, accusing the Chileans of the violation and usurpation of the conquered territories. The consequences of the territorial losses are perennial and endless:

More than one hundred years after this war, our country is still living the consequences of [its] enclosure (La Hoguera 2015, p. 132).

In accordance with the implications of this Bolivian discourse, the territorial violation does not stay limited to a mere defeat of the past. The Bolivian text links everything to the present, as a contemporary photograph about the Chilean activity in its
copper mines (on formerly Bolivian territory) indicates. Following this mental map, the idea transmitted is that each benefit gained by Chileans through the continued exploration of this territory signifies a benefit lost by the Bolivians.

4 Conclusion

Our social and political life is a form of imposition on the world [Shapiro 1988, p. 301]

The raison d’être of libertarian education [...] lies in its drive towards reconciliation [Freire 1996, p. 53]

As this analysis has demonstrated, discursive constructions on the War of the Pacific in textbooks present a series of estrangements between the three countries studied. The discursive encounter we have conducted allows us to clearly visualise the contradictions between the various perceptions and interpretations of the self and the Other in national literatures. The textual compositions of Bolivia and Peru seek to ‘other’ Chile as a danger, a threat. In opposition thereto, they construct their own historical conduct as diplomatic and peaceful. On the other side, the Chilean discourse ‘others’ the confederate states as violators of universal principles: Bolivia for the increase to the nitrate taxes, Peru for forging a secret alliance with the former. In the Chilean texts, the behaviour of both countries justifies the war. Across all three national discourses as they manifest in these textbooks, the systematic estrangement with the Other, in its all dynamics of negation and differentiation, strives to allocate the self in a position of rectitude whose actions appear as justifiable and correct; criticism of the national (or the self’s) positions or actions in the war is non-existent in the books analysed here. Produced as they are by different authors and publishers, the textbooks line up to a dominant national discursive tone. All texts transmit a nationalist rhetoric, reproduce prejudices, stereotypes and resentment, and channel the narratives of the war through a militaristic perspective. Textbooks transmit powerful discourses, and once instrumentalised by political interests, they have the potential to manipulate the school environment. In accordance with particular circumstances, in troubled times, there is the danger that textual frameworks could be rearticulated and realigned to the dominant categories of contemporary public debate in each case and thus serve the (non-peaceful) purposes of foreign policy in specific countries.
5 Final Reflections

We are in fact facing a crisis of tolerance based on the assumption that there is a single center of perception [Shapiro 2009]

[...] our greatest need reflects our gravest danger: until we learn how to recognize ourselves as the Other, we shall be in danger and we shall be in need of diplomacy [Der Derian, 1987, p. 209]

Through their textbooks, Peru, Chile, and Bolivia have produced historical revisions of the War of the Pacific, each based on a single centre of perception which leads to dissimilarity and discrepancies among the various discourses and narratives which appear in the texts. The texts analysed in this study completely ignore the point of view of the Other. But what is the most appropriate way of telling history, specifically in relation to controversial issues such as this conflict? What concept of textual production should be adopted to make textbooks more ‘conflict-sensitive’ and which tools should be employed to overcome fixed and hostile images of ‘the enemy’? According to Werner Wintersteiner (1999), the search for models for dealing with the Other, the stranger, belongs ‘to the core area of peace education’ (quoted in Jäger 2006, p. 12). Uli Jäger, in his article on peace education (2006), accentuates the importance of consolidating competencies that make for peace in school education. To this end, it is assumed that ‘peace’, which in this context is regarded as a competency teachable in schools, should be strengthened to the extent that students are able to deepen their political knowledge about the matters at issue – ‘peace education is primarily education in politics’ (Hentig 1987, p. 29). Peace competencies are important for their enablement of students to ‘understand interrelationships, classify developments, and to develop independent analyses and strategies for dealing with war and peace, violence and nonviolence’ (Jäger 2006, pp. 8-9). It is ‘one of the most important tasks of peace education, in the light of the given complexity of international relations, to sharpen [pupils’] awareness of the truly relevant issues, i.e. the problems, matters of disagreement and interest-driven controversies’ (Senghaas 1969, p. 266).

Another point concerns the internationalisation, or, in the case of the countries dealt with in this work, the regionalisation of education and its consequent effects on textbooks. Peace education must, more than ever, be thought of and developed in an

international context, claims the Georg Eckert Institute (GEI 2016). ‘It is necessary’,
asserts UNESCO,27 ‘to introduce, at all levels, true education for citizenship which
includes an international dimension’. The objective of such a dimension would be to
avoid the reproduction of points of view exclusively centralist and national in nature, in
order to achieve a broad and cosmopolitan approach, and thus make students more
aware of and sensitive to issues of global importance. More precisely regarding
textbook production, UNESCO argues that ‘textbooks should offer different
perspectives on a given subject and make the national or cultural background against
which they are written transparent’ (Pingel 2010, p. 16), and that ‘international
cooperation in producing textbooks should be encouraged’ (ibid., p. 15). Some history
textbooks have been produced in bi- or multilateral cooperation projects in various parts
of the world; such a manner of proceeding may be able to serve as a potential model for
an approach to the War of the Pacific. One such project is the Franco-German history
textbook produced for upper secondary level in both Germany and France and available
since 2006 (ibid., p. 59). The book was written by a Franco-German team of authors and
has identical content in both countries (ibid.). In June of 2016, the German-Polish
Textbook Commission, established in 2010, launched the book Europa. Unsere
Geschichte (Europa. Nasza Historia in Polish), in which the two countries tell the
European story in a conjunct narrative (Tagesspiegel 2016). Appointing transnational
committees of authors and thus regionalising the production of textbooks could be a
way towards de-escalating, or, in the vocabulary of Copenhagen, to ‘desecuritising’, the
educational texts of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, and, if possible, towards contributing to
the transformation of the Andean region into a ‘textbook peace zone’. It is unlikely that
the institutionalisation of a trilateral textbook project would be able to completely
eliminate the conflict, but it may allow the oppositional and conflicting discourses
currently in evidence to be overlaid by a position that unites the different sides
p. 194) – could be helpful in conflict management (Konfliktbearbeitung) and potentially
support wider-scale change. A multilateral consultation group can be an effective tool
for the achievement of these goals by anchoring in any textbook the perspective of the
Other, which tends to disarm stereotypes, prejudices and concepts loaded with

27 Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and
nationalism. The attainment of a ‘mutual harmonization of feelings’, as Habermas proposes in his book *The Inclusion of the Other* (1998, p. 19), could enable greater inclusivity and aid the creation of more constructive educational content in reference to controversial historical issues. As is the case with conflicts, the inclusion of the Other also begins discursively. In the words of Todorov (1992, p. 182), ‘nonviolent communication exists, and we can defend it as a value’. It would act as a start for Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in an attempt to overcome the past and improve their countries’ relationship.

Michel Foucault, in his abundant work, philosophises about spatiality (Foucault 1984; 1971) and reformulates the concept of ‘heterotopy’ in the field of social sciences. Heterotopies are paradoxical spaces (physical and imaginary) situated between the real and the unreal, or, to put it another way, between dystopia (where all is imperfect) and utopia (where all is perfect) (Foucault 1984). Prisons, brothels, mental health institutions, rest homes and cemeteries are, in Foucault’s view, ‘heterotopic spaces’ where, in the aim of making possible an utopian space, undesirable bodies (deviants, prostitutes, mentally ill, old and dead people) are removed and isolated from society (1984). The mirror, an object that enables us to see ourselves where we are absent, also constitutes through its reflection a heterotopia, being the latter (the reflection) located in the space between the real (the body) and the unreal (the image in the mirror) (ibid., p. 4). The reflection in the mirror is isolated from all other spaces yet related to these spaces, reconstituting our own visibility, in its giving us ‘an alternative view of who we are’ (Topinka 2010, p. 60). If the Pacific Ocean and a reintegration with the sea seems unrealistic to Bolivians (utopia), and the mediterraneidad (landlocked state) is the real situation (dystopia), the dreamed-of Pacific corridor can be considered the great heterotopic space of Bolivia. It is to the desert coast of the Pacific that the Bolivians transport their country’s (maritime) imaginary, where they have their image reflected in the mirror, where they conceive of and visualise their identity. It is to the other side of the Atacama that the Bolivians dream of autonomously routing their products, controlling the logistics of imports and exports, having their own port, the gate of entrance and exit from the country, and anchoring ships. The ship, ‘a floating piece of space’, is the ‘heterotopia par excellence’, affirms Foucault (1984, p. 9). Being a spatial discontinuity connecting the coasts, the boat (ship, vessel) has not only been the great engine of development since the fourteenth century, it has been ‘the greatest reserve of
imagination’, (ibid.). Spatially closed in itself (‘the place without place’, says Foucault),
the boat launches itself into the oceanic infinite, towards the unknown, in search of
adventures and fantasies. ‘In civilizations without boats’, completes Foucault, ‘dreams
dry up’ (ibid.). It is precisely to avoid the drying up of their dream that the maritime
consciousness is being kept alive among Bolivians, so that one day, maritime
reintegration, attending to the teleology of the nation, might turn into reality. It is
expected that, if this happens, it will occur through diplomatic means.

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The constructions of Self and Other in the history textbooks of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in relation to the War of the Pacific


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The constructions of Self and Other in the history textbooks of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in relation to the War of the Pacific


**Original Spanish of the textbook extracts**

**Peru**

(1) *La economía chilena merece especial atención porque desde sus orígenes era un país pobre en recursos naturales, en un territorio con áridos desiertos, ríos de caudal...*
limitado y curso irregular y con una población indígena (los araucanos) rebelde y difícil de ser integrados. Por ello, su economía por el año 1878 era calificada como “sumamente grave”; por eso veían con buenos ojos que sus vecinos vivieran crisis y desórdenes agudos (p. 101).

(2) [...] su oligarquía, consciente de su destino y de sus aspiraciones, organizaba planes de desarrollo agresivos fomentando el patriotismo y el expansionismo para salir de sus limitaciones y llegar a ser un país poderoso. Por eso, las luchas y disputas por el poder político entre Liberales y Conservadores no fueron muy intensas y frecuentes; la agresión, la guerra y el saqueo contra sus vecinos no eran ajenos en sus planes de solución a sus problemas económicos (p. 102).

(3) [por] oponerse a los principios de fraternidad americana propiciados por el Perú;

(4) [por] no estar de acuerdo con los planes federativos de Bolívar; por eso aplaudió la creación de Bolivia, separándose del Perú y Argentina;

(5) [porque] se opuso activamente a la Confederación Perú-Boliviana;

(6) [porque] Chile no sólo tenía ambiciones territoriales hacia el norte contra Bolivia y el Perú, sino también hacia el sur contra Argentina, con quien disputaba la Patagonia y el estrecho de Magallanes (p. 105).

(7) La causa fundamental para la intervención del Perú también fue la política expansionista de Chile para apoderarse por la fuerza de los territorios de Atacama y Tarapacá, con cuyas riquezas (principalmente el salitre) proyectaba resolver la crisis económica que enfrentaba, así como su deuda externa. Esta intención fue apoyada por capitalistas chilenos e ingleses, vinculados al imperialismo inglés, al que ofrecieron toda clase de ventajas si les apoyaban en contra del Perú. Tal como lo hicieron, poniendo toda clase de dificultades para que el Perú no obtuviera material de guerra en Europa (p. 106).

(8) El afán expansionista de Chile no fue previsto por el Perú; al contrario, [...] se redujo drásticamente los gastos militares. Entre 1849 y 1860 [...] eran de 45%, los cuales bajaron a un 18% por la crisis fiscal; entre 1879 y 1880. Al estallar la guerra, sube sólo a un 28%. A eso se sumó que [el presidente] Pardo suprimió el reclutamiento militar, reduciéndose los efectivos y se canceló la compra de armamentos. Em cambio Chile había obtenido la superioridad militar marítima y terrestre [...] El Estado chileno no podía costear estas compras [...] de modo que esto sólo fue posible gracias al financiamiento del capitalismo inglés [...] (p. 106).

(9) se había preparado hace años para la Guerra (p. 108).

(10) Un grito desde lejos, como el cupo fragor que anuncia el terremoto, envuelve el pueblo, fragor y sibilantes, pues, fuego, lenguas de fuego y espirales de humo negro nacían por todas partes en el pueblo. La destrucción y la muerte bailaban. Un grupo de
niños aterrorizados y atontados por el terror se volcaron gritando hacia el portón de la “Garibaldi”. ¡Bomberos! ¡Bomberos! nuestra casa arde. Todo arde y a todos matan, una vez entraron y se dejaron caer al suelo como heridos. Bien, respondió el capitán Rossi, ¡Ya vamos! El sonido garibaldino llamó a todos [...] (p. 108).

(11) ¿en una guerra es válido cometer todo tipo de actos? ¿Por qué? (ibid.).

(12) Allí muere lo mejor de la población limenã, entre jóvenes y adultos trabajadores, aparte de ancianos y mujeres (p. 111).

(13) [...] el Gobierno chileno organiza una expedición [...] con las estrictas instrucciones de destruir y saquear [...] no sólo los comercios peruanos sino también los extranjeros, lo que desató un profundo rechazo por la comunidad internacional, incluso de Inglaterra (p. 111).

(14) Bolivia, país acostumbrado a golpes militares que dio origen a cientos de exiliados en Chile (p. 104).

(15) [...] Bolivia no podía estar en peor situación: su economía era muy incipiente, su principal recurso, el salitre, era explotado por chilenos e ingleses (p. 108).

(16) Chile ocupa militarmente el territorio de Antofagasta [...] o Bolivia exige al Perú cumpla con el Tratado firmado en 1873 (p. 108).

(17) Bolivia no tenía marina de Guerra y no contaba con un buen ejército por la crisis política y económica en que se encontraba; entonces su participación en esta etapa fue simbólica (ibid.).

(18) [...] chilenos derrotan 7 mil soldados aliados [...] por error de los bolivianos de iniciar la lucha (ibid.).

(19) [...] el control del mar para el Perú no sólo debe ser considerado un factor de seguridad nacional, sino que también está estrechamente unido al desarrollo de su economía e integración como país soberano. Nuestra ubicación central y occidental en América del Sur determina una situación de valor excepcional estratégico en los acontecimientos de nuestro continente (p. 100).

(20) ¿Seremos nosotros capaces de mantener en su verdadero equilibrio la difícil carga de una república? ¿Se puede concebir que un pueblo recientemente desencadenado se lance a la esfera de la libertad, sin que, como Ícaro, se le deshagan las alas y recaiga en el abismo? (p. 8).

(21) En [...] Perú, Bolivia y Ecuador la oligarquía se debatía en sus disputas entre políticos Liberales y Conservadores; demostraban su ineptitud para gobernar, lo que dio lugar a los golpes y contragolpes de los caudillos militares sin un proyecto nacional de integración y desarrollo, al punto que sólo pensaban que llegar a ser Presidente de la República era el último grado de su carrera militar, para beneficiarse o despilfarrar
los fondos del Estado con sus allegados, estos errores cometidos en el pasado afectaron nuestra historia nacional (p. 102).

(22) No había líderes capaces de imponer orden ante la creciente inestabilidad por el descontento y continuas rebeliones contra el Gobierno (p. 104).

(23) Los gobernantes para superar la crisis no tenían éxito ni ofrecían las garantías necesarias a los capitalistas para invertir (p. 105).

(24) La Misión Lavalle enviada a Chile: no pudo persuadir a este país de no iniciar una guerra; por el contrario, fue duramente hostilizado por la sociedad sureña (p. 106).

(25) El objetivo era evitar de cualquier manera la guerra, algo que no se logró, puesto que Chile estaba decidido a poner en marcha su proyecto de expansión, por lo que Chile le exige al Perú que mantenga su neutralidad; ante la negativa peruana, el 5 de abril de 1879 Chile declaró la guerra al Perú y a Bolivia (p. 106).

(26) [...] magnanimidad con el enemigo vencido y con las poblaciones indefensas (p. 108).

(27) [...] burlando a la escuadra chilena (ibid.).

(28) Fue rodeado por la escuadra chilena [...] en Angamos; aún así el “Huáscar” cubrió la huida del barco “La Unión” y efectuó el primero disparo en combate (p. 109).

(29) Grau y todo su comando mueren, pasando a la inmortalidad como ejemplo de cómo se defiende la patria (ibid.).

(30) Batalla de Arica (7 de junio de 1880). La pequeña guarnición, encabezada por Francisco Bolognesi, se defendió con coraje el último bastión que quedaba en el sur: “Hasta quemar el último cartucho” (p. 110).

(31) [...] 1800 soldados peruanos [...] [que] resisten el ataque de 7 mil chilenos [...] luego de varios días de bombardeo y rechazar el ofrecimiento de rendición (p. 110).

(32) [...] en la campaña de resistencia, le valió el sobrenombre de “El Brujo de los Andes” por su tenacidad y heroísmo frente al invasor chileno (p. 112).

(33) su habilidad y liderazgo detuvo a chilenos en Sierra Central, [pero] la falta de armamentos y municiones fue decisiva (p. 109).

(34) en muchas ocasiones enfrentaban al enemigo con el arma en la mano (p. 114).

(35) La mujer peruana participó de manera activa, aunque anónima, haciendo uniformes, curando heridas, obteniendo información, llevando mensajes o difundiendo entre el enemigo noticias alarmistas para engañarlos o sorprenderlos (p. 114).
Chile

(1) En un contexto de crisis económica, en 1878 el Gobierno boliviano decidió aumentar el impuesto al quintal de salitre en 10 centavos a la Compañía de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta. La empresa se negó a pagar y el presidente boliviano Hilarión Daza ordenó el embargo de sus bienes. Como respuesta, el presidente de Chile, Aníbal Pinto, envió a Antofagasta 100 soldados al mando del coronel Emilio Sotomayor, el mismo día en que se iban a rematar los bienes de la empresa, el 14 de febrero de 1879. Los soldados desembarcaron en Antofagasta y ocuparon la ciudad (SM, pp. 200-201).

(2) [...] Bolivia decidió aumentar los impuestos (destacado em vermelho no livro) en un 10% a las empresas salitreras [...], lo que afectaba directamente las empresas chilenas en la zona y a su vez, transgredía lo acordado en el tratado de 1874 [...] A su vez, ante esta medida, el gobierno chileno decidió proteger sus intereses y decretó ocupación militar de la zona (Santillana, p. 166).

(3) Un año más tarde, el presidente Hilarión Daza rompió el tratado establecido con Chile en 1874 y Bolivia comenzó a cobrar a los chilenos diez centavos por quintal de salitre exportado. Ante la negativa de pagar impuestos por parte de las empresas chilenas, el gobierno boliviano dispuso que el 14 de febrero de 1879 las posesiones chilenas fueron rematadas. El presidente chileno Aníbal Pinto, para evitar el remate ocupó militarmente Antofagasta que en esa época era territorio Boliviano. Debido a ello, Bolivia declaró la guerra a Chile. Luego, al darse a conocer el Tratado secreto entre Perú y Bolivia, Chile declaró la guerra a ambos países (Zig-Zag, p. 109).

(4) A finales de la década de 1870, el gobierno boliviano comenzó a tomar medidas arancelarias sobre las empresas chilenas instaladas en la zona sobre el paralelo 24º, situación que dio lugar a la Guerra del Pacífico (1879-1883), que enfrentó a Perú y Bolivia contra Chile (Santillana, p. 166).

(5) La zona del Norte Grande, especialmente el desierto de Atacama, se encontraba bastante despoblada. Bolivia, que se constituyó como Estado independiente en 1825, (1) tenía salida hacia el Pacífico a través de esa zona, específicamente por la caleta de Cobija. Los bolivianos tenían gran interés en dicho lugar, pues deseaban desarrollar un puerto en Cobija y explotar el potencial minero de la zona; sin embargo la distancia, la realidad natural adversa y la escasa población dificultaron ese proyecto (Santillana, p. 163).

(6) El interés por invertir y explotar los recursos mineros de la zona de Antofagasta produjo que tanto el gobierno chileno como el boliviano se preocuparan de delimitar los territorios de esa zona (ibid., p. 164).
(7) [...] al existir un Tratado de Alianza entre Perú y Bolivia, firmado en secreto en 1873, el Gobierno chileno solicitó al peruano garantías de que no intervendría en el conflicto. Como Perú no accedió a esta demanda, Chile declaró la guerra a ambos países el 5 de abril de 1879 (SM, p. 201).

(8) El gobierno de Lima instaba al gobierno boliviano a que desahuciasa el Tratado de 1866 y recuperase su completa soberanía sobre los territorios conflictivos. Este fue el origen del Tratado Secreto de 1873, mediante el cual Perú y Bolivia se comprometieron a apoyarse mutuamente en caso de guerra. [...] Los tres países iniciaron acelerados preparativos militares, y el gobierno de Chile no tuvo ya confianza en la actitud de las dos naciones aliadas (SM, p. 204).

(9) [...] observando el camino que hemos recorrido lo comparamos con el que en este tiempo han andado otros pueblos, no podremos menos que admirar el desarrollo extraordinario que ha tenido el nuestro en todas las esferas de su actividad [D. Marcial Gonzáles, 1871 (Santillana, p. 156)].

(10) Pinto no estaba convencido de la necesidad de llevar la guerra hasta Lima. Sin embargo, Estados Unidos alentó a los peruanos a no ceder territorios, mientras que les vendía armamento, pues consideraba el triunfo chileno un avance del imperialismo británico en América del Sur. Pinto aceptó la idea de ocupar Lima, reconociendo que de otra forma Bolivia no aceptaría las condiciones chilenas (SM, p. 202).

(11) La guerra del Pacífico [...] tuvo importantes consecuencias económicas para Chile. La anexión de territorios ricos en salitre atrae nuevos capitales que impulsaron el proceso industrializador iniciado en la década de 1860, al mismo tiempo que se aceleraron las transformaciones sociales con la emergencia de los sectores obreros y las clases medias. El aumento de las arcas fiscales permitió, a su vez, una mayor intervención del Estado en la economía del país. (SM, p. 201).

(12) La victoria de Chile ante Perú y Bolivia trajo favorables consecuencias para el país. El mayor beneficio fue la incorporación de los territorios de Tarapacá y Antofagasta a la soberanía nacional, zonas de una gran riqueza minera que generaron un nuevo ciclo económico, el del salitre, lo que permitió reactivar la economía nacional. Además, la movilización de grandes tropas reactivó la economía de varios sectores. La necesidad de abastecer al ejército de alimentos y pertrechos produjo que se dinamizara el comercio y la agricultura de la zona central para poder proveerlos [...] (Santillana, p. 167).

(13) la estabilidad política y el auge económico convirtieron a Chile en una potencia en el Pacífico Sur (Zig-Zag, p. 112).

(14) Todo ha estado dispuesto para una gran catástrofe (SM, p. 203).

(15) Había fuego de cañonazos de una parte y de otra (SM, p. 203).
Felipe Rossi Schmechel
The constructions of Self and Other in the history textbooks of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in relation to the War of the Pacific

(16) Nos ha salvado el heroísmo de nuestro marinos (SM, p. 203).

(17) mujer luchadora que perdió en la guerra a su marido e hijos [...] [y] [p]articipó, junto a sus compañeros del Regimiento Atacama, en la batalla de Tacna (Zig-Zag, p. 110).

(18) el tipo de la mujer chilena (Zig-Zag, p. 110).

Bolivia

(1) [...] a partir de la década de 1840 se sucede una serie de agresiones por parte de Chile que tenían como único objetivo apoderarse de las tierras atacameñas. El impuesto de los diez centavos fue un pretexto para poner en práctica un plan largamente preparado (La Hoguera 2015, p. 127).

(2) El uti possidetis juris [...] asienta los derechos incuestionables de Bolivia sobre Atacama y sus costas del Pacífico. [...] Chile no cuestionó estos derechos hasta 1842, cuando se descubrieron inmensos yacimientos de guano en Mejillones. A partir de entonces, el gobierno chileno empezó a interesarse por la región, creando la provincia de Atacama en Chile, invirtiéndose capitales, llevando población y manteniendo una política diplomática favorable a sus intereses (Santillana, p. 104).

(3) No sólo hay una invasión de empresas chilenas y de otras naciones para explotar la riqueza del Atacama, sino también un verdadero éxodo de población chilena que pronto se convierte en mayoría [...] (ibid.).

(4) [...] Balmaceda, notable hombre de Estado chileno, y más tarde Presidente de esa república, había dicho que en la costa sudamericana del Pacífico no había sino dos centros de acción y progreso – Lima y Callao, Santiago y Valparaíso – y que era necesario que uno de esos dos centros cayera para que el otro se levantara. Por nuestra parte, agregó el brutal y cinico estadista, “nosotros necesitamos a Tarapacá como una fuente de riqueza y Arica como nuestro más avanzado punto en la costa. Por esto es que el pueblo de Chile reclama Arica y Tarapacá” (La Hoguera 2016, p. 202).

(5) Las evidentes intenciones expansionistas de Chile llevaron a Bolivia y Perú a firmar un tratado secreto en febrero de 1873, por el cual los dos países se comprometían a aliarse en caso de un ataque militar de Chile (ibid., pp. 199-200).

(6) [...] Perú trató de arreglar el conflicto a través de la diplomacia, pero todo fue inútil pues la maquinaria bélica chilena – que venía preparándose desde algún tiempo – ya estaba en marcha (La Hoguera 2015, p. 128).

(7) También se incurrió en el error de confiar excesivamente en la potencia bélica del aliado, especialmente en el mar, ya que Bolivia carecía hasta de una cañonera, y la guerra había que decidirla en las operaciones navales. El Perú no estaba mejor que
Bolivia en cuanto a preparación bélica, pese a que poseía una pequeña escuadra (ibid., p. 129).

(8) Perú llegó a este final después de haber confrontado las situaciones más dolorosas y terribles de una guerra injusta y de una ocupación de varios años en que sus hijos lucharon con heroísmo y valentía contra el invasor. Pero Perú firmó separadamente sin consultar su aliada el tratado de Ancón que se convirtió en la peor negociación para Bolivia (ibid., p. 131).

(9) [...] al ceder Perú el departamento de Tarapacá, “como consecuencia tácita comprometía la situación del Litoral boliviano situado al sur” [Quejerazu (ibid., p. 130)].

(10) El vínculo entre la región andina y la costa de Atacama se remonta a tiempos inmemoriales cuando la territorialidad indígena se conectaba de modo permanente con el océano. [...] El imperio Incaico llegó en el sudoeste de sus dominios al desierto de Atacama. El pueblo aymara tuvo siempre interacción y presencia comunal de agricultura y ganadería en espacios geográficos que conectan las alturas andinas con la costa. Esta relación fue respetada por el ordenamiento colonial, base sobre la cual se fundó Bolivia con una extensa y rica costa en la región de Atacama, ejerciendo en ese territorio soberanía hasta que en 1879 se produjo la invasión chilena que modificó su geografía y su historia (El Libro del Mar, p. 15).

(11) En 1877 un terremoto seguido de maremoto (estimado en 8,8 grados en la escala de Richter en mediciones posteriores) arrasó la costa boliviana devastando ese territorio. Por si esto fuera poco, en 1878 una terrible sequía asoló importantes sectores del territorio boliviano. Como consecuencia de estos desastres naturales, el Gobierno de Bolivia solicitó [...] el pago de 10 centavos por cada quintal de salitre exportado, a fin de generar recursos ante las catástrofes naturales que habían afectado a la región (El Libro del Mar, p. 20).

(12) [...] los gobiernos bolivianos, concentrados en las luchas internas y en desarrollar la economía del altiplano y de los valles, no tuvieron la capacidad una mayor presencia económica y poblacional en la región (Santillana, p. 104).

(13) [...] la provincia de Atacama, con la que nació Bolivia la vida independiente, había quedado totalmente abandonada por el eje central La Paz-Sucre (La Hoguera, p. 126).

(14) [...] se trataba de un ejército muy mal equipado; estaba formado por mestizos en su gran mayoría, pues la población indígena fue eximida (La Hoguera, p. 129).

(15) Bolivia habría podido rechazar victoriosamente una agresión en el seno mismo de su territorio interior, y habría defendido palmo a palmo su heredad, entre sus riscos y sus breñas. Pero ahora debía acudir a la costa desierta y distante, equipando un
ejército que carecía de servicios de movilización y hasta de adecuado armamento (La Hoguera, p. 129).

(16) A pesar de la valentía y patriotismo de los soldados, la campaña terrestre fue desastrosa, en gran parte atribuible a la ineptitud de los mandos militares (La Hoguera, p. 130).

(17) [...] la total ineptitud de Daza, que raya en la traición, hizo que las tropas bolivianas no llegaran a su destino (ibid.).

(18) Legenda: Retrato alegórico del Presidente Daza, con el Litoral cautivo y el soldado boliviano vencido. Cuadro de Elisa Rocha de Ballivián. 1889 (Santillana, p. 104).

(19) El desastre era inevitable y, sin embargo, nadie lo comprendía. Seguíase pensando que el valor del soldado bastaba para contener la agresión extranjera. Y Bolivia se lanzó a la lucha, sin ninguna probabilidad de éxito (ibid.).

(20) [...] una división chilena atacó la población. A pesar de la heroica defensa, Calama fue tomada. Los últimos combatientes se reunieron en el puente Topáter dirigidos por un notable del lugar, Eduardo Albaroa. Resistieron hasta el último aliento tratando de defender la soberanía nacional (La Hoguera, p. 128).

(21) [...] un grupo de civiles encabezado por Ladislao Cabrera resistió el ataque distinguiéndose en la defensa el ciudadano Eduardo Avaroa, que murió heroicamente. (Santillana, p. 128).

(22) Desde 1846, el gobierno boliviano acreditó misiones diplomáticas ante Santiago para definir el tema de límites, pero sin resultados (Santillana, p. 104).

(23) A más de cien años de esta guerra nuestro país todavía vive las consecuencias del enclaustramiento (La Hoguera, p. 132).

(24) Legenda: las minas de cobre en Chile, aún hoy en día siguen siendo una importante fuente de ingresos para ese país (La Hoguera, p. 132).